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

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

THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

VOL. I.

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GENERAL HISTORY

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POLYBIUS,

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BY MR. HAMPTON.

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THE

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

POLYBIUS.

BOOK THE FIRST.

CHAPTER I.

IF those who have been employed before me in relating the transactions of former times, had been altogether silent concerning the use and excellence of History, it might, perhaps, be necessary to begin this Work, with advising all mankind to apply themselves with earnestness to that kind of Study; since the knowledge of past events affords the best instructions for the regulation and good conduct of human life. But as the greater part, or rather all of them, have taken every occasion to declare, repeating it as we may say from one end of their writings to the other, that History supplies the only proper discipline, to train and exercise the minds of those who are inclined to enter into public affairs; and that the evil accidents, which are there recorded to have befallen other men, contain the wisest and the most effectual lessons, for enabling us to support our own

misfortunes with dignity and courage; there is surely little need to repeat again, what others have so often urged with eloquence and force. But indeed the subject itself, which I am engaged to treat, may well exempt me from this task; since it is of a kind so new and singular, that it cannot fail to excite the attention of every reader. For what man is there so sordid and insensible, that he would not wish to be informed, what manner, and through what kind of government, almost the whole habitable world, in less than the course of fifty-three years, was reduced beneath the Roman yoke: an event, of which there is no example in any former time? Or who on the other hand is so passionately fond of any other kind of speculation, or of any branch of science, as to think it more worthy of his care and pains, than this inquiry?

That the subject of this work deserves more than a common share of attention and regard, on account both of its novelty and greatness, will most evidently appear, if we take a view of all the ancient states that are chiefly celebrated in history, and compare them with the Roman.

The Persians were for some time possessed of a very wide dominion: but whenever they laboured to extend it beyond the bounds of Asia, the attempt was always unsuccessful, and once indeed proved almost fatal to them. The Lacedæmonians, after many struggles, obtained the sovereignty of Greece: but, within twelve years, were again divested of it. The Macedonian kingdom

was at first extended from the provinces that border on the Adriatic coast, as far as the Danube; the whole including but a small and inconsiderable part of Europe. After some time, indeed, they found means to break the Persian monarchy, and joined Asia to their empire. But though the general opinion of mankind may perhaps have taught us always to regard this people as a very flourishing and potent state, it cannot be denied, that a great part of the world was totally exempted from their sway. Afric, Sicily, and Sardinia, were never visited by their arms. And those fierce and warlike nations, who possessed the western parts of Europe, were utterly unknown and undiscovered by them. But the Romans, disdaining to confine their conquests within the limits of a few countries only, have forced almost the whole habitable world to pay submission to their laws: and have raised their empire to that vast height of power, which is so much the wonder of the present age, and which no future times can ever hope to exceed. And this is the event, which I design to explain in all its parts and circumstances in the following narration: and from thence it will be evident, what great advantages may be derived from an attentive and close perusal of political history.

The point of time, from whence I begin my work, is the hundred-fortieth Olympiad. The transactions, are these which follow. In Greece, the social war, conducted by Philip, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in conjunction

with the cities of Achaia, against the Ætolians. In Asia, the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, for the sovereignty of Cœle-syria. In Italy and Afric, that between the Carthaginians and the Romans, which is most frequently styled the War of Annibal. These events are the next in order to those with which the history of Aratus is concluded.

Now before this period, the great transactions of the world were single, distinct, and unconnected, both in place and time; while each proceeded from motives peculiar to itself, and was directed to its own proper end. But from this time history assumes an entire and perfect body. The affairs of Italy and Afric were now conjoined with those of Asia and of Greece: and all moved together towards one fixed and single point. And this it was that first determined me to choose this æra for the beginning of my work. For it was not till after [illegible]had broken the strength of Carthage in the w[illegible]st mentioned, that the Romans, imagining that by this success they had accomplished the chief and most important part of their intended enterprise, and opened to themselves the way to universal empire, now first resolved to enlarge their conquests, and spread their arms over Greece and Asia.

If mankind were already sufficiently acquainted with the condition and past fortunes of these republics, which contended thus together for the sovereignty of the world, there would perhaps be no occasion to have recourse to the former parts

of their story, in order to explain the strength and number of their forces, or the probable hopes of success, by which they severally were excited to so great and difficult an undertaking. But because the Greeks are for the most part strangers to the ancient state, power, and exploits both of the Carthaginians and the Romans, I thought it necessary to prefix this book, and that which follows, to the body of my history: to remove all doubts that might occur; and to exhibit clearly to the reader's view, the counsels, strength, resources, upon which the Romans supported those great designs, which rendered them the masters of the world both by land and sea. For from the recital which I design to make in these preliminary books, it will be seen beyond all doubt, that this vast project was neither formed, nor carried into execution, but upon reasons the most fair and solid, and which gave strong assurances of success.

The circumstances of this great event, which so justly raise the admiration of the present age, will also afford one very eminent advantage to my work, which will distinguish it from every other history. For as all the great transactions of the world were now forcibly attracted to one side, and compelled to move in one direction towards the same single end, I shall from thence be able to connect together, and dispose into one perfect body, the series of different events, and to exhibit, in one point of view, the whole variety of action. It was this, indeed, which gave me the first inclination to write the history of these times. An-

other motive was, that no one has hitherto composed a General History. For if this task had ever been before attempted, I should myself have been less solicitous to engage in such an undertaking. There are many, indeed, who have written an account of particular wars; and among them, some perhaps have added a few coincident events. But no man, as far at least as I can learn, has ever yet employed his pains, in collecting all the great transactions of the world into one regular and consistent body; remarking also the time of their commencement, the motives to which they owed their birth, and the end to which they were directed. I therefore judged it to be a task that might prove highly useful to the world, to rescue from oblivion this great and most instructive act of fortune. For in all the vast variety of disorders, struggles, changes, which the power of this deity introduces into human life, we shall find none equal to that long and desperate scene of contention, none worthy to be compared for their importance with those events which have happened in the present age. But this is what the writers of particular histories can never set before us in its full and proper light. It might with equal reason be supposed, that by singly visiting all the noted cities of the world, or from a view of each delineated on paper, we should be able to acquire a right notion of the figure of the earth, with the due order and arrangement of all its parts. But surely this must be thought a most absurd conceit. In a word, whoever is persuaded that the study

of particular histories is alone sufficient to convey a perfect view and knowledge of the whole, may very properly be compared with one, who, on surveying the divided members of a body that was once endued with life and beauty, should persuade himself that he had from thence obtained a just conception of all the comeliness and active vigour which it had received from nature. But let these broken parts be again placed in order, restored to all their first activity and life, and be once more offered to his view; he will then be ready to acknowledge, that all his former notions were as remote from truth, as the shadows of a dream are different from realities. For though some faint conception of the whole may perhaps arise from a careful examination of the part, no distinct or perfect knowledge can ever be expected from it. In the same manner it must also be confessed, that particular relations are by no means capable of yielding any clear or extensive view into general history: and that the only method, which can render this kind of study both entertaining and instructive, is that which draws together all the several events, and ranges them in their due place and order, distinguishing also their connexion and their difference.

I shall begin this book with the first expedition of the Romans out of Italy; which is the next in order to those events, with which the history of Timæus is concluded, and which happened in the hundred-twenty-ninth Olympiad. I must therefore relate, at what time, in what manner, and on

what occasion, this people, after they had firmly settled and secured their government at home, resolved to pass over into Sicily: for that was the first country, beyond the bounds of Italy, into which they sent their armies. I shall mention in the plainest and most simple manner, what it was that gave rise to this invasion: that the reader may not be forced to perplex his mind, with searching after the causes of that which was itself the genuine and immediate cause, and the very entrance to the work be from thence involved in insuperable darkness and uncertainty. And since it will be necessary to give an abstract also even of some events that passed before this period, I shall take care to choose some known and undisputed æra; and to begin from facts, which are clear, precise, and well established. For when the beginning of a history is involved in any kind of intricacy or obscurity, the parts which follow can never obtain any great degree of credit or regard. But, on the other hand, when the introduction to the subject is made intelligible and clear to all, the subsequent narration will easily gain admission and belief.

IN the year, then, which was the nineteenth after the engagement near Ægospotamus, and the sixteenth before the battle of Leuctra; the year, when the Lacedæmonians confirmed the treaty which Antalcidas had made with the Persians;

and the elder Dionysius, having some time before defeated the Greeks of Italy near the river Helleporus, laid siege to Rhegium; in this same year, the Gauls took Rome by storm, and remained masters of all the city, the capitol alone excepted. But the Romans, having yielded to such conditions as the conquerors thought proper to impose, were once more restored, beyond all hope, to the possession of their country. From this time, being, as it were, again renewed in strength and vigour, they made war upon the states that were contiguous to their own. And having, partly by their bravery, and partly with the aid of fortune, reduced all the Latins to their yoke, they next attacked the Tyrrhenians; after these the Gauls; and then the Samnites; whose country lay contiguous to the territory of the Latins, and bounded it towards the north and east. Some time afterwards the people of Tarentum, having treated an embassy from Rome with great indignity and insult, and being apprehensive that the Romans were preparing vengeance for the affront, invited Pyrrhus into Italy. This happened the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, and received that signal overthrow at Delphi, which drove them with the remains of their army into Asia. But the Romans, who had already reduced the Tyrrhenians and the Samnites to their yoke, and had returned with conquest from many engagements also with the Gauls, were now beginning to enlarge their views; and resolved to seize upon the rest of Italy, as if the whole country had belonged to them by a

natural and proper right. Their former combats had completely trained and exercised them in the use of arms. They attacked the Tarentines with vigour; and persisted in the war with so much firmness, that they at last drove Pyrrhus out of Italy; and then turned their arms against the cities, which had been confederated with that prince against them. And having, by a course of wonderful success, forced all the inhabitants of Italy, except the Gauls, to receive their laws, they were now at leisure to march against a body of Roman soldiers, who had possessed themselves of Rhegium.

The two cities Messana and Rhegium, both situated upon the same straits, had both experienced the same misfortune. Not long before this time, a body of Campanian mercenaries, who had served in the armies of Agathocles, invited by the beauty and rich condition of Messana, watched their time for gaining possession of the place by treachery. They soon found means to be received as friends within the city; where they killed one part of the inhabitants, and drove the rest without the walls. And having taken to themselves the wives and children of those unhappy men, as they fell into the hands of every one at the very time of the disorder, they made afterwards a division of their lands and riches: and thus, with little difficulty, gained full possession of a very splendid city and fertile territory. This success soon excited others to follow the example. The inhabitants of Rhegium, alarmed by the entrance

of Pyrrhus into Italy, and being also under no small apprehensions of some danger from the Carthaginians, who were at that time the sole masters of the sea, implored the assistance of the Romans; who sent them a garrison of four thousand men under the command of Decius Campanus. These for some time remained firm in their duty, and guarded the liberties of the city; but being at last seduced by the commodious situation of the place, and by the wealth and flourishing condition of the citizens, they resolved to imitate the example which the Campanians had so lately set before them: and, being assisted also by them in the execution of their design, they drove out or killed the inhabitants, and obtained entire possession of the city.

This horrid act of treachery raised great indignation in the Romans: but the wars in which they were then involved restrained their vengeance. As soon as these were ended, they marched and laid siege to Rhegium. The place soon fell into their hands; but the greatest part of the garrison was destroyed in the assault: for they fought like men who well foresaw the consequences of their crime. About three hundred only that were taken alive were sent to Rome; and, being conducted by the prætors into the forum, were first scourged, and then beheaded. By this just severity, the Romans hoped that they should again recover their character of good faith among their allies. They restored the city also, with all the lands, to the former inhabitants.

The Mamertines of Messana, for this was the name which the Campanian mercenaries had assumed, as long as they were supported by the Romans who had possessed themselves of Rhegium, not only remained in quiet and secure enjoyment of their own city and proper territory, but made frequent incursions also into the adjacent countries; creating no small terror and disturbance, both to the Carthaginians and the Syracusans; and exacting contributions from many parts of Sicily. But no sooner had the siege of Rhegium deprived them of the assistance of these allies, than they were themselves so vigorously pressed by the Syracusan forces, that they were constrained to abandon all the open country, and to keep close behind their walls. The occasion was this that follows:

A little before this time, when some dissension had been raised between the citizens of Syracuse and the army, the troops, while they lay encamped in the neighbourhood of Mergana, elected two magistrates out of their own body; Artemidorus, and Hiero who was afterwards king. Hiero was then extremely young; but he seemed to have been singularly formed by nature to sustain the regal dignity. As soon as he was invested with this new authority, he found some means, by the assistance of his friends, to gain admission into the city. And having there drawn all the chiefs of the opposite faction into his power, he showed in his whole deportment such proofs of clemency and true greatness, that the people, though they

were by no means satisfied with the liberty which the army had assumed, with one voice declared him prætor. But it was easy to discern from his first behaviour in this office, that he had some more exalted post in view. For having remarked, that as often as the forces, with the magistrates at their head, were obliged to take the field, some new commotions and disorders were always raised among the citizens, and observing also, that a certain Syracusan, named Leptines, was the first in favour with the people, and far superior in his influence and credit to all the rest of the inhabitants, he resolved to contract a close alliance with him, and to marry his daughter; being persuaded, that by the help of his authority, he should be able to keep all things quiet and secure at home, whenever himself should be engaged in the command of the army abroad. Some time afterwards, observing that the mercenaries, who had been long employed in the Syracusan armies, were become untractable and mutinous, he ordered all the forces to take the field, and to march against the barbarians of Messana. Being encamped within sight of the enemy near Centuripe, he drew up his army in order of battle along the side of the Cyamosorus. But having stationed the Syracusan troops, both infantry and cavalry, at a distance from the rest, as if he had intended an attack from a different quarter, he opposed the mercenaries only to the enemy, by whom they were entirely defeated and destroyed. But as soon as the slaughter was begun, himself with all the forces of the city re-

turned back again to Syracuse. Having thus happily accomplished his design, and cleared the army of its seditious members, and having filled their place with a sufficient number of new mercenaries levied by himself, from that time he continued to discharge the duties of his post, without any tumult or disorder. And when the Mamertines, elated by their past success, had spread themselves over all the country without any fear or caution, he led against them the forces of the city, which were now completely armed and disciplined, and came to an engagement with them upon the banks of the river Longanus, in the plain of Mylæ. And having obtained an entire victory, in which their generals also were taken prisoners, he gave an effectual check to the insolence of those barbarians, and on his return to Syracuse was saluted king by the army.

The Mamertines, who had been before deprived of the assistance which they had been accustomed to receive from Rhegium, were now so broken and disheartened by this last defeat, that they considered their affairs as almost desperate. In this state, some among them had recourse to the Carthaginians, and delivered the citadel into their hands: while the rest sent ambassadors to Rome, to make an offer of their city, and to implore the protection of the Romans, for a people sprung, as they pretended, from one common stock with themselves. The Romans were for some time under great perplexity and doubt. To comply with this demand, appeared to be in a high degree

improper and absurd. They had lately punished with the last severity a body of their own citizens, for having betrayed the public faith in seizing Rhegium: and if now they should support the Mamertines, who not only had surprised Messana by the very same kind of perfidy, but had assisted in taking Rhegium also, it would be difficult to find any fair apology for such a conduct. On the other hand, as the Carthaginians, besides the dominions which they possessed in Afric, were masters also of many parts of Spain, and of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas, it was greatly to be feared, that, if Sicily should now fall into their hands, they would soon become too formidable neighbours, since they would then lie close to every part of Italy, and encircle them on every side. It was easy also to discern, that they must very soon be able to reduce this island, if the Mamertines were not now supported. For if once they were permitted to possess Messana, they would find it no hard task to conquer Syracuse, since they were already masters of almost all the other parts of Sicily. The Romans saw the danger, and considered it as a matter of the last necessity, to obviate and prevent these consequences; and not suffer Messana to fall into the hands of those who might from thence be able to lay as it were a bridge for passing into Italy. Yet after many long debates upon the subject, the senate even at last refused to pass any decree concerning it: because the manifest absurdity on one side seemed still to draw with equal

weight against the advantage on the other. But the people, who had been much exhausted by their former wars, and wished for some occasion to repair their shattered fortunes, being incited partly by the great utility which would confessedly accrue to the republic from the war, and animated also by the show of those advantages with which the prætors in their speeches flattered every private man, resolved that the desired assistance should be sent, and made a law for that purpose, commanding Appius Claudius, one of the consuls, to pass over to Messana. The Mamertines, partly by the means of fraud, and partly by open force, drove out the Carthaginian commander from the citadel, and delivered the city to the Romans.

The Carthaginians, when they had first crucified their general, for his cowardice and ill conduct in relinquishing the citadel, made haste to draw together all their forces, to retake Messana. And having stationed their fleet near Pelorus, and posted their land army on the side of Senæ, they began to press the siege with vigour. At the same time Hiero, imagining that this occasion might be favourable for driving the Mamertines entirely out of Sicily, entered into treaty with the Carthaginians: and beginning his march from Syracuse, he came and invested the city on the other side, having encamped near the mountain called Chalcidicus.

The consul Appius passed the Straits in an adventurous manner by night, and was received into

Messana. But finding that the place was closely pressed on every side, and reflecting with himself that the affair was full of hazard, and that little reputation was likely to be gained from a war in which the enemy were so much superior both by land and sea, he sent offers of accommodation to both camps; desiring only that the Mamertines might remain unmolested. But as this proposal was rejected, he was forced to venture on a battle; and resolved to make his first attack upon the Syracusans. He accordingly drew his forces out of the city, and offered battle to Hiero, who readily accepted it. The fight was long and obstinate; but at last the Romans obtained the victory, and drove back the enemy to their camp: and having spoiled the dead, they returned again to Messana.

But Hiero, beginning now to apprehend some worse event, as soon as night came on, returned back again with his army in all haste to Syracuse. When Appius, on the following day, was informed of this retreat, he immediately conceived new hopes, and resolved to attack the Carthaginians without delay. He gave orders, therefore, to the troops to take their repast betimes; and marching out of the city at break of day, he charged the enemy, killed great numbers of them, and forced the rest to fly to the neighbouring cities. After these signal victories, the siege being raised, and no forces appearing in the field, the Romans wasted at their leisure the country of the Syracusans and their allies; and at last advanced to Syracuse itself, in order to besiege it.

Such were the causes, and such the time and manner, of the first expedition of the Romans out of Italy; and here I fix the beginning of my work: having first run through the times which just before preceded it, in order more clearly to explain the genuine and real grounds of this transaction. For that the reader might be able to obtain a just and perfect knowledge of the causes of the present power and greatness of the Romans, it was proper previously to acquaint him both with the time and manner in which this people first recovered into better hopes, after they had beheld their country lost; and by what means afterwards, when they had vanquished all the neighbouring states, they found occasion to extend their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy. Nor let it be thought in any manner strange, if, in the subsequent parts of this history, when I am speaking of the states that are chiefly celebrated in the world, I should look back to ages that are more remote. For this I shall do, merely for the sake of beginning from such facts as will best enable us to discern, from what causes, and in what time and manner, they severally grew to that condition, in which they are seen to flourish in the present times. But I now must hasten to the task that is before me; mentioning first, in few words, the events which are designed to be the subject of these preliminary books.

The first, then, is the war in Sicily between the Carthaginians and the Romans; and after it the African war. Next will follow a recital of the actions of Amilcar and of Asdrubal in Spain:

with the invasion also of Illyria by the Romans, who then for the first time sent their armies into those parts of Europe. After these transactions come the battles, which the Romans were forced to sustain in Italy against the Gauls: about which time it was, that the war of Cleomenes broke out in Greece; with an account of which I shall conclude the second book, and close the introduction to my history.

To enter into a minute detail of all the parts and circumstances of these wars, would be a labour quite unnecessary to myself, and attended with no great advantage to the reader. For it is not my design to write the history, but rather to give a general and summary account of these transactions, such as may serve for an introduction to my history: and by making a short recital of the chief events, in the order in which they were transacted, and carrying on the narration in one regular and connected series to the time from whence my own work commences, to prepare the reader for the accounts that follow, and make the whole both easy and intelligible. I design, however, to be somewhat more particular and copious in describing the war in Sicily between the Carthaginians and the Romans. For it is not easy to find in history any one more considerable, either with respect to the time of its duration, the diligence and forces by which it was sustained, the constant and uninterrupted course of important actions that happened in it, or the great and sudden turns of fortune that attended it. And because the public manners and

civil institutions both of Rome and Carthage were as yet pure and unimpaired; as their wealth was moderate; their strength nearly equal; it will be more easy to form a perfect judgement from this war, of the powers peculiar to the constitution of each republic, than from those that followed.

Another motive, which inclined me not less strongly to give a more minute description of the Sicilian war, was because Fabius and Philinus, who are esteemed the most skilful writers on this subject, have by no means shown a due exactness or fidelity in their relations. I cannot, indeed, persuade myself that they would knowingly deviate from the truth. The characters of the men, and the whole tenour of their lives, exclude all such suspicion. But as it happens in the case of lovers, a certain secret affection and partiality towards their friends and countrymen seem to have fixed insensibly some prejudices upon them. To these it must be imputed, that Philinus in every part of his history so highly praises the virtue, courage, and wisdom of the Carthaginians; allowing none of all these qualities to the Romans: while Fabius on the other hand takes all occasions to depreciate the Carthaginians, and extol the Romans. Now such a disposition, when it is shown in other circumstances, is truly commendable. It is, in part, the character of a good man to love his country and his friends, and to hate the enemies of both. But a historian must divest himself of these affections; and be ready, on many occasions, to speak largely in the praises even of an enemy, when his conduct

deserves applause; nor scruple to condemn his most esteemed and dearest friends, as often as their actions call for censure.

Truth is the eye of history. For as an animal, when deprived of sight, becomes incapable of performing its natural and proper functions, so if we take away truth from history, what remains will be nothing but a useless tale.

Now, if we pay a proper regard to truth, we shall find it necessary not only to condemn our friends on some occasions, and commend our enemies; but also to commend and condemn the same persons, as different circumstances may require. For as it is not to be imagined, that those who are engaged in great affairs should always be pursuing false or mistaken measures; so neither is it probable that their conduct can, at all times, be exempt from error. A historian, therefore, in all that he relates, should take care to be directed in his judgement by the genuine and real circumstances of every action, without regarding the actors of it. The following examples may serve to show the truth of these remarks.

Philinus, in the beginning of his second book, gives this account of the affairs of Sicily: "That Messana was invested by the Carthaginians and Syracusans: that the Romans had no sooner passed the Straits, and gained admission into the city, than they sallied out and attacked the Syracusans, but were repulsed with considerable loss: that they next made a like attempt upon the Carthaginians; in which engagement they not only were defeated,

but lost also many of their men, who fell alive into the hands of the enemy." He then adds; "that immediately after this action, Hiero was so struck with terror, that he not only set fire to his camp, and fled away by night to Syracuse, but abandoned all the fortresses in the district of Messana: that the Carthaginians in the same manner deserted their intrenchments, and retired to their cities, not daring to oppose the Romans in the field: that the generals, observing that their troops were quite disheartened, were afraid to venture on a second battle: that the Romans pursued closely after them in their retreat; and having plundered and destroyed the country, advanced even to Syracuse, in order to besiege it."

A relation so absurd must needs confute itself. The armies which, as this historian writes, were laying siege to Messana, and which had gained the victory in two engagements, on a sudden become dispirited and heartless, abandon all the open country, and are themselves besieged: while the Romans, besieged and twice defeated, are yet described as pursuing the flying enemy, in possession of the open country, and at last laying siege to Syracuse. Facts so opposite can never be reconciled together. It is evident, that either the first, or the subsequent part of this narration must be false. But the latter is undoubtedly true: for the Romans actually laid siege to Syracuse, as this writer himself admits; and afterwards to Echetla, a city standing on the frontier between the Carthaginian and the Syracusan territories. It follows, therefore,

that the facts are false which are first affirmed: and that the Romans were victorious in the two engagements, in which they are represented by this historian to have been defeated. Such then is the character of Philinus. For the same mistakes are to be found in almost every part of his performance. Nor is the history of Fabius in this respect more accurate; as I shall hereafter take occasion to demonstrate. But I now return from this digression; and shall endeavour, by a regular though short deduction of the chief events, to set before the reader a clear and just description of the war.

CHAP. II.

AS soon as the news of these victories which had been gained by Appius, were received at Rome, the Romans chose for consuls M. Otacilius and M. Valerius, and sent them both into Sicily, with all the forces. The armies of this republic, besides the troops which are raised among the allies, are composed of four legions. These are levied every year: and each of them consists of four thousand foot, and three hundred horse. At their first arrival, many cities, both of the Carthaginians and the Syracusans, immediately submitted to them. When Hiero saw that a general dread and consternation had spread through all the island, and

considered likewise the numbers and the strength of the legionary forces, he began to think, that the issue of the war would necessarily be determined by these circumstances in favour of the Romans: he sent ambassadors, therefore, to the consuls, with proposals for a treaty. The offer was embraced with pleasure by the Romans: chiefly for the sake of securing provisions to their army. For as the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, it was greatly to be feared that their supplies would be all intercepted. And, indeed, the forces of the former year had been reduced to great extremity, through the want of necessaries. Perceiving, therefore, that the friendship of this prince might prove highly serviceable to them in this respect, they accepted it with joy; and agreed to a treaty with him upon these conditions: "That he should pay a hundred talents of silver, and restore, without ransom, all the Roman prisoners." Thus the alliance was concluded; and from this time Hiero, sheltered under the protection of the Romans, whom he supplied from time to time as their necessities required, possessed his kingdom in security; pursuing always the right paths of glory, and employing all his pains to gain the applause and favour of his subjects. And, indeed, so wise and prudent was his conduct, both in the general tenour of his policy, and in every single act of government, that he reaped from it the most lasting fruits; and enjoyed a fame to which few princes have been ever able to aspire.

As soon as the treaty was confirmed at Rome in

an assembly of the people, it was resolved, for the time to come, to send two legions only into Sicily. For as by this alliance the burthen of the war was become much lighter to them than before, so they considered likewise, that a smaller army might more easily be supplied with necessaries. But when the Carthaginians saw that Hiero was become their enemy, and that the Romans were preparing to pursue the war with all imaginable vigour, they soon were sensible, that it neither would be possible for them to oppose the enemy in the field, nor even to retain what they then possessed in Sicily, without a more considerable force. They therefore made great levies in Liguria, and among the Gauls, and greater still in Spain; and embarked them all for Sicily. And because Agrigentum was the strongest of all the places in the island that were subject to their power, and the most commodious also for the occasions of the war, they resolved to make that city their place of arms, and removed into it their stores and all the forces.

The consuls, who had made the alliance with the king of Syracuse, were now returned to Rome; and L. Postumius and Q. Mamilius, who succeeded them in office and command, arrived in Sicily with the legions. As soon as they had seen the designs and preparations of the enemy, they resolved to act more vigorously than before. Neglecting therefore all the other business of the war, they marched directly to Agrigentum with all their forces; and encamping at the distance of

eight stadia from the city, shut up the Carthaginians within their walls. It was now the time of harvest: and as the siege was likely to be of long continuance, the Roman soldiers were eagerly employed in getting in the corn, and had spread themselves over all the country, without care or caution. The Carthaginians seeing this disorder, sallied out upon the foragers, and routed them with little difficulty. They then ran towards the camp to plunder it, and with great fury attacked the troops that were left to guard the intrenchments. But the excellence of the Roman discipline, upon this occasion, as on many others, proved the cause of their safety. For the soldiers, remembering that those who yielded their place in battle, or fled basely from their post, were always punished with death, not only sustained the charge against an enemy that far exceeded them in numbers, but also pressed their adversaries with so much force and vigour, that though they lost many of their men, they destroyed a great number of the Carthaginians: and having at last surrounded them on every side, when they were just now ready to tear away the palisade of the intrenchments, they drove them back with considerable loss, and pursued them even to the city. After this action, the Carthaginians were less frequent in their sallies; and the Romans used more precaution, when they went abroad to forage.

As the enemy never appeared without the walls, unless to engage in some slight skirmishes, the consuls having divided their army into two bodies,

posted one of them near the temple of Æsculapius, and the other on the side which looked towards Heraclea, and fortified with works on both sides of the city, the space that lay between the camps. They drew a line round the city, to obstruct the sallies of the besieged; and another on the side towards the country, to repel all approaches from that quarter, and to intercept all succours. The space between the lines and the camps was secured by advanced bodies of troops, and by works thrown up at proper distances, as the nature of the ground required. The allies had brought together to Erbessus provisions and every kind of stores. And as this city stood at no great distance from the Roman camps, their convoys went and returned continually, and supplied them with all things in great abundance.

In this condition things remained for near five months: in which time, many slight engagements happened, but no decisive action. But the besieged were now greatly pressed by famine: for the numbers that were within the walls were not fewer than fifty thousand men. Annibal, therefore, who commanded in the city, finding that all things tended to the last extremity, dispatched messenger after messenger to Carthage, to solicit some relief. The Carthaginians embarked some troops and elephants, and sent them into Sicily, to Hanno their other general. Hanno ordered all these forces to be drawn together to Heraclea: and having made himself master of Erbessus by

some secret practices among the citizens, he cut off all supplies from the Roman camp, and constrained them in their turn to feel the miseries of the besieged. Indeed, so great was the extremity to which they were reduced, that they often were inclined to raise the siege: which at last they must have been compelled to do, if Hiero had not practised every method of address and diligence, to furnish them from time to time, in moderate quantity, with such supplies as were chiefly wanted.

But when Hanno saw, that the Roman army was disheartened and distressed by sickness as well as famine, while on the other hand his own troops were fresh and fit for action; taking with him the elephants, which were about fifty in number, and the rest also of his forces, he marched in haste from Heraclea, having sent away the Numidian horse before, with orders that they should approach the Roman camp, provoke their cavalry to action, and immediately retire back again towards the main army. These troops accordingly advanced: and no sooner had they reached the nearest camp, than the Roman cavalry came pouring out against them, and began the attack with fury. But the Numidians observed their orders, and maintained a flying fight, till they were joined by Hanno with the other forces: and then suddenly facing round, they fell with vigour upon the enemy, killed great numbers of them, and pursued the rest even close to their intrench-

ments. After this action Hanno fixed his camp upon a hill called Torus, at the distance of ten stadia from the Romans.

In this situation they both remained during two whole months. Many slight engagements happened every day between them; but no action, that was general or decisive. But as Annibal now made continual signals by fires from the city, and sent messengers from day to day to Hanno, to acquaint him, that the multitude were no longer able to support the miseries of the famine, and that great numbers had deserted to the enemy, this general resolved at last to venture on a battle. The Romans on their part also, for the reasons which have been already mentioned, showed an equal eagerness to engage. They drew out their forces on either side, and ranged them in order upon the ground that lay between the camps. The fight was long and obstinate: but after some time, the Carthaginian mercenaries who composed the first line gave ground, and falling back upon the elephants and the ranks that were behind them, threw the whole army into such disorder, that a general rout ensued. The greatest part of the troops were destroyed in the place: a small number only escaped to Heraclea. The baggage, and almost all the elephants were taken. When night came on, the Romans, partly from the joy which their victory inspired, and partly through the fatigue which they had suffered in the action, neglected to guard their camp with the usual care. Annibal, whose affairs were desperate, considered

this as the very moment of his safety. About midnight, therefore, he began his march out of the city with all the foreign troops, filled up the lines with sacks of matting that were stuffed with chaff, and passed undiscovered by the enemy. In the morning, the Romans perceiving what had happened, gave some little disturbance to the rear; but soon returned, and marched directly to the gates of Agrigentum: and finding no resistance, they entered the city and plundered it, and brought away many prisoners, with rich spoil of every kind.

The news of this success filled the Roman senate with joy, and inspired them with greater hopes than those which they had at first conceived. Instead of being satisfied with having relieved the Mamertines, and enriched themselves by the war, they now began to think, that it would be no hard task to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of Sicily, and by the acquisition of that island, to add no small increase to the strength of their republic. To this point, therefore, they directed all their views. And, indeed, on the part of the land forces, every thing seemed to promise a fair accomplishment of their designs. The two new consuls, L. Valerius and T. Octacilius, maintained their ground in Sicily, and carried on the war with equal prudence and success. But, on the other hand, as long as the Carthaginians should be suffered to remain sole masters of the sea, the event must still be doubtful. For though after the time when Agrigentum had first fallen into their

bands, many of the inland cities, in despair of being able to resist the Roman legions, had embraced their party, yet a greater number of those that stood along the coast revolted from them, through terror of the Carthaginian fleets. Thus the success on one side was still balanced by some equal loss. It was considered, likewise, that the maritime parts of Italy were often pillaged and insulted by the enemy, while the coasts of Africa remained secure and unmolested. From all these reasons, they at last resolved, that they would oppose the Carthaginians upon the sea.

Among the motives which induced me to enter into a more minute description of the war in Sicily, this was not the least: that I might take occasion to explain the time and manner in which the Romans first equipped a naval armament, together with the causes that gave birth to that attempt.

Their design then was, to bring the war to a speedy and effectual conclusion. With this view, they resolved to build a hundred quinqueremes, and twenty triremes. But one great difficulty occurred. Their builders were entirely unacquainted with the manner of constructing quinqueremes; the use of which was then unknown in Italy. But in this design, we may observe a most conspicuous proof of that bold and daring spirit which is peculiar to the Romans: who, though destitute of all the means that such an enterprise required, and before they had even gained the least degree of knowledge or experience in maritime affairs,

could at once conceive, and carry into execution, so vast a project, and make the first trial of their forces against the Carthaginians, who had received from their ancestors the undisputed sovereignty of the sea. The following fact may serve to confirm the truth of this reflection. When this people first resolved to send their forces over to Messana, they had neither any decked vessels, or ship of transport, nor even a single shallop. But having borrowed among the Tarentines, Eleates, Locrians, and Neapolitans, some boats of fifty oars, and a few triremes, they boldly embarked the legions in those vessels.

The Carthaginians bore down upon them in their passage: when one of their quinqueremes, advancing to the fight with too great eagerness, struck upon the sands, and was taken by the Romans. This vessel was now made use of as the model of their fleet: and indeed without some such accident, their want of skill must soon have forced them to abandon the design.

While the workmen were busy in building and fitting the ships, others were employed to draw together a body of sailors, and instruct them in the exercise of the oar. This was done in the following manner. They placed benches along the shore, upon which the rowers were ranged in the same order as at sea, with a proper officer among them to give the command. In this situation, they accustomed themselves to perform all the necessary motions of the body: to fall back together, and again to bend forwards; to contract and

extend their arms; to begin, or leave off, according to the signals. After this preparation, the vessels being now completely finished, they sailed out to sea, and, when they had spent some little time in perfecting their exercise, advanced along the coast of Italy, agreeable to the orders which they had before received.

For Cn. Cornelius, who commanded the naval forces, had sailed a few days before with seventeen ships towards Messana, to provide whatever might be wanted for the fleet; and had left directions with the other captains that they should follow him as soon as they were ready. But while he lay at Messana, having received some intelligence which gave him hopes of taking the town of Lipara by surprise, he too easily engaged in the design, and steered his course towards the place, with the ships just mentioned. But on the news of this attempt, Annibal, who then was stationed at Panormus, immediately sent away the senator, Boodes, with twenty ships. Boodes, sailing to the place by night, blocked up the Romans in the port. As soon as day appeared the sailors all fled from their ships, and escaped to land; and Cornelius, being struck with terror, and perceiving no means of safety, surrendered himself to the enemy, who immediately returned back again to Annibal, carrying with them the Roman consul, and all his squadron. Not many days after this exploit, while the misfortune of the Romans was still fresh and recent, an accident of the same kind proved almost fatal to Annibal himself; for having received infor-

mation that the whole Roman fleet had steered their course along the coast of Italy, and were now at no great distance, he presently advanced with fifty vessels, designing to take a view of their numbers, and of the order in which they sailed. But he had scarcely doubled the promontory of Italy when he found himself at once in the very midst of the enemy, who were all disposed in perfect order, and ready to engage. A great part of his ships were taken: but himself escaped with the rest, though not without the greatest difficulty. The Romans then held on their course to Sicily; and being there informed of what had happened to Cornelius, they sent messengers to Duilius, who commanded the land forces in the island, and waited his arrival. At the same time, having received intelligence that the Carthaginians were at no great distance, they began to make the necessary preparations for an engagement. But, because their ships were built with little skill, and were both slow and heavy in their motions, it was resolved to balance these defects by the use of certain machines, which some person in the fleet had invented for the occasion, and which were afterwards called by the Romans, *corvi*. The description of them is as follows:

They erected on the prow of every vessel a round pillar of wood, of about twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth in diameter, with a pully at the top. To this pillar was fitted a kind of stage, eighteen feet in length and four feet broad, which was made ladder-wise, of strong timbers laid

across, and cramped together with iron: the pillar being received into an oblong square, which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six feet within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways was a parapet, which reached just above the knee. At the farthest end of this stage or ladder, was a bar of iron, whose shape was somewhat like a pestle; but it was sharpened at the bottom, or lower point; and on the top of it was a ring. The whole appearance of this machine very much resembled those that are used in grinding corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, by which, with the help of the pully that was at the top of the pillar, they hoisted up the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near, let them fall upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes on their sides, as occasion best served. As the machine fell, it struck into the decks of the enemy, and held them fast. In this situation, if the two vessels happened to lay side by side, the Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at once. But in case that they were joined only by the prow, they then entered two and two along the machine; the two foremost extending their bucklers right before them to ward off the strokes that were aimed against them in front; while those that followed rested the boss of their bucklers upon the top of the parapet on either side, and thus covered both their flanks. Having, in this manner, prepared their vessels for the combat, they now only waited for the time to engage.

As soon as Duilius heard of the misfortune that

had happened to the other consul, he left the care of the army to the tribunes, and hastened to the fleet; and having received information that the enemy were employed in ravaging the plain of Mylæ, he presently steered his course that way. The Carthaginians beheld their approach with joy; and immediately drew out their fleet, which consisted of a hundred and thirty ships: despising the inexperience of the Romans, and flattering themselves with such assurance of success, that they even disdained to form their squadron into any kind of order, and, turning their prows towards the enemy, bore down instantly upon them, as to a certain spoil. The commander of the fleet was the same Annibal who made his retreat by night from Agrigentum. He sailed in a vessel of seven banks of oars, which had formerly belonged to Pyrrhus. As they approached more nearly to the Roman fleet, the sight of those strange machines, erected on the prow of every ship, occasioned some little hesitation and surprise. After some time, however, as their contempt of the enemy again took place, they advanced with the same ardour as before. But when their vessels, as soon as they were joined in action, were grappled fast by these new instruments of war, and when the Romans, instantly advancing along the machines towards them, maintained the fight upon their very decks, one part of the Carthaginians were immediately destroyed, and the rest threw down their arms, being struck with terror by this new kind of combat, which seemed so nearly to resemble an engagement upon

land. The ships that had advanced the foremost of the fight, being thirty in number, were taken with their men. Among these was the general's ship. But Annibal himself found means to get on board a boat, and escaped, though not without the greatest hazard.

The rest of the squadron were now advancing to the fight, but having observed the fate of their companions, they at first turned aside, in order to elude the stroke of the machines. But as their ships were light, and easy in their motions, they soon resumed their confidence, and began to fall upon the Roman vessels, some in stern, and some upon their sides; being persuaded, that, with this precaution, they should be secure from danger. But when they saw, with great astonishment, that, on which side soever they advanced, the *corvi* still hung over them, they were at last content to seek their safety in flight, with the loss of fifty ships.

This great and unexpected success upon the sea encouraged the Romans to pursue the war with double ardour. They land their forces upon the island, near Ægesta; raise the siege of that city, when it was reduced to the last extremity, and take Macella by storm.

About the time when this victory was gained by sea, Amilcar, who commanded the land forces of the Carthaginians, and was encamped near Panormus, having heard that some disputes had happened between the Romans and their allies concerning the post of honour in the field, and that the

allies were preparing to encamp a part between Thermæ and Paropus, fell suddenly upon them with all his forces, when they had just raised their camp, and killed near four thousand men.

About the same time Annibal returned back to Carthage, with the ships that had escaped in the late engagement. Not long afterwards he sailed from thence to Sardinia with the fleet; taking with him also some officers of the chiefest note. But being there surprised one day by the Romans, who, from the time when they first appeared upon the sea, had resolved to attempt the conquest of this island, and being blocked up by them in a certain harbour, so that many of his vessels fell into their hands, he was seized and crucified by the Carthaginians who got safe to land.

The succeeding summer produced in Sicily nothing memorable on the part of the Romans. But the consuls of the following year, A. Atilius and C. Sulpicius, having led the army to Panormus, where the Carthaginians then lay in winter quarters, drew up their forces in order of battle before the town. But when the enemy kept close behind their walls, they directed their routs back again to Hippana, and took it in the first assault. Mytistratum was also taken: but not without much labour, and a siege of long continuance; for the natural situation of the place had rendered it very strong. They then marched to Camarina, which not long before had revolted from them; and having advanced their works close against the city, and with their engines battered down the walls, they

soon forced it to surrender. After this success, the town of Enna, with many other little places that belonged to the Carthaginians, submitted to the Romans, who then resolved to form the siege of Lipara.

In the following year, Atilius, the Roman consul, who then lay at anchor in the port of Tyndaris, having perceived the Carthaginian fleet passing very near him, in a careless manner and without any order, made haste immediately to pursue them with ten ships, and gave orders to the rest to follow as soon as they were ready; but when the Carthaginians saw that one part of the enemy were already under sail, while others had scarcely yet got on board, and that the foremost ships had advanced far before the rest, they suddenly turned upon them, and surrounding them on every side, sunk the other vessels, and had almost taken that in which the consul sailed; but, because his ship was lighter than the rest, and well supplied with a body of the most skilful rowers, by the help of those advantages he escaped the danger. But in a short time afterwards the rest of the Roman squadron advanced in order; and, having all turned their prows in one line against the enemy, they engaged them with such vigour and success, that they took ten of their ships with all the men, destroyed eight more, and forced the others to retreat in haste towards the Liparean islands.

As the advantages in this engagement had seemed to be on both sides equal, they both resumed their naval preparations with greater vigour than before;

and resolved to employ their whole attention to obtain the sovereignty of the sea. During this time, the armies upon land performed no exploit that deserves to be related, but wasted the whole campaign in slight and inconsiderable actions, of little moment or importance.

In the following summer the Romans, having employed, as we have said, their utmost diligence to complete their naval preparations, sailed out to sea, with a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships, and cast anchor at Messana. From thence, leaving Sicily on the right, and doubling the promontory Pachynus, they steered their course towards Ecnomus, where their army at that time lay. The Carthaginians, having also drawn together a fleet, which consisted of three hundred and fifty ships of war, sailed first to Lilybæum, and from thence to Heraclea of Minos. The design of the Romans was, to divert the war from Sicily to Afric, and constrain the Carthaginians to employ their strength in the defence of their own proper country. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, being sensible that their coasts were open, and that the people of the country must become an easy prey, if the enemy should once gain the land, resolved to intercept them in the attempt, and force them to a battle.

When such were the sentiments on either side, it was easy to discern, that an engagement soon must follow. The Romans, therefore, made such a disposition of their forces, that they were equally prepared either to proceed in their intended descent upon the coasts of Afric, or to accept a battle,

in case that it should now be offered by the Carthaginians. They selected from the land army all their choicest troops; and having divided the fleet into four separate bodies, assigned to each of them a double name. The first division was called the first legion, and the first squadron; and so the rest. The last only, being not distinguished by any such particular denomination, was styled, in general, the triarii: the name which is appropriated to the last division in the armies upon land. The whole fleet consisted of a hundred and forty thousand men: each vessel containing one hundred and twenty soldiers, and three hundred seamen. On the other hand, the forces of the Carthaginians, whose preparations were made wholly for the sea, amounted to more than a hundred and fifty thousand; if we compute them from the number of their ships. How impossible is it, I do not say to behold so vast an armament, but even to hear a bare description of it, without being fixed in admiration, both of the importance of the contest, and of the power and strength of the two republics that were thus engaged.

The Romans, having considered that the course which they were obliged to steer lay through the open sea, and that the chief advantage of the enemy consisted in the lightness and celerity of their ships, resolved to make such a disposition as might render their whole fleet firm, compact, and very difficult to be broken. For this purpose, two vessels carrying six banks of oars, being those in which the consuls sailed, were first placed side by side in front.

Each of these was followed by a line of vessels; the first squadron making one line; and the second the other: the ships of either line extending themselves to a greater distance still as they advanced, and gradually widening the area of the figure. Their prows were all turned outwards. The first and second squadrons being thus disposed in form of a wedge, they drew up the third division in a line behind: so that the whole resembled the figure of a triangle; the third squadron constituting the base. These last were followed by the transports, which they held in tow. Last of all came the triarii, or fourth division, ranged likewise in a line of single ships, but so extended, as to cover both the flanks of the line before them. This disposition resembled, as I said, the figure of a triangle, the upper part of which was hollow, and the base solid; the whole being strong, and proper for action, and such as could not easily be broken by the enemy.

The Carthaginian generals, having animated their men as the occasion required, and represented to them in few words, that if they should gain the victory in the present combat, the business of the war would still be confined to Sicily as before, but that in case they were defeated, they must then be forced to defend their country, families, and possessions against the Romans, ordered all immediately to get on board. The forces being fully sensible of the truth of what was spoken to them, received the order with alacrity, and came sailing from the harbour full of hope and eager resolution.

The generals, having remarked the disposition of the enemy, ranged three parts of all their fleet in a line of single ships, extending the right wing far out to sea, with design to surround the Romans, and turning all their prows towards them. The remaining part was posted on the left, very near to the shore, and in the figure which is called the *forceps*. The right wing, composed of all the quinqueremes and galleys, which, from their lightness and celerity, were most proper for the design of surrounding the enemy, was led by Hanno, whose army was defeated in the siege of Agrigentum: and the left was committed to the care of Amilcar, who commanded in the former battle of Tyndaris. This general took his station in the centre of the line, and, as soon as the fight began, put in practice the following stratagem.

The Romans, when they saw that the enemy were ranged in a line of single ships, began the combat by attacking their centre. But the Carthaginians in the centre received orders from Amilcar immediately to retreat, that they might thus force the Romans to break the order of their battle. They fly accordingly with the greatest haste: and the Romans followed them with eagerness. By this contrivance the first and second squadrons of the Romans were soon divided from the third, which held the transport ships in tow, and from the triarii, who were drawn up behind to support the rest. When they were separated to a sufficient distance, the Carthaginians, upon a signal given

from Amilcar's ship, suddenly turned about and fell with fury upon the vessels that pursued them. The fight was obstinate, and the advantages on both sides for some time equal. For though the Carthaginians were far superior in the lightness of their ships, and in their skill in advancing or retreating, and attacking the enemy on every side; yet the Romans derived no less assurances of victory from the vigour and courage of their troops, the advantage of their machines, and the presence of both the consuls, under whose eyes the soldiers fought. Such was the state of the action on that side.

About this time Hanno, who commanded in the right wing at some distance from the vessels that were first engaged, stretched out to sea, and bearing down upon the triarii, threw them into great disorder. The Carthaginians also that were ranged along the coast, having changed their first disposition, and turned their prows in front towards the enemy, advanced against the squadron that towed the transports. Thus the whole engagement consisted at once of three different combats, maintained in different places. And, because in each of these divisions the strength of the combatants was nearly equal, the success was also for some time equal. But in the progress of the action the affair was brought at last to a decision: a different one, perhaps, than what might reasonably have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squadron that had begun the engagement, gained

so full a victory that Amilcar was forced to fly, and the consul Manlius brought away the vessels that were taken.

The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the triarii and the transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with the second squadron, which was still entire. The triarii, having received these succours, when they were just upon the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, and renewed the fight with vigour: so that the enemy, being surrounded on every side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once both in the front and rear, were at last constrained to steer away to sea.

About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed that the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to the shore, and there blocked up by the left division of the Carthaginian fleet. He joined his forces, therefore, with those of the other consul, who had now placed the transports and triarii in security, and hastened to assist these vessels, which were so invested by the enemy, that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed, they must have all been long before destroyed if the Carthaginians, through apprehension of the *corvi*, had not still kept themselves at distance, and declined a close engagement. But the consuls, having now advanced together, surround the enemy, and take fifty of their ships with all the men. The rest, being few in number, steered close along the shore, and saved themselves by flight.

Such were the circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory at last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their ships were sunk in the action, and more than thirty of the Carthaginians. No vessel of the Romans fell into the hands of the enemy; but sixty-four of the Carthaginians were taken with their men.

After this success, the Romans, having supplied the fleet with new provisions, repaired the vessels that were taken from the enemy, and shown such care of their naval forces as the late victory well deserved, again sailed out to sea, and steered their course towards the coast of Afric. The foremost ships, arriving at Hermæa, cast anchor there, and waited for the rest of the fleet. The promontory, called Hermæa, is situated upon the extreme edge of the Gulf of Carthage, from whence it extends far out to sea, and points towards the coast of Sicily. When the other vessels were arrived, they all sailed together along the coast, till they came to Aspis. And having there disembarked their forces, drawn their ships to land, and thrown up an intrenchment round them, they resolved immediately to invest the city, having first in vain invited the inhabitants to surrender.

CHAP. III.

THE Carthaginians, who had escaped from the late engagement, and returned safe to Carthage, were persuaded that the Romans, elated by so great a victory, would immediately direct their course towards that city. They made, therefore, the necessary disposition, both by land and sea, for securing all the approaches to the coast. But when they heard that the enemy had already disembarked their troops, and were laying siege to Aspis, having now lost all hope of being able to prevent their landing, they began to levy forces, and employed all their care to fortify the city and the adjoining country.

The Romans soon forced Aspis to surrender: and having left in the place a proper garrison, they sent some messengers to Rome to convey the news of their success, and to receive instructions with regard to the measures that were next to be pursued. They then decamped with all their forces, and marched through the country, to waste and plunder it. Finding no resistance from the enemy, they destroyed many houses of great magnificence, and returned back again to their ships, carrying with them a great quantity of cattle, and more than twenty thousand slaves.

The messengers about this time returned from Rome with orders that one of the consuls should

remain in Afric with the forces that were necessary, and the other carry back the fleet. Regulus, therefore, was left behind with fifteen thousand foot, five hundred horse, and forty of the ships; while Manlius, taking with him the prisoners, and the rest of the naval forces, passed safely along the coast of Sicily, and arrived at Rome.

The Carthaginians, perceiving from the preparations that were made, that the enemy had no design to leave the country, chose at first two generals, Bostar, and Asdrubal the son of Hanno, and sent afterwards for Amilcar likewise from Heraclea. Amilcar sailed in haste to Carthage with five thousand foot and five hundred horse; and, being declared third general, he held a consultation with Asdrubal and the other chief, concerning the measures that were most proper to be taken. It was soon resolved, that they should lead the forces against the enemy, and not suffer them thus to waste the country without resistance. The consul, after some days, advanced again with his army through the country, storming all the posts that were not fortified with walls, and reducing the rest by siege. Being at last arrived near Adis, a city of some importance, he encamped before it, prepared his works, and began to press the siege with vigour. The Carthaginians, in order to relieve the place, and save the country round it from destruction, directed their march that way with all their forces, and fixed their camp upon a hill, which indeed overlooked the enemy, but was, in every other respect, a very improper situation for their army.

For as their chief strength consisted in their elephants and cavalry, they should, in prudence, have encamped upon the open plain; whereas by marching into places that were steep, confined, and craggy, they seemed to instruct their enemies in what manner they best might act against them. And this, indeed, was the event; for the Romans, wisely judging that the strongest and most serviceable part of the Carthaginian army, and that which they had the greatest cause to dread, was rendered wholly useless by their situation, resolved to seize the occasion, and engage the enemy before they should descend into the plain. They drew out their forces, therefore, at break of day, and began the attack on both sides of the hill. The Carthaginian cavalry and elephants were not able to perform any service in the action. But the mercenaries stood for some time firm, and maintained the fight with so much vigour, that they forced the first legion to give ground. But when these troops were attacked behind, and dispersed with little difficulty, by the Romans who had ascended the hill on the other side, the whole army then fled at once from the camp, and a general rout ensued. The elephants, with the cavalry, gained the plain, and escaped. The Romans, having for some time pursued the infantry, returned back to the camp, and pillaged it; and marched afterwards at leisure through the country, wasting and destroying all the cities in their way; and having, at last, possessed themselves of Tunis, they there encamped, because this city not only seemed commodious for the oc-

casions of the war, but was also situated with great advantage, for infesting Carthage itself and all the adjoining country.

The Carthaginians were now reduced to a condition which, indeed, seemed next to desperate. For besides these two defeats, the one by sea the other by land, which were both occasioned not so much through any want of courage in the troops, as by the unskilful conduct of the generals, the Numidians had also sent detachments into their territories, and committed even greater devastations than the Romans. The people all left their habitations in the country, and fled to Carthage. Their numbers soon occasioned a most dreadful famine in the place; while the apprehensions also of a sudden siege filled every heart with consternation and dismay. But Regulus, who had given so great a shock to the strength of Carthage both by land and sea, that the city itself seemed almost ready to surrender to him, began now to fear that a new consul might arrive from Rome, and rob him of the glory of finishing the war. He invited, therefore, the Carthaginians to a treaty. The offer was embraced with pleasure; and some of the chiefs of the city were sent to settle the conditions with him. But so far were they from yielding their consent in any point to the terms that were proposed, that they scarcely could submit to hear them; for Regulus, as if he had been already master of their fate, seemed to think that every thing which he was inclined to grant should be accepted by them as mere grace and favour. But the am-

bassadors, perceiving that though they should entirely be reduced beneath the Roman yoke, no worse conditions could be imposed than those that now were offered, not only returned again without concluding any treaty, but were greatly offended also, and incensed by the unyielding haughtiness of the consul. The Carthaginian senate, when they knew the terms that were demanded, assumed a noble constancy; and, though they were almost ready to despair of safety, resolved to encounter every danger, and put in practice every expedient that time might offer, rather than by a base submission to disgrace the glory of their former actions.

About this time, one of those that had been sent by the Carthaginians into Greece, to raise some mercenaries in that country, returned to Carthage, bringing with him a large body of troops. Among them was a certain Lacedæmonian, named Xantippus, who had been educated in the Spartan discipline, and from thence had gained a perfect knowledge in the art of war. As soon as he was informed of all the circumstances of the late defeat, and had seen the nature of the Carthaginian forces, with the numbers of their horse and elephants, he began first to reflect within himself, and afterwards to declare among his friends, that the Carthaginians had not been vanquished by the Romans, but owed their losses to their own mistakes, and to the want of skill in their commanders. This discourse being soon spread among the people, as it happens in such conjunctures, came at last to the ears of the generals and the magistrates, who ordered Xan-

tippus to be called. When he came before them he explained with so much clearness the causes of their late misfortune, and showed such strong assurances of victory, in case that they now would yield to his advice, and choose the open plains for their encampments, marches, battles, that the chiefs with one voice applauded all his sentiments, and committed the care of the army to him.

From the time when this discourse was first known among the people, a kind of joyful rumour began to spread through all the city, and raised a general expectation of some happy change. But when Xantippus drew up the troops in order without the walls, and formed them into several bodies, training and instructing each of them to move according to the rules of military discipline, a skill so visibly superior to that of the other generals, forced loud applauses from the multitude. They demanded to be led immediately against the enemy; and seemed to be assured, that under such a chief they could never suffer any loss. The generals, when they saw the courage of the soldiers thus restored, harangued them in such words as the time required, and in a few days afterwards began their march. Their army was composed of twelve thousand foot, and four thousand horse, besides elephants, which amounted to near a hundred. The Romans were under some surprise when they saw that the Carthaginians now, for the first time, chose the open plains both for their marches and encampments. They resolved, however, to meet and engage them without delay. Having advanced,

therefore, with all their forces, on the first day they fixed their camp at the distance of ten stadia only from the enemy. On the following day the Carthaginian generals held a consultation, in order to determine what was necessary to be done; but the soldiers ran together in crowds, and calling aloud upon the name of Xantippus, demanded to be led without delay against the enemy. The generals perceiving the great alacrity and confidence of the troops, and being also strongly urged by the entreaties of Xantippus, who pressed them instantly to seize the occasion that was offered, gave orders to prepare for the engagement, and committed to Xantippus the care and disposition of the whole. Xantippus, being intrusted with this power, ranged the elephants in a single line, in front; and behind them, at a moderate distance, the Carthaginian phalanx. He posted on the right wing one part of the mercenaries; the rest that were more lightly armed, were equally distributed into either wing, together with the horse.

The Romans also drew up their army in battle with equal readiness. Their chief care was, to secure themselves against the elephants, which they greatly dreaded. For this purpose, having placed their light-armed troops in front, they drew up the legions in deep and close order behind, and divided the cavalry upon the wings. Thus they lessened the usual extent of their front; but gave a greater depth to the body of their army; so that, upon the whole, their disposition was well adapted to sustain the shock of the elephants, but was wholly ineffec-

tual for resisting the Carthaginian cavalry, which in numbers far exceeded that of the Romans.

In this order both armies stood awhile, expecting the signal to engage; but when Xantippus ordered the elephants to approach, and break the ranks of the enemy, while the horse on either wing, advancing in the same moment to the charge, endeavoured to surround them, then the Romans, clashing their armour after their custom, ran forward with loud cries to the engagement. Their horse, overpowered by numbers, were soon turned to flight; but the infantry of the left wing, led on by their contempt of the mercenary troops, and being desirous likewise to avoid the shock of the elephants, fell furiously upon the right wing of the Carthaginians, and, having routed them with little difficulty, pursued them even to their camp. The troops that first encountered with the elephants were soon destroyed, and trampled down in heaps; but the main body of the army remained for some time firm, by reason of the depth and closeness of the files; but when the hindmost ranks were obliged to face about, and engage the cavalry that had now surrounded them; and when those who had forced their way beyond the elephants, were charged by the Carthaginian phalanx, which was still entire; then were the Romans distressed on every side, and destitute of all resource. The greatest part were trodden down in heaps, under the enormous weight of the elephants; and the rest destroyed in their very ranks by the javelins thrown from the horse. A small number only hoped to

find their safety in flight. But as their way lay through a flat and open country, the elephants and cavalry soon overtook and destroyed the greater part. About five hundred only were taken alive; and among these, the consul Regulus. The Carthaginians lost in the action eight hundred of their mercenary forces, who were attacked and routed by the left wing of the Roman army. Of the Romans, about two thousand men, being those that had charged the mercenaries, were separated, in the course of the pursuit, to a distance from the army; and, having thus escaped the general slaughter, they retreated safe to Aspis. The rest all were slain upon the place, the consul alone excepted, and those that were taken with him. The Carthaginians, having spoiled the dead, returned back again to Carthage, exulting in their success, and carrying with them the consul Regulus, and the other prisoners.

How wide a field of reflection is opened to us by this event; and what admirable lessons does it contain for the good conduct of human life. In the fate of Regulus we may discern how little confidence should be reposed in Fortune; especially, when she flatters with the fairest hopes. For he, who a few days before beheld the miserable state to which the Carthaginians were reduced, without remorse or pity, was now himself led captive by them; and forced to implore his safety of those very enemies to whom he had shown no mercy. We may also remark, in this event, the truth of that saying of Euripides: "That one wise counsel is

better than the strength of many." For here, the wisdom of one man defeated legions that were thought invincible; infused new life into a people whose losses had even almost rendered them insensible of misery, and saved their tottering state from ruin. Let the reader then take care to reap some profit from these examples, and apply them to the improvement of his life and manners. For since there are two sources only from whence any real benefit can be derived; our own misfortunes, and those that have happened to other men; and since the first of these, though generally perhaps the most effectual, is far more dangerous and painful than the other, it will always be the part of prudence to prefer the latter, which will alone enable us at all times to discern whatever is fit and useful, without any hazard or disquiet. And hence appears the genuine excellence of history; which, without exposing us to the labour or the cost of suffering, instructs us how to form our actions upon the truest models, and to direct our judgement right in all the different circumstances of life. But let us return from this digression.

After a victory so complete, the Carthaginians set no bounds to the expressions of their joy, but poured out incessant acknowledgements to the Gods, and strove to outdo each other in all the acts of hospitality and kindness. But Xantippus, who had thus saved their state from ruin, returned back again to Greece, within a short time after. In this he showed great prudence and discernment; for signal and important services seldom fail to ex-

cite sharp malevolence and calumny; which, though a native of the country, supported by his friends and family, may, perhaps, be able to resist and conquer, yet foreigners are usually oppressed and ruined by them. Some writers give a different account of the departure of this general, which I shall examine in its proper place.

As soon as the Romans heard that the affairs in Afric had proved so contrary to all their hopes, they immediately prepared a fleet to bring away the men that had escaped in the late engagement. On the other hand, the Carthaginians advanced and laid siege to Aspis, hoping to get these troops into their hands; but, meeting with a stout and vigorous resistance, they were at last obliged to raise the siege. Being then informed that the Romans were fitting out a fleet, with design to return to Afric, they repaired all their old vessels, and built some new; and having, in a short time, equipped a fleet of two hundred ships, sailed out to sea to observe the motions of the enemy.

In the beginning of the summer the Romans came out to sea with a fleet of three hundred and fifty ships, under the command of the consuls, M. Æmilius, and Servius Fulvius; and sailed along the coast of Sicily, towards Afric. Near the promontory Hermæa, having met with and engaged the Carthaginians, they defeated them even in the first attack with little difficulty, and took a hundred and fourteen of their vessels, with all the men. They then received on board the troops that had escaped to Aspis, and directed their route back

again to Sicily. But when they had completed the greatest part of their course, and were now approaching the Camarinean coast, they were suddenly attacked by a tempest so great and terrible that no words can sufficiently describe the horrors of it. Of four hundred and sixty-four vessels, no more than eighty escaped the fury of this storm; the rest being either buried in the ocean or dashed against the rocks and promontories. The whole shore was covered with dead bodies, and with broken ships; so that history scarcely can afford another example of so great and general a destruction. This misfortune was not so much to be ascribed to accident as to the imprudent obstinacy of the consuls; for the pilots had given them repeated warnings not to sail along the exterior coast of Sicily, which looks towards Afric, where the shore was open and afforded no convenient harbour; especially too as the season was then the most unfavourable for navigation, the constellation of Orion being not quite passed, and the Dog-star just ready to appear. But the consuls despised their admonitions, and held on their course along the coast; being tempted by the hopes of gaining certain towns, which they flattered themselves would surrender to them without resistance, upon the first approach of their victorious fleet. Thus were they hurried, by the prospect of some slight advantage, into misfortunes that were irretrievable, and which forced from them an acknowledgement of their rashness, when it was now too late to remedy it. But such, in truth, is the disposition of the Romans.

Hot and violent in their pursuits, they pursuade themselves that whatever they undertake must of necessity be accomplished, and that nothing is impossible which they have once resolved to carry into execution. Their success has been often owing to this persuasion; though it cannot be denied that, on many occasions, it has also proved the only cause of their misfortunes, especially upon the sea, for in land engagements, where the contest only lies against the strength of men and human preparations, this confidence alone will frequently force the victory to their side. Yet, even in such conjunctures, they have sometimes been deceived in the event; but when they presume to encounter with the winds and sea, and challenge all the elements to combat, what wonder is it if they are then involved in the worst calamities? For such was now the punishment that befel their rashness; the same that, in former times, had happened to them, and which must again hereafter happen, unless they find some means to moderate that daring and impetuous spirit by which they are persuaded, that both land and sea are at all times subject to their control.

The destruction of the Roman fleet, together with the victory that had been obtained by land against them not long before, inclined the Carthaginians to believe that they now should prove superior to the enemy both by land and sea. They resumed their preparations, therefore, with greater diligence and vigour than before, and, in a short time afterwards, sent Asdrubal to Sicily; having

added to his army the forces that were brought from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. They refitted also two hundred ships, and equipped them for the war. Asdrubal being arrived at Lilybæum without any accident, exercised his troops and elephants, and seemed resolved to maintain the field against the enemy.

The Romans having received a full account of the destruction of their vessels from those that had escaped the storm, were sensibly afflicted for their loss; but, being determined not to yield, they resolved to build another fleet, entirely new, which should consist of two hundred and twenty ships. And, what will scarcely obtain belief, in three months' time this vast armament was all completely finished, and sailed out to sea under the command of the two new consuls, A. Atilius, and Cn. Cornelius. They passed the Straits, and being joined at Messana by the vessels that had escaped the storm, so that their whole fleet now consisted of three hundred ships, they directed their course towards Panormus, the most considerable of all the Carthaginian cities, in order to besiege it. They threw up works on both sides of the place, and planted their machines against it; and having, with little difficulty, battered down the fort that stood nearest to the sea, they entered immediately by the breach, and made themselves masters of the new town upon the first assault. The old, despairing to make any long resistance, surrendered at discretion. The consuls having thus gained possession

of the city, left in it a sufficient garrison, and returned to Rome.

In the following summer the consuls, Cn. Servilius and C. Sempronius, sailed again to Sicily with all the fleet, and from thence steered their course to Afric. They made many descents upon the coast, but without performing any action of importance. But as they were sailing near the island Meninx, which is inhabited by the Lotophagi, and lies contiguous to the little Syrtis, their ignorance of the coast proved almost fatal to them; for as the sea was then at ebb, their fleet stuck fast upon the sands. In this distress they had almost lost all hopes of safety. But some time afterwards the tide suddenly returned, when they least expected it, and freed them from the danger; for, having thrown over all their baggage and heavy furniture, they at last set their vessels afloat again, though not without much pains and labour; and steering back to Sicily with great precipitation, cast anchor at Panormus. From thence, as they passed the Straits, and were sailing on to Rome, with their usual disregard of every thing that might befal them, they were again attacked by a very dreadful storm, in which a hundred and fifty of their vessels perished.

The Romans were unable to support such great and repeated losses; and though their ardour was not slackened, nor their zeal in the least abated, they were forced by mere necessity to lay aside all farther attempts upon the sea, and depend entirely

upon their land forces for a happy issue of the war. They, therefore, sent the consuls, L. Cecilius and Cn. Furius, into Sicily with the legions; equipping only sixty vessels, to convey provisions to the army.

On the other hand, these misfortunes seemed to open to the Carthaginians the fairest prospect of advantage and success. They were now sole masters of the sea, which was abandoned by the Romans; and, with regard to the armies upon land, they began to be persuaded, and not without good reason, that their troops would prove superior to the enemy; for the Romans, having heard what horrible destruction the elephants had spread among their ranks, in the battle that was fought in Afric, were so possessed with apprehensions of the fury of those beasts, that, during the course of two whole years from that engagement, though they frequently fixed their camp within the distance of five or six stadia from the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Selinus and Lilybæum, they never once dared to venture on a battle, or even to trust their army in the plains. They reduced, indeed, the towns of Lipara and Thermæ; but during the siege of both, were always careful to post their troops in places that were steep and difficult of access. When the Romans saw that so great dejection and dismay had spread through all the army, they resolved to change their measures, and resume their naval preparations. As soon, therefore, as C. Atilius and L. Manlius, were elected

consuls, they built fifty ships, and began to make levies for the sea with the greatest diligence.

The Carthaginian general Asdrubal, having remarked the consternation that lately had appeared among the Romans, whenever their armies were forced to take the field; and being informed that one of the consuls had returned to Italy with one half of the troops, and that Cecilius was left behind at Panormus with the rest, to cover the harvest of the allies, which was just now ripe; marched his army from Lilybæum towards Panormus, and encamped upon the frontier of the district. Cecilius saw the confidence with which the enemy advanced towards him, and, with design still more to heighten it, kept his army close within the city. Asdrubal, deceived by this appearance, grew bolder than before: and being persuaded that the Romans wanted courage to oppose him, advanced with his army through the passes, destroyed the harvest every where, and wasted all the country. The consul still kept close behind the walls; till the enemy should have passed a river that ran near the city. But no sooner had the elephants with the army gained the other side, than Cecilius sent against them a part of his light-armed forces, to harass the foremost troops, and constrain the Carthaginians to draw up all their army in order of battle. When this was done, he placed his light-armed troops before the intrenchments; with orders that they should throw their javelins at the elephants as they ad-

vanced, and, whenever they found themselves too closely pressed, retire back again to the trenches, and from thence sally out from time to time, and make a fresh discharge upon them. The combatants were supplied with weapons in great numbers by the artificers of the city, who were drawn up in order for that purpose at the foot of the walls. The consul himself was posted with the legions without the gate that looked towards the left wing of the enemy, and sent away continual detachments to support the light-armed forces. As soon as the fight grew warm, the leaders of the elephants, in hopes of securing to themselves the honour of the victory, advanced with eagerness against the foremost combatants, turned them to flight with little difficulty, and pursued them close to the intrenchments. But the elephants, being now exposed to all the fury both of the archers from the walls, and of those that were posted in the trenches, who lanced their weapons at them without remission and with sure success, grew mad at last with rage; and turning back upon their own forces, trampled them down in heaps, and broke and dissipated all the ranks. Cecilius seized the time of this confusion, and advancing against the left wing of the Carthaginians, with the legions which were still entire and disposed in perfect order, fell upon the enemy in flank, and soon caused a general rout. Many were destroyed in the place, and the rest forced to fly in great disorder. Ten elephants were taken, with the Indians who conducted them. The rest, having

thrown their guides, were surrounded after the engagement, and were all likewise taken. After this great victory, it was confessed by all, that Cecilius by his wise and skilful conduct had infused new life and spirit into the Roman armies, and given them confidence once more to face the enemy in the field.

The account of this success was received at Rome with the greatest joy: not so much because the loss of the elephants had weakened the Carthaginian army, as because a victory once gained against those beasts had restored the courage of the legions. They therefore resumed their first design, and resolved to employ again a naval armament; and thus by exerting together all their strength, to bring the war at last to a conclusion. When all their preparations were completed, the consuls with a fleet of two hundred ships steered their course to Sicily. It was now the fourteenth year of the war. They arrived at Lilybæum; and being joined by the legions that were thus encamped, they prepared to lay siege to the city. For they had considered with themselves, that if they could once be able to obtain possession of this place, it would be easy to transport their forces from thence to Afric. The Carthaginians on their part penetrated into this design, and made the same reflections upon the consequences of it. Neglecting, therefore, all the other business of the war, they made haste to draw together their forces, and resolved to use their utmost efforts to defeat the enemy in this attempt. For in their present

circumstances, the loss of Lilybæum would leave them destitute at once of all resource: since the Romans already were possessed of all the other cities of importance in the island, Drepanum alone excepted.

But lest this part of the history should prove obscure and unintelligible to those who are unacquainted with the places of which we now are speaking, we shall endeavour, in few words, to give the reader some right conception of the manner in which the island and its several parts are situated.

The whole of Sicily in its situation bears the same respect to Italy, as the Peloponnesus does to the rest of Greece. But in this they are different; that the one is an island, separated from the continent by a narrow sea; the other a peninsula, the approach to which lies along a small neck of land. The form of Sicily is triangular: and the angles are so many promontories. The first, inclining to the south, and extending into the Sicilian sea, is called Pachynus. The second, named Pelorus, and standing to the north, bounds the Straits upon the western side, and is distant from Italy about twelve stadia. The third, which is the western promontory, called Lilybæum, stands opposite to the shore of Afric; and lies commodious for passing over to those promontories which we before have mentioned, being distant from them about a thousand stadia. It also divides the seas of Afric and Sardinia.

Adjoining to this last promontory was a city of

the same name, which the Romans were now preparing to besiege. It was secured by a wall and ditch, of a very uncommon strength and depth; and by standing lakes that were filled with the waters of the sea. And as the passage to the harbour lay over these, it was not to be entered without the greatest hazard, by those that were unacquainted with the ground. The Romans encamped on both sides of the town: and having fortified the space between their camps with an intrenchment and a wall, began their first attack against a fort that stood upon the shore, on the side of the African sea. By making their approaches without remission, and adding new works continually to the former, they at last demolished six of the towers that stood contiguous to the fort, and prepared to batter down the rest. As the siege was pressed with all imaginable earnestness and vigour, the towers already in part destroyed, and the rest so weakened as to threaten speedy ruin, while the enemy gained ground in their approaches every day, and advanced their works still nearer to the city, the garrison within, though it amounted to full ten thousand men besides the inhabitants, was seized with the utmost consternation. But Imilco, who commanded in the city, by his pains and unwearied ardour, gave no small resistance to the progress of the enemy; repairing every where the breaches; digging countermines; and transporting himself from place to place, hoping to find some moment in which he might be able to set fire to the Roman works. For this

purpose, he made many desperate sallies both by night and day; in which, greater numbers sometimes were destroyed, than even in regular engagements.

While things were in this condition, some of the chief officers that led the mercenary troops formed the design of betraying the city to the enemy; and thinking themselves secure of the compliance of the soldiers, went privately by night to the Roman camp, and concerted the project with the consuls. But a certain Achæan, named Alexo, who some time before had saved the town of Agrigentum from some treacherous attempts that were contrived against it by the Syracusan mercenaries, having made discovery of this treason likewise, informed the Carthaginian commander of it. Imilco presently called together the other officers; and having partly by his earnest exhortations and entreaties, and partly also by the promise of great rewards, engaged them to stand firm in the interests of the Carthaginians, he sent them to confirm the troops in their fidelity. To the Gauls he deputed likewise Annibal, who had long served among them. He was the son of that Annibal who lost his life in Sardinia. To the other mercenaries he sent Alexo, who was held in high esteem and credit by them. These generals having assembled all the troops, and harangued them as the time required, and having engaged their own assurance for the payment of those rewards that were now promised by Imilco, prevailed with little difficulty, and checked all their inclination to

revolt. When those therefore who had left the city were returned, and began to propose aloud the terms which they had brought, the garrison were so far from embracing the conditions, that they even refused to hear them; and with stones and javelins drove back the traitors from the walls. Thus were the Carthaginians brought to the very brink of ruin by the treason of their mercenaries; and in this manner were they rescued by Alexo; whose virtue, as we have observed, had once before afforded the means of safety to the Agrigentines upon a like occasion, and preserved to them their city, liberties, and laws.

CHAP. IV.

DURING this time, no accounts had been received at Carthage of any thing that passed at Lilybæum. But being persuaded that the besieged must certainly be in want of some relief, they filled fifty ships with soldiers, and sent them away under the command of Annibal, the son of Amilcar, who was general of the triremes, and an intimate friend of Adherbal. They exhorted him to use the greatest diligence, to take advantage of the first favourable moment, and to make some bold attempt to enter the city with his succours. Annibal soon sailed out to sea with all the forces,

which amounted to ten thousand men; and casting anchor at Ægusa, between Carthage and Lilybæum, waited for a fresh and favourable wind. As soon as it began to blow, he spread all his sails, and steered his course directly towards the harbour's mouth; the troops being ranged in order upon the decks, and ready to engage. The Romans, surprised by an attempt so bold and unexpected, and being apprehensive also, that their own vessels might be carried into the harbour by the wind together with those of the enemy, stood fixed in wonder and astonishment, and made no resistance to the entrance of the Carthaginians. The multitude within the city ran together in crowds upon the walls; anxious for the event, but filled with joy at the sight of these unexpected succours, which they now invited and encouraged by the loudest cries and shouts. At last the Carthaginians gained the port, and safely disembarked their forces, without any opposition from the Romans: a circumstance which afforded greater pleasure to the Lilybæans, than even the arrival of the troops themselves; though these were then so necessary to their affairs, and so greatly increased both their strength and hopes.

When Imilco saw that both the former forces of the city, and those that were now arrived, were animated to a high degree of alacrity and confidence; the first, on account of the relief which they had received; the latter, because they had yet encountered with no hardships; he resolved to take advantage of their present ardour, and endea-

vour to set fire to the Roman works. He therefore called all the troops together; and having harangued them in such words as his design required, and promised great rewards to those that should perform any eminent and signal service, besides the gifts and honours which they might all expect in common from the state of Carthage, he raised their minds to such a point of courage and impatience, that they all with one voice cried out, that he should lead them against the enemy without delay. The general applauded their good disposition, and dismissed the assembly: having exhorted them to retire betimes to their repose, and hold themselves in readiness to execute the orders of their leaders. He then called together the chief among the officers; assigned to each his several post; acquainted them with the time, and signal, of engaging; and directed them to attend in the appointed places, with their respective companies, by break of day.

These orders being carefully observed, the general at break of day led out his army, and fell upon the works in different quarters. But the Romans, who for some time before had expected this attempt, and had neglected no precaution, were now ready with their succours wherever they were most required, and vigorously opposed the enemy. The engagement soon became general; and was maintained on both sides with the greatest obstinacy. For the numbers from the city amounted to twenty thousand men: on the part of the Romans, they were greater. And as the

soldiers fought without regarding any order, every one in the place to which his inclination led him, the battle was on that account more fierce and terrible. For man with man, and rank with rank, engaged with all the fury and jealous emulation, that are found in single combats. But the clamour was far the loudest round the works; and the dispute most close and obstinate. For those whose task it was to ruin and destroy them, and those who on the other side were posted there for their defence, maintained the fight together with so much steadiness and ardour, that, while the one still laboured to advance, the other still refusing to give ground, it happened in the end, that both were alike destroyed in the places where they had begun the combat. But there were some among them, who, with flaming torches in their hands, invaded the machines with so much force and fury, that the Romans, unable to repel their efforts, were reduced to great extremity. But the Carthaginian general, perceiving that his troops were destroyed in heaps, and that he had not yet been able to accomplish his design, commanded the trumpets to sound the signal of retreat, and called the soldiers from the engagement. Thus the Romans preserved their works entire; even in the very moment, when they were just upon the point of being utterly destroyed.

After this action, Annibal leaving the harbour in the night, sailed out to sea with all the fleet, undiscovered by the enemy, and joined Adherbal who lay at Drepanum. This town is distant

from Lilybæum about a hundred and twenty stadia; and both on account of its commodious situation, as well as for the excellence of the harbour, had always been considered by the Carthaginians as a place of the last importance, and was guarded by them with the greatest care.

At Carthage, the people were impatient to be informed from time to time of all that passed at Lilybæum; but knew not any method by which their wishes could be satisfied. For the besieged were closely confined within their walls; and the port as closely guarded by the Romans. But a certain man of rank among them, Annibal, surnamed the Rhodian, engaged to sail into the harbour, and when he had seen the condition of the city, to return again to Carthage, with an account of all that they desired to know. His offer was received with joy, though the success was greatly doubted. But Annibal, having equipped a vessel of his own that was proper for his purpose, sailed and cast anchor near one of the islands that lie opposite to Lilybæum: and on the morrow, taking advantage of a brisk and favourable wind, steered his course through the midst of all the enemy, who stood astonished at his boldness, gained the harbour, and prepared to return again on the following day. The consul, more effectually to guard the entrance of the port, got ready in the night ten of his swiftest ships; and himself with all the forces stood attentive to the motions of the Rhodian. The ten ships were stationed on both sides of the harbour's mouth, as near to it as the shal-

ground upon him, he was at last forced to turn, and try the fortune of a battle. The Romans, who were far superior both in the strength and number of their men, obtained an easy victory; and being now masters of this ship likewise, they fitted it with all things necessary; and from this time effectually secured against the Carthaginians the entrance of the port.

The besieged were now employed without remission in repairing the breaches of their walls: but had thrown away all hopes of being able to destroy the works of the enemy: when on a sudden a strong wind arose, and blew with so much violence that it shook the Roman galleries, and threw down the towers that were built before them for their defence. Some of the Greek mercenaries, having reflected within themselves, that this conjuncture was highly favourable for ruining all the works at once, communicated their sentiments to the general, who readily approved them, and gave immediate orders for the attack. The young men sallied out in separate bands, and set fire to three different quarters. As the buildings, being old, were easily inflammable; and were now so loosened likewise by the wind, that both the machines and towers were shifted from their place; the fire soon spread with great rapidity and force. The Romans were struck with consternation, and knew not in what manner they might best resist the impending ruin. Terrified by an attack so unexpected, and blinded by the smoke and darkness, and sparks of fire, that rolled continually to-

wards them, they neither saw nor comprehended any thing that passed: so that great numbers fell, without being able even to come near the fire. The more the Romans were incommoded, the greater also were the advantages of the enemy. For while the wind still blew against the faces of the former whatever could annoy or hurt their sight, the latter who saw clear before them, were able to direct their aim with certainty, both against the machines and combatants; the wind also driving forwards every thing that was thrown, and giving greater strength and efficacy to the stroke. In the end the destruction was so complete, that the towers were all consumed to their foundations, and the heads of the battering rams melted in the fire. After this great loss, the Romans laid aside all thoughts of being able to reduce the place by their works: and having thrown up an intrenchment round the city, and fortified their camp also with a wall, they committed the event to time. The Lilybæans on their part repaired their breaches; and resolved to expect with patience the determination of the siege.

As soon as they heard at Rome the news of this misfortune, and that the greater part of their naval forces had been destroyed, either in defending the works against the enemy, or in the former business of the siege, they immediately raised new levies, which amounted to ten thousand men, and sent them away to Sicily. When they arrived in the camp, the consul, P. Claudius, assembled all the tribunes, and represented to them, that they ought

to seize the present moment, and sail away immediately to Drepanum; "where Adherbal," continued he, "lies unprepared, and suspecting nothing; is unacquainted with the arrival of these new levies; and persuaded that our losses in the siege have disabled us from sending out a fleet to sea." As this design was readily approved, he ordered the sailors immediately to embark, both those that were in the camp before, and those that had lately landed; and added to them some of the bravest soldiers from the legions, who were tempted by the shortness of the voyage, and the prospect of assured success, to make a voluntary offer of their service in the expedition. When all his preparations were completed, about midnight he began the voyage, undiscovered by the enemy, and keeping the island on his right, sailed in close order along the shore. As soon as it was morning, and the foremost ships had arrived in sight of Drepanum, Adherbal, who had no expectation of this accident, was at first under great surprise. But when he had viewed them more attentively, and perceived that they were the Roman fleet, he resolved to exert his utmost efforts, rather than submit to be invested in the place. Having assembled, therefore, all the naval forces upon the shore, and called the mercenaries from the city, he showed them in a short harangue with how great ease they might obtain the victory, if they had courage to engage the Roman fleet; and represented to them on the other hand all the miseries of a siege, to which, if they now declined the combat, they must inevitably be exposed.

They all cried out at once, and demanded to be led against the enemy without delay. Adherbal commended their alacrity, and ordered them immediately to get on board; to observe the motions of his ship; and to follow close behind, in the course which they should see him take. He then sailed away the first, and steered his vessel along the rocks that lay opposite to that side of the harbour by which the enemy designed to enter. When the consul saw that the Carthaginians were so far from being struck by his arrival, and surrendering to him as he had before expected, that, on the contrary, they were making all things ready for the combat, he ordered all his vessels to turn about again, when some of them were already within the harbour, others in the entrance, and the rest making sail that way. The ships that had gained the port, as they directed their course back again, fell against those that were now just entering, broke their oars, and occasioned great disorder. As fast, however, as they returned, the officers ranged them all in a line along the shore, with their prows turned towards the enemy. The consul Publius, who at first had followed in the rear, was now carried out to sea, and took his station in the left wing of the fleet; but Adherbal, having passed this wing with five of his largest vessels, and gained the open sea, turned his prow towards the enemy. The rest of his ships, as fast as they came up, received orders to extend themselves in the same single line. As soon as they were all ranged in front, he gave the signal to engage, and advanced against the Ro-

mans, who still stood close along the shore, in order to receive their ships as they sailed back again from the harbour; but to this situation were chiefly owing the losses which they afterwards sustained. When the fleets were joined, the contest was for some time equal; being maintained on either side by the choicest of the legionary troops. But, by degrees, the Carthaginians drew the victory to their side, by the help of many favourable circumstances in which they were superior to the Romans during the whole engagement. Their vessels were light, and swift in sailing; their rowers skilful and experienced; and lastly, they derived no small advantage from having ranged their fleet in battle on the side of the open sea. Whenever they were closely pressed, as they had full room to retreat, so were they able also by their swiftness to transport themselves at once out of the reach of danger. If the enemy advanced too far in the pursuit they then turned suddenly upon them, and making their attack with vigour and agility, now upon the sides, and sometimes on the stern, sunk many of the Roman vessels, which, being unwieldy by their bulk, and incumbered with unskilful rowers, performed all their motions heavily and without success. When any of their vessels seemed ready to be mastered by the enemy, they advanced securely through the open sea, and by ranging some fresh galleys in the stern of those that were engaged, rescued their friends from danger. But, on the part of the Romans, every circumstance was contrary to these. When pressed, they had no room to retreat; for

every vessel that retired before the enemy, either stuck fast upon the sands, or was dashed against the shore. As their ships were also heavy, and their rowers destitute of skill, they were quite deprived of the advantage, the greatest that is known in naval battles, of sailing through the squadron of the enemy, and attacking in stern the ships that were already engaged with others; nor could they, on the other hand, send any succours, or support their own vessels from behind, as the distance was so narrow between them and the land. Such were the disadvantages under which the Romans laboured through the whole engagement. Many of their vessels, therefore, were broken against the shore; and many stuck fast upon the sands. The consul, with about thirty only that stood with him upon the left, withdrew from the engagement, and directed his flight along the coast. The remaining ships, in number ninety-three, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, together with all the men; a small number only excepted, who forced their vessels close to shore, and escaped the danger.

Thus ended the engagement; from whence the Carthaginian general reaped, among his countrymen, all the applause and honour that were due to his brave and skilful conduct; while the Romans, on the contrary, pursued with curses and invectives the consul Publius, whose rash imprudence had brought such heavy losses upon his country, and, after his return to Rome, condemned him by a public sentence to the payment of a heavy fine.

The Romans, notwithstanding this defeat, were

so fixed in their design to conquer, that they continued all their preparations for the war with the same ardour as before; and, when the election of their magistrates was past, sent L. Junius, one of the consuls, into Sicily, with a convoy of sixty ships, to carry corn and other necessary stores to the army that invested Lilybæum. Junius arriving at Messana, and having there received some vessels that came to join him, both from the camp and from the other parts of the island, sailed soon afterwards to Syracuse. His whole fleet now consisted of a hundred and twenty ships of war, besides eight hundred transports. Having given the half of these, together with a small part of the former, to the quæstors, he ordered them to sail with the provisions to the camp; while himself staid behind at Syracuse, to receive the ships that were not able to attend him from Messana, and to collect the corn which the allies from the inland parts of Sicily were obliged to furnish.

About the same time Adherbal, when he had sent to Carthage the prisoners and all the vessels that were taken in the last engagement, joined thirty of his own ships to seventy others that were under the command of Carthalo, and gave orders to that general to go and fall suddenly upon the Roman fleet, which lay at anchor in the port of Lilybæum, to bring away as many of their ships as he could get into his hands, and to burn the rest. Carthalo, having received this commission, steered his course towards the harbour; and entering it before break of day, he set fire to one part of the

fleet, and made himself master of the rest. This accident occasioned no small disorder in the Roman camp; for while the soldiers ran together with loud cries from every quarter, to succour and save their fleet, Imilco, who commanded in the town, perceiving what was done, sallied out upon them with the mercenaries. Thus were they surrounded by danger on every side, and their consternation became complete.

The Carthaginian general, having taken one part of the vessels, and destroyed the rest, the whole amounting to no very considerable number, steered his course from Lilybæum towards Heraclea, with design to intercept the fleet that was sailing to the camp from Syracuse. Elated by his past success, he no sooner was informed by the scouts whom he had sent before, that the Roman fleet, composed of a great number of ships of every kind, was arrived almost in sight, than he advanced in haste to meet them. The Romans, having received notice likewise of his approach, from the frigates that sailed at the head of all their squadron, and thinking it unsafe, in their present circumstances, to venture on a battle, directed their course towards a little town that owned their jurisdiction; where, though there was indeed no harbour, certain creeks, that were enclosed on every side by a kind of promontories which ran out into the sea, afforded a convenient shelter for their fleet. Having here disembarked their forces, and disposed in order some catapults and balistæ which the town supplied, they waited the arrival of the enemy. The Car-

thaginians, as soon as they approached, made haste to begin the combat; being persuaded that the Romans, upon the first attack, would abandon all their vessels, and take refuge in the town. But when their expectations were so far from being answered, that, on the contrary, they found a vigorous and stout resistance; and as the place was also, in all respects, disadvantageous to them, they were at last obliged to retire from the engagement, carrying with them a small number of the transports only; and, sailing to the mouth of a certain river that was near, they cast anchor there, and resolved to wait for the departure of the Roman fleet.

The consul Junius, having now transacted his affairs at Syracuse, doubled the promontory Pachynus, and was steering his course to Lilybæum, ignorant of all that had happened to the quæstors. The Carthaginian general, being informed by his scouts of their approach, sailed out to sea with the greatest haste, designing to engage them before they could be joined by the other fleet. The consul saw that the enemy approached fast towards him, and that their fleet was very numerous. Being unwilling, therefore, to venture on a battle against so great a force, and not able on the other hand to fly because they were so near, he cast anchor upon a rough and dangerous part of the coast; and resolved to suffer every thing that might there befall him rather than deliver up his ships and all his forces to the enemy. The Carthaginians, not daring to risk a combat in places so unsafe, cast an-

chor also near a certain promontory, which lay between the Roman fleets, and from thence observed their motions.

About this time a most dreadful tempest was just ready to break upon the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, who, from their long experience, and their knowledge of the coasts, were able to foresee such accidents before they happened, advised the commander to double the Cape Pachynus without delay, and shelter himself from the impending storm. The general wisely yielded to this advice; and having passed the promontory, though not without the greatest pains and difficulty, cast anchor in a place of safety. But when the storm came on, the Roman fleets, being quite destitute of shelter, and far removed from any harbour, were both so miserably wrecked and broken, that the account almost exceeds belief. For so complete was the destruction, that scarcely a single plank remained entire. This accident gave new life and hopes to the Carthaginians; for the whole naval strength of Rome, which had already been greatly weakened by repeated losses, was now all at once destroyed. The Romans, indeed, were still superior in their armies; but, on the other hand, the Carthaginians were sole masters of the sea, and their affairs by land were by no means desperate.

This great misfortune raised a general grief and consternation, both at Rome and among the troops that invested Lilybæum. The siege, however, of this city was still pressed as closely as before; while all the necessary stores were carefully

supplied by the allies, and sent by land into the camp. The consul Junius, who had escaped the storm, returned to the camp full of grief, and resolved to repair, if possible, by some signal and important action, the loss that he had sustained by sea. With this design, having conceived some hopes of taking Eryx by surprise, he so well improved the slight occasion that was offered, that he became master both of the city and of the temple of Venus that was near it. The mountain Eryx is situated on that part of the Sicilian coast which looks towards Italy, between Drepanum and Panormus; but lies nearest to the former of these cities, and is most difficult of access on that side. It is the largest of all the mountains of Sicily, Ætna alone excepted. On the top of it, which is a level plain, stands a temple dedicated to Erycinian Venus; which, in splendour, wealth, and beauty, is acknowledged to be far superior to all the other temples of the island. Below the summit lies the town; the ascent to which is long and difficult. The consul having placed some troops upon the top, and on the road that led to Drepanum, designed to act chiefly on the defensive, and was persuaded that, by guarding carefully these two posts, he should be able to keep possession both of the town and all the mountain.

CHAP. V.

AFTER these transactions the Carthaginians appointed Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, to be their general in chief; and gave to him also the command of all the fleet. This was now the eighteenth year of the war. Amilcar, having drawn together the naval forces, sailed away to plunder the coast of Italy. When he had wasted all the lands of the Brutii and the Locrians, he then steered his course with the whole fleet to Sicily; and encamped in a certain place upon the coast, between Eryx and Panormus, whose situation was, in all respects, so advantageous, that an army no where could be lodged with more convenience or security. It was a rough and craggy mountain, rising from the plain to a considerable height, whose top was more than a hundred stadia in circumference. The lands beneath the summit were rich in husbandry and pasture; refreshed by wholesome breezes from the sea; and not infested by any noxious beast. On every side stood precipices not easy to be surmounted, and the space between them was so straight and narrow, that no great force was required to guard it. There was, besides, an eminence upon the very top of the mountain, from whence, as from a watch-tower, every thing might be discerned that was transacted in the plain below. The harbour that was near it was deep and

spacious, and lay commodious for all vessels that were sailing towards Italy from Drepanum or Lilybæum. There were three ways only of approaching this mountain; two on the side of the land, and the other towards the sea. In this post it was, that Amilcar had the boldness to encamp: throwing himself into the very middle of his enemies; having no confederated city near him; nor any hopes of succour beyond his own army. Yet even in this situation, he contrived to engage the Romans in many desperate contests, and distressed them by continual alarms. Sometimes he sailed out with his fleet, and wasted all the coast of Italy as far as Cumæ. And afterwards, while the Romans lay encamped within five stadia of his army, in the district of Panormus, he waged against them, during the course of three whole years, an almost infinite variety of battles, which cannot particularly be described. For, as in the public games, when two champions of distinguished bravery and strength contend together for the prize, the strokes on either side fall so close and frequent, that neither the spectators, nor the combatants themselves, are able precisely to remark the direction, scope, and force of every single blow, though it be no hard thing to form a judgement upon the whole of the emulation, spirit, strength, and skill of those who are thus engaged: so in the present instance, it would neither be an easy nor a useful task, to recount the manner, or the aim, of all the various snares, contrivances, attacks, surprises, which both sides practised every day; and

from which, if known, the reader never could obtain so just an apprehension of the characters and conduct of the two commanders, as from surveying the whole together, and attending to the final issue of the contest. In general, every stratagem which history has recorded, every invention which circumstances could suggest, or necessity require, every attempt to which the most impetuous and daring spirits could excite them, were all severally embraced and carried into practice. But no action passed that was decisive. For as the forces on both sides were equal, as their camps were strongly fortified, and at the same time separated from each other by a very moderate distance, hence it happened that they were every day engaged in partial combats, without performing any thing that was complete or general. Great numbers fell in these engagements: but when either side were too closely pressed, they presently retired to their intrenchments; and from thence sallied out again upon the enemy.

But fortune, like an experienced judge of combats, removed these champions not long afterwards into a narrower ground, and engaged them in a closer and more desperate fight. For while the Romans guarded Eryx in the manner before mentioned, by posting some troops upon the summit, and others at the foot of the mountain, Amilcar found means to gain possession of the city that lay between. The Romans on the top, being thus besieged, maintained their post, and encountered, with a most amazing fortitude, the dangers to

which they were now exposed. On the other hand, the courage and the firm resistance of the Carthaginians were such as scarcely will obtain belief. For it is not easy to conceive, by what means they were able to sustain the efforts of the enemy, exposed as they were to their attacks both from above and from beneath, and having no way by which they could receive supplies, except one single passage which lay open to them from the sea. Yet, notwithstanding these great difficulties, all the methods, both of art and violence, which especially belongs to sieges, were practised in their turn by either party. And when they had exhausted the whole variety of attacks and combats, and been pressed by every kind of distress and misery, they did not at last decline the contest through weariness or weakness, as Fabius has affirmed; but both sides still remained unyielding and unconquered, till the war was brought by other means to a conclusion, two years after. Such was the condition of the armies, in the neighbourhood of Eryx.

If we stop now to make reflection upon the conduct and the various efforts of these two republics, we may properly enough compare them with those generous and valiant birds, which, when they have fought so long together that they are quite disabled from making any farther use of their wings in the engagement, yet retaining still their courage, and exchanging mutual wounds, at last unite by a kind of instinct in a closer combat, and maintain the fight together with their beaks, till the one or other

of them falls beneath his adversary's stroke. In the same manner, the Carthaginians and the Romans, exhausted by continual expense, and weakened by the miseries and the losses which the war had brought upon them, were now reduced on both sides to the last extremity. But the Romans still maintained their firmness: and though they had for five years past abandoned all attempts upon the sea; partly by reason of the heavy losses which they had there sustained; and partly also because they were persuaded, that their armies upon land would alone be able to give a favourable issue to the war; yet, when they found that all their expectations were likely to be frustrated, by the vigorous and intrepid conduct of Amilcar, they resolved for the third time to make trial of a naval armament; conceiving it to be now the only kind of force which, if conducted with dexterity and prudence, would end the war upon such conditions as their interest and their hopes required. Nor were they, indeed, deceived in the event. They had twice before, as we have said, been forced to abandon all attempts upon the sea: once, by the shipwreck of their fleets; and afterwards, by the loss which they sustained in the fight of Drepanum. But having now once more resumed the same design, and gained the victory in one naval battle, they deprived the Carthaginian troops that were in Eryx of the means of receiving any farther supplies or succours from the sea, and thus gave a full determination to the war. This resolution was

wholly the effect of that strong and ardent zeal with which the Romans then were animated. For the treasury afforded no supplies that were sufficient for the undertaking. But the generous sentiments and spirit of the chief among the citizens, and their earnest love of the republic, enabled them to carry it into execution. For each particular man, or two or three together, in proportion to their wealth, engaged to provide a quinquereme completely fitted and equipped; on condition only of being reimbursed, in case that the design should be attended with success. By this method they brought together a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes, which were all built upon the model of that vessel that was taken from the Rhodian. With this new armament, the consul C. Lutatius, in the beginning of the summer, sailed out to sea; and appearing suddenly upon the coast of Sicily, gained possession of the ports and bays of Drepanum and Lilybæum without resistance. For the enemy had sailed back to Carthage with their fleet some time before. The consul advanced his works against the town of Drepanum, and began to press the siege with vigour. But being at the same time sensible that the Carthaginian fleet would soon return, and keeping always in his mind the chief design and purpose of the expedition, which was to end the war at once by a naval victory, he suffered no moment to be lost, but employed the sailors in such constant tasks and exercises as might best conduce to that design; and by training them in all the parts of naval discipline, he rendered them

in a short time hardy and expert, and completely prepared for action.

The Carthaginians heard with great astonishment, that the Romans again appeared at sea. They immediately got ready their fleet; and being desirous to supply in the amplest manner the wants of the troops that were at Eryx, they filled their vessels with provisions and other stores, and sent them away under the command of Hanno; who sailed and cast anchor at the island Hiera. His intention was, to arrive at Eryx undiscovered by the Romans; and when he had eased his ships of their heavy lading, and taken on board a sufficient number of the choicest troops, together with Amilcar, to sail back and engage the enemy. But the Roman consul, informed of the motions of this fleet, and penetrating also into the views of Hanno, selected all the bravest of the legions, and sailed to Ægusa, an island that lay opposite to Lilybæum. He there harangued his forces, as the time required; and acquainted the pilots that he should next day offer battle to the Carthaginians. But when the morning came, observing that the wind blew strong and favourable to the enemy, but contrary to the course which himself was obliged to steer, and that the sea was rough and turbulent, he was for some time in doubt what resolution he should take. But when he had reflected within himself, that if he should now engage, notwithstanding all the roughness of the season, the contest would only be with Hanno and the naval forces, and with ships that were heavy and encum-

bered; but that, if by waiting till the sea was calm he should suffer the enemy to pass and join the camp, he must then be forced to encounter with troops selected from the army, with ships which would be light and easy in their motions, and above all the rest, with the bold and daring spirit of Amilcar, who was now become very terrible to the Romans; he at last resolved to seize the occasion, and to venture on a battle. As the enemy were sailing full before the wind, he made haste to get out to sea. The rowers, strong and dextrous, broke with ease the force of the wind and waves; and the vessels soon were ranged in a single line, with their prows turned towards the enemy. The Carthaginians, being thus intercepted in their course, take down their sails, and after mutual exhortations, begin the combat. As the condition of the several fleets was now in all points different from what it had been in the former battle, it was reasonable to expect that the event would be also different. The Roman fleet was built in a more skilful manner than before. Their vessels were not encumbered with any heavy furniture, except such only as was necessary for the fight. Their rowers had been exercised with so much diligence and care, that they were able to perform the greatest service. And in the last place, their soldiers, being all selected from the choicest of the legions, were men who knew not how to retreat or yield. But on the other side of the Carthaginians, all things bore a different face. Their ships were burthened with a heavy lading, which rendered

them unfit for action. Their sailors were unpractised in their art, and such as had been hastily thrown together for the present voyage: and their troops were new raised levies, not yet acquainted with the terrors or the toils of war. For so strongly were they assured, that the Romans never would appear again upon the sea, that they had for some time past neglected all their naval forces. From these causes then it happened, that they were in every part defeated, even in the first encounter. Fifty of their ships were sunk, and seventy taken by the Romans, with all the men. But the wind, as if engaged to favour them, turning suddenly about in the very moment of their danger, filled all their sails, and carried the rest of the fleet safe back to Hiera. The consul steered his course to Lilybæum; where his first care was to dispose of the captive ships and men: a task which gave him no small trouble; for the numbers of the latter amounted to near ten thousand.

This defeat, however great and unexpected, abated nothing of the former zeal and ardour of the Carthaginians: but they saw themselves at once deprived of all the means by which they could hope to carry on the war. As the enemy were masters of the sea, it was now no longer in their power to send supplies to the troops in Sicily: so that being forced, if we may so express it, to betray and abandon these, they had in truth neither general nor army left on which they could at all depend. They sent therefore to Amilcar,

and left to his discretion the care and management of the whole. The conduct of Amilcar in these circumstances was such as well became an expert and wise commander. While any prospect of success remained, or any reasonable ground of hope, he boldly attempted every thing, how full soever of hazard and of danger, that could distress the enemy; and rested all his hopes of victory upon the strength and vigour of his arms, even more than any general that had lived before him. But when the face of affairs was changed, and all probable resources cut off and lost, he resolved no longer to expose his troops to danger; but wisely yielding to the necessity of the times, sent ambassadors to the Romans to treat of peace. For the part of a consummate general is not only to know when to conquer, but when also to renounce all hopes of victory.

The consul, knowing that the Romans were on their part also weary of a war, which so greatly had exhausted the strength of the republic, embraced the offer with little difficulty; and a treaty was soon afterwards concluded in the following terms.

"There shall be peace between the Carthaginians and the Romans, with the approbation of the Roman people, upon these conditions. The Carthaginians shall relinquish every part of Sicily. They shall not make war upon Hiero; nor give any disturbance to the Syracusans, or their allies. They shall restore, without ransom, all the Roman

prisoners: and pay a tribute of two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver, within the course of twenty years."

When the conditions were sent to Rome, the people at first refused to confirm the treaty; and deputed ten commissioners to examine into the state of affairs in person. When these arrived in Sicily, they made no considerable alteration in the whole of what had been agreed: but only added to the tribute a thousand talents more; shortened the time allotted for the payment of it; and demanded also, that the Carthaginians should retire from all the islands that lay between Sicily and Italy.

Such was the end of the war of Sicily between the Carthaginians and the Romans; when it had continued during the course of twenty-four years, without any intermission. A war, the longest in its duration, the least interrupted in its progress, and upon the whole the most considerable, of any that we find in history. For, not to mention again the various combats, which have already been recounted, in one naval battle only, which happened in this war, five hundred quinqueremes were engaged together in action; and in a second, scarce fewer than seven hundred. The Romans, in the course of the war, lost seven hundred quinqueremes; if we reckon those that were destroyed by tempests: the Carthaginians, about five hundred. And now let those, who have been accustomed to contemplate with surprise the naval preparations and engagements of Antigonus, Demetrius,

and Ptolemy, let them I say consider, whether the present war be not a subject far more worthy of their admiration and regard. For if we carefully reflect upon the difference between these quinqueremes and the trireme vessels that were made use of by the Persians in their expeditions against the Greeks, and afterwards by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians in all their naval combats, it will very clearly appear, that no state or people ever brought so great a force upon the sea, as those that were engaged in the war before us. From this view of things, we may also be convinced, that it was by no means an effect of chance or rashness, as the Greeks foolishly imagine, that the Romans had afterwards the boldness to attempt, as well as the power to reach, the conquest of the whole known world: but, on the contrary, that having first been trained in a course of great and important actions, and disciplined for such an undertaking, they built their project upon very solid grounds, and such as gave the fairest prospect of success.

It will perhaps be asked, from whence it happens that the Romans, in all the present greatness of their power, and extent of territory, to which they have advanced their empire by the conquest of the world, are yet unable to equip so many ships, or send such powerful fleets upon the sea, as in former times. I shall endeavour to give a clear solution of this difficulty, when I come to treat of the constitution of the Roman government: a subject which I design to examine in its

full extent; and which will well deserve the closest attention of the reader. For, besides that the matter in itself is curious, it has also hitherto been but little known, through the fault of those that have attempted to write concerning it. For while some of them were themselves entirely unacquainted with every part of this inquiry, others have pursued it in a manner so perplexed and intricate, that no kind of satisfaction or advantage can be expected from their labours.

In the present war we may remark, that the same ardent zeal, the same designs, the same generous perseverance, and the same passion for dominion, animated alike both republics. The Roman soldiers, indeed, in all points of bravery and spirit exceeded those of Carthage. But, on the other hand, the Carthaginian general, both in conduct and in courage, was far superior to any of those commanders that were sent against him. This general was Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Annibal, who afterwards waged war with Rome.

Soon after the conclusion of the peace, both nations were involved in the same misfortune, and forced to employ their arms to quiet some domestic troubles. These were raised against the Romans by the Falisci; who were reduced however in the course of a few days only, and their chief city taken. But the Carthaginians were engaged in a war of much greater moment, against their mercenaries, and against the Africans and Numidians, who joined in the revolt. A war, which in the

progress of it filled them with the greatest terrors and alarms, and threatened even the entire subversion of their state.

It will not be improper or unuseful, to rest awhile upon the subject of this war, and to recount in few words the chief transactions of it. The task, for many reasons, well deserves our pains. For first, we may from hence be fully informed of the nature, circumstances, and whole conduct, of that kind of war which is usually called, Inexpiable. We shall likewise learn from the misfortunes which now happened to the Carthaginians, what foresight and precaution should be used, and what dangers apprehended, by those who employ mercenary troops: and also, how great the difference is, between a mixed assembly, made up of barbarous and foreign nations, and an army composed of those who had been educated in the discipline, and trained under the laws and customs of their country. In the last place, the transactions of these times may serve to lead us to the true causes of that war which Annibal made afterwards upon the Romans: and enable us to fix with some assurance what has been hitherto a matter of much dispute and doubt; not only among historians, but even among the parties also that were themselves engaged in the war.

CHAP. VI.

AS soon as the treaty was concluded, Amilcar led the army from Eryx to Lilybæum; and there laying down his command, left it to the care of Gesco, the governor of the city, to send the forces back to Carthage. Gesco, having some kind of foresight and apprehension of what might happen, conducted the affair with great prudence and precaution. He embarked the soldiers in small divisions, and sent them away at different times, that the Carthaginians might be able to pay them their arrears as they arrived, and so dismiss them to their several countries, before the others joined them. This was Gesco's design. But the Carthaginians, finding that their treasury was much exhausted by the late expenses of the war, and persuading themselves that if the mercenaries were to be drawn together and entertained for some time at Carthage, they might be prevailed on to abate some part of the stipend that had been promised them, admitted them all within the walls as they arrived, and gave them quarters in the city. But when many tumults and disorders began to grow among them, and to break out both by night and day, being now in apprehension of some dismal consequences from the licentiousness and insolence of such a multitude, they were forced to entreat their

officers to conduct them to a certain town called Sicca, giving to each a piece of gold for defraying their present wants, and to keep them there, till every thing was ready for the payment of their stipends, and the rest of the forces also arrived from Sicily. The soldiers readily agreed to this proposal of removing, but designed to leave their families and baggage behind at Carthage, as they had hitherto done, especially as they expected to return shortly back again to receive their pay. But the Carthaginians, fearing that some among them, detained by the caresses of their wives and children, whom a long absence had now endeared to them, might altogether refuse to quit the city, and that others invited by the same tender motives, would make frequent occasions to return, and renew the late disorders, obliged them, in spite of all their wishes and inclinations to the contrary, to carry with them their families and all their goods. The troops being arrived at Sicca, began to live according to their own discretion, without any control or rule. They were now fallen at once into a state of ease and inactivity, from a course of long fatigue and hardship: a state which ought by no means ever to be permitted among mercenary soldiers; and which is often of itself the principal and only cause of seditions.

During this time of leisure, some among them began to compute together the arrears that were pretended to be due; accumulating various articles without any show of reason, and enlarging the sum beyond its just amount. Others called to

mind the rewards which the generals had promised to their services in times of extraordinary difficulty and danger. Upon the whole, their expectations were raised to such a height, that when the rest of the forces had joined them, and Hanno, who presided over the affairs of Afric, being arrived at Sicca, instead of giving satisfaction to their hopes, began to enlarge upon the bad condition of the republic, burthened as he said by heavy taxes, and an uncommon scarcity of all things, and requested them to abate some part even of that which was acknowledged to be due, immediately the whole army fell into discontent and mutiny. Meetings and cabals were formed, and assemblies held continually; sometimes of the troops apart, according to their several tribes and countries; and sometimes of all together in a body: while, from the various and discordant mixture of different languages and nations, every place was filled with confusion, noise, and tumult.

If the Carthaginians, in filling their armies, as their constant custom was, with mercenaries drawn together from different countries, designed nothing more than to prevent conspiracies, and render the authority of their generals more absolute and effectual, they may seem perhaps in this respect to have judged not unreasonably; for troops of this sort cannot easily unite together in factious counsels. But, on the other hand, this practice must be allowed to be highly impolitic and rash, if we consider how difficult and desperate a task it is, to instruct, convince, or soften the minds of an

army so composed, when once their passions are inflamed, when hatred and resentment have taken root among them, and a sedition is actually begun. Under these circumstances, they are no longer men, but wild beasts of prey. Their fury will not be confined within the ordinary bounds of human wickedness or violence; but breaks out into effects the most terrible and monstrous that are to be found in nature. This was now experienced by the Carthaginians. Their army was composed of Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; of some from the Balearic islands; of spurious Greeks, the greater part of whom were fugitives and slaves; but chiefly of Africans. To assemble all these together, and harangue them with any good effect, was a thing impracticable; unless the general had been acquainted with all their different languages. And to address them separately by interpreters, repeating still the same thing four or five times over, seemed a task as difficult as the other, and not more likely to succeed. It remained therefore, to engage their officers to employ such entreaties and arguments among them as the occasion required. And this was the method that was now pursued by Hanno. But it happened, that some of these understood not what was said: while others, seeming to consent to, and approve of the instructions that were given them, repeated all things differently to the soldiers; some through ignorance, and some from malice: so that suspicion, doubt, distrust, and discord reigned through all. They suspected likewise, that it was not by acci-

dent, but with deliberate design, that the Carthaginians had deputed to them a man who was not present at any of their services in Sicily; instead of sending any of those generals, who had been eye-witnesses of their exploits, and had promised them the rewards which they now demanded. At last, being fully inflamed against the Carthaginians, despising the authority of Hanno, and distrusting severally their own officers, they began their march towards the city with all their forces, amounting to more than twenty thousand men; and encamped at Tunis, which was distant from Carthage about a hundred and twenty stadia.

The Carthaginians were sensible of their imprudence when it was now too late. They had been guilty of one great error, in drawing together to one place so large a body of foreign soldiers; while the forces that they were able to raise at home, were such as could not greatly be depended on, in case of any difficult emergency. But it was still more rash and inconsiderate, to oblige them to take along with them their wives and children, and all their goods; for these might have served as hostages, by the help of which the Carthaginians might have made the troops at all times tractable and compliant, and pursued in full security such measures as their interest required.

In consequence of these mistakes, they now were thrown into so great a consternation, upon the near approach of these enraged mercenaries, that they submitted to try every expedient that was likely to soften their resentment. They or-

dered all kinds of provisions to be conveyed to their camp in great abundance; and there to be sold, at such prices as the soldiers were pleased to fix. They sent continual deputations to them from the senate, promising to consent to all their demands as far as their power would reach. But as this denoted the extreme apprehension and dismay with which the Carthaginians were seized, so it served only to increase the insolence of the mercenaries. Their demands rose higher every day. And so much were they elated by their past exploits in Sicily against the Romans, that they began to be persuaded that neither the Carthaginians nor any other people of the world, were able to stand against them in the field. No sooner therefore were the stipends settled upon their own conditions, than they made a new demand of some allowance for the horses which they had lost in battle. This being likewise consented to, they next insisted, that their appointment for provisions, which was now run into a long arrear, should be adjusted according to the highest price that corn had borne during any part of the war. In a word, some new pretences were every day suggested by the seditious that were among them; till their demands upon the whole were such as it was not possible for the republic to discharge. The Carthaginians however engaged to satisfy them to the utmost of their abilities; and at last prevailed to have the dispute referred to one of the generals under whom they had served in Sicily.

Amilcar Barcas, who was one of these, was by no means agreeable to the troops: for as he never had been joined in any of the deputations to them, and had also shown such willingness and haste to lay down his command, they considered him as in part the cause, that so little respect had been paid to their demands. But Gesco was a man whom they all regarded with esteem and favour. He also had borne command in Sicily; and had, upon all occasions, seemed attentive to their interests; but most particularly so, when he was intrusted with the care of embarking them for Carthage. To his decision, therefore, they readily consented to refer the whole.

Gesco being furnished with such sums of money as were necessary, sailed away to Tunis. As soon as he arrived, he called together first the officers, and afterwards the soldiers by their several nations. And having reproved them for the past, enlarged upon the state and circumstances of the present times, and above all things recommended to them a better conduct for the time to come; conjuring them to look more favourably upon the Carthaginians, under whose pay they had so long borne arms; he next applied himself to distribute among the troops, according to their several countries, the stipends that were due.

There was among them a certain Campanian, a fugitive slave, named Spendius, who was noted both for an uncommon strength of body, and for a spirit in war that was fearless and enterprising even to rashness. This man, being apprehensive

of falling again into the hands of his master, and of being put to death in torture, according to the Roman laws, employed his utmost efforts, both by words and actions, to prevent all treaty with the Carthaginians. There was also an African, whose name was Matho, who was indeed of free condition, and had served regularly in the army: but having been the chief incendiary in the late commotions, and fearing lest the punishment even of those disorders which others had committed should fall most heavily upon himself, he entered eagerly into all the views of Spendius, and resolved to pursue the same design. Having therefore assembled the Africans apart, he endeavoured to convince them, that as soon as the rest of the troops were satisfied, and dismissed to their respective countries, they alone would be exposed to all the vengeance of the Carthaginians, who would not fail to punish their revolt, in a manner that should strike a terror into all the states of Afric. These suggestions increased the rage with which they were before inflamed. And because Gesco only discharged the stipends that were due, but reserved the allowance for their corn and horses to a distant time, on this slight pretence the soldiers ran together tumultuously in a body. Spendius and Matho harangued the assembly, in terms full of the bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians. These were greedily received, and attended to with pleasure: but if any other persons advanced to speak, the multitude, without waiting till they were informed whether their sen-

timents were contrary to, or the same with those of Spendius, instantly fell upon them, and destroyed them with stones. A great number, as well of officers as private men, lost their lives in this manner. The single word which they all in common understood, was, *kill;* for this was now become their constant practice: especially in their afternoon assemblies, when they were inflamed with wine. At those times, as soon as any one began to call out *kill,* the attack was made so suddenly, and with so much fury from every quarter, that it was not possible for any to escape, who had fallen within their reach. This fury having in a short time silenced all debate, Spendius and Matho were declared generals.

Amidst all the madness and disorder, which had now taken possession of the camp, Gesco, preferring the safety of his country to every other consideration, and fearing lest the savage fury, with which these mercenaries were inflamed, should bring entire destruction and ruin upon Carthage, never ceased to expose himself to danger, but tried every remedy which care or vigilance could suggest: sometimes addressing himself to the officers apart; and sometimes calling together the soldiers of each several nation, and exhorting them to return again to their duty. But it happened, that when the Africans, in one of these assemblies, were bold and importunate in their clamours for the allowance for provisions, which they had not yet received, Gesco, in order to check their insolence, bade them go and demand

it of their general Matho. This answer inflamed their minds to such a height of fury that, not admitting the least delay, they ran to lay hands upon the money that had been brought from Carthage, and afterwards seized Gesco and his company. Spendius and Matho employed all their arts to feed and keep up the rage of the soldiers; being persuaded, that if they could once be drawn to commit some violent and desperate action, a war must necessarily follow. The attempt succeeded; they seized the money into their hands; plundered the Carthaginians of their goods and equipage; and having ignominiously loaded Gesco and his companions with chains, threw them into prison; and from this time declared open war against the Carthaginians, in defiance of all the laws of justice and religion, and of the established rights of mankind.

Such were the causes, and such the beginning of the war against the foreign mercenaries, which is usually called the African war.

When Matho had thus far accomplished his design, he sent ambassadors to all the cities of Afric, inviting them to join in this attempt, and lend their assistance towards the recovery of their common liberty. The greater part of these readily embraced the occasion, and raised large supplies both of troops and stores. The army then divided itself into two separate bodies, and marched to lay siege to Utica and Hippo, two cities that had refused to join in the revolt.

The Carthaginians were deeply affected by this

state of their affairs, which seemed to be almost desperate. What their own territory produced was, indeed, at all times sufficient for the common occasions of the people; but all the public necessities had constantly been supplied by stores and contributions drawn from the African cities; and their battles were always fought by foreign troops. But now these resources not only failed, but were turned against them to their destruction. The misery, too, was more severely felt, because it had happened so contrary to all their hopes. Wearied and exhausted by the length and close continuance of the war in Sicily, they flattered themselves that, after the conclusion of the peace, they should be able to enjoy some little repose and ease. But the event proved different; a war was ready to receive them, far greater and more terrible than the other. In the first, the only contest was for Sicily against the Romans: the latter was a civil and domestic war, in which their country, lives, and liberties, were all in danger. Besides this, they had no store of arms, nor any naval force; for their fleets had been all destroyed in the late engagements. They had no method of procuring supplies; no revenues to support an army; nor so much as one single ally or friend, from whom they could expect assistance. Now were they sensible, how much more civil dissentions are to be dreaded than a war maintained in a foreign country, against a foreign enemy. But these distresses were in a great measure owing to themselves. For during the late war they had treated all the Africans with extreme severity;

being persuaded that the necessities of the times would justify their conduct. Upon this pretence, they exacted through the country one half of all the annual produce; and imposed a tribute on the cities, double to what was paid before the war. No favour or remission was ever shown to any, how poor or indigent soever. Among the governors of provinces, such as were of a mild and gentle disposition, were held in no esteem at Carthage; but those were most caressed and honoured who collected the amplest stores, and practised the greatest cruelty upon the country. Hanno was one of these. A people so oppressed wanted no persuasions to excite them to revolt; a single message was sufficient. The very women, who had often quietly beheld their husbands and their children dragged to prison, when they were unable to discharge the tribute, now met together in every city; and having solemnly engaged themselves not to conceal any part of their goods, they brought together all their ornaments, and threw them into the common treasure; by which means Spendius and Matho were furnished with supplies in such abundance, that they not only paid the soldiers their arrears, as it had been promised them in the beginning of the revolt, but were able also from that time to defray all the necessary expenses of the war. So true it is, that in affairs of government it is the part of prudence not to confine our views to the exigencies only of the present time, but rather to look forwards to the future.

The Carthaginians, though beset by so many

evils, made haste to draw together new troops of mercenaries, and appointed Hanno to be their general; who, some time before, had been successful in reducing Hecatompylus, together with the adjacent parts of Afric, to the Carthaginian yoke. They armed, likewise, all the citizens that were of sufficient age; trained and disciplined the cavalry of the city; and refitted what was left them of their fleet; some triremes, a few vessels of fifty oars, and the largest of their boats.

Spendius and Matho, being joined by all the Africans, to the amount of seventy thousand, had divided their forces, and were now laying siege to Utica and Hippo. They held also a strong camp at Tunis; so that the Carthaginians were cut off from all communication with exterior Afric; for Carthage is situated within a gulf upon a long tract of land, which bears the form of a peninsula, being almost every way surrounded, partly by the sea and partly by a lake. The isthmus, which connects it with the rest of Afric, is about twenty-five stadia in its breadth. At a moderate distance from the isthmus, and on that side which is bounded by the sea, stands Utica; on the other side, upon the lake, is Tunis. The mercenaries having gained possession of these two posts, and thus blocked up the Carthaginians within their walls, made frequent incursions both by night and day even to the very gates, and filled the city with continual terror and alarms.

Hanno completed all the necessary preparations with diligence and dexterity. This, indeed, was his

peculiar talent; but his abilities in the field were wholly contemptible and mean. He wanted penetration to discern the proper opportunities of action; and his whole conduct showed him to be destitute both of skill and spirit. For though, upon his first march to Utica to relieve the siege, he obtained great advantages against the enemy, who were seized with terror at the number of his elephants, which were not fewer than a hundred; yet so far was he from improving this success, as he might have done, so as to gain a complete and decisive victory, that, on the contrary, he endangered even the safety of those whom he came to succour. He had ordered catapults, and all the train of military engines, to be brought to him out of the city; and sitting down at no great distance from the besiegers, he resolved to attack their camp. The elephants advanced with so much violence that they soon broke through the intrenchments; and the mercenaries, unable to sustain the shock, fled from the camp with the utmost precipitation. A great part of them were killed by the beasts; the rest escaped to an adjoining hill, that was rough and craggy, and covered with woods, and relied upon the strength of the place for their security. Hanno, who had been always used to fight against the Africans and Numidians, whose custom it is, whenever they are routed, to continue their flight for two or three days together, till they are quite removed from the place of action; Hanno, I say, imagining that the war was ended, and all danger past, abandoned at once all care both of

the soldiers and the camp; and retiring into the city, began to spend his time in luxury and ease. But these troops, who saved themselves upon the hill, had been trained under the discipline of the bold Amilcar; and, during their campaigns in Sicily, had been accustomed to retreat before the enemy, even many times in the same day, and to return again as often to the charge. When they therefore saw that the general was gone into the city, and that the soldiers, through confidence from their late victory, neglected to guard the camp, and were dispersed up and down without any care or caution, they suddenly returned, and marching in close order, forced their way through the intrenchments, killing a great number of the Carthaginians, and constraining the rest to save themseves by a hasty and ignominious flight. They became masters also of the baggage, and of all the military machines which Hanno had ordered to be brought out of the city, and which were now by that means lost. But this was not the only instance in which this general showed his want of sense; for in a few days after, when the two armies lay encamped very near each other in the neighbourhood of Gorza, though he had twice an opportunity of forcing the enemy to an engagement, and twice also of attacking them by surprise, yet so absurd and foolish was his conduct, that he suffered all these occasions to escape him.

At last the Carthaginians seeing that their affairs were so ill conducted, made choice of Amilcar Barcas for their general, and intrusted to him the

care of the war. The army consisted of seventy elephants; of such bodies of mercenaries as they had been able to draw together; of some deserters from the enemy; and of the cavalry and infantry of the city, which amounted to about ten thousand men. Amilcar, by the very first action which he performed, struck the enemy with inconceivable dismay and terror, and forced them to raise the siege of Utica. It was an action equal to the greatness of his past exploits; and such as fully answered the expectations which his country had conceived of him. The manner of it was as follows.

The extremity of the isthmus, which joins Carthage to the rest of Afric, is secured by a chain of rough and craggy hills, over which there are roads made by art, which give access to the other side. Upon these hills Matho had taken care to place a guard in every part that was commodious for the purpose. Every other passage from Carthage to the country was obstructed by the Macar; a deep and rapid river, that was scarcely fordable in any part, and which had only one single bridge across it. The mercenaries had built a town upon the bridge, and guarded it with the greatest care, so that it was not possible not only for an army, but even for a single man, to pass without discovery. Amilcar having carefully considered all these obstacles, and employed his thoughts on every probable method of surmounting them, at last put in practice the following expedient. Having observed, that as often as certain winds began to blow,

the mouth of the river was always filled with sand, so as to afford a firm and easy passage over it, he made all things ready for his design, and waited for the time, without disclosing to any one his intention. The winds blew accordingly; and Amilcar, beginning his march by night with all possible secrecy, appeared on the other side of the river before break of day, to the great astonishment both of the enemy and of those that were besieged in Utica. He then continued his march along the plain, to attack the forces that were stationed at the bridge.

When Spendius saw what had happened, he made haste to meet the enemy, at the head of ten thousand men, from the town upon the bridge. About fifteen thousand more marched at the same time from the camp before Utica to support the first. As soon as they were joined, they mutually exhorted each other, and advanced to the fight, imagining that it would be easy to surround the Carthaginian army, and enclose them as in a snare. Amilcar was marching with the elephants in front; behind these were the light-armed troops and cavalry; and last of all, his heavy forces. But when he remarked the impetuosity with which the enemy advanced against him, he suddenly inverted his whole disposition; commanding the troops that were in front to wheel off and fall behind, and those that were behind to advance and form the front. The mercenaries, imagining that this motion was the effect of fear, and that the Carthaginians already were preparing to retreat, quitted their ranks, and ran on briskly to the charge. But

no sooner had the cavalry faced about again, and come forwards to cover and support the rest of the forces that were standing in perfect order, than the Africans, astonished by a motion which they had not looked for, turned their backs and fled; and fell back upon their own forces in great disorder. Many were destroyed in that confusion; but the greater part were trodden down in heaps by the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants. Upon the whole, about six thousand of them were killed, and two thousand taken. The rest escaped, some to the camp before Utica, and some to the town upon the bridge.

Amilcar having thus gained the victory, pursued the enemy to the town, which they abandoned on his first approach, and retired to Tunis. He afterwards marched his army through the country, drawing many cities to submission, and reducing many more by force; and by this success he restored the courage and raised the drooping spirits of his countrymen.

But Matho, who was at this time employed in the siege of Hippo, advised Spendius, and Autaritus the general of the Gauls, to follow closely after the Carthaginians, and attend to all their motions; taking care only to avoid the plains, by reason of the cavalry and elephants; and keeping their route along the sides of the mountains, to wait their opportunity of falling upon the enemy, whenever they should be engaged in any difficulties. He sent likewise to the cities of Afric and Numidia, to solicit new supplies; and conjured them

not to let pass the present occasion, so favourable for recovering their common liberty. Spendius, taking with him six thousand men from all the different nations that were at Tunis, together with the Gauls, who now amounted to two thousand only, the rest having deserted to the Romans during the siege of Eryx, followed the advice of Matho, and marched along the sides of the hills and mountains, waiting still upon the motions of the Carthaginian army. It happened, that Amilcar lay encamped in a certain plain surrounded on every side by mountains, when the expected succours also arrived from Afric and Numidia, and joined the army of the rebels. This threw the Carthaginians into the greatest consternation. The Africans had fixed their camp before them; Spendius with his forces lay on one side, and the Numidians were in their rear. The danger was so threatening, that there seemed to be no way left to escape it.

But while things were in this situation, a certain Numidian prince, named Naravasus, a man of a noble and generous disposition, and one whose inclinations had always led him to favour the Carthaginians on account of former connexions between his family and that people, and who was now the more confirmed in those sentiments by what he had heard of the great abilities and fame of Amilcar Barcas, considered this as a proper time for settling an entire and perfect union between himself and the republic. He went therefore to the Carthaginian camp, attended by about

a hundred horsemen; and advancing close to the intrenchments, stood boldly there, making signals with his hand. Amilcar, surprised at the appearance, sent one to inquire his business. He answered, that he desired a conference with the general. And when Amilcar seemed still doubtful and irresolute, as if suspecting some ill design, Naravasus, delivering his horse and javelins to some of the attendants, entered unarmed into the camp; with such an air of confidence and intrepidity, as struck the Carthaginians with astonishment and awe. They conducted him however to the general, to whom he declared, "that he was attached by inclination to all the Carthaginians, but more particularly solicitous to obtain Amilcar's friendship: that he was therefore come to enter into treaty with him: to assist in all his undertakings; and to share in all his counsels, without deceit or fraud." The candour and sincerity that appeared in this discourse, together with the confidence with which the young man had at first approached the camp, gave so much joy and satisfaction to Amilcar, that he not only consented to admit him as a partner in all his counsels and designs, but promised also with an oath to give him his daughter in marriage, if he continued firm in his alliance with the Carthaginians. The agreement being thus concluded, Naravasus brought over to the camp the Numidians that were under his command, amounting to two thousand men.

As soon as Amilcar had received this reinforcement, he drew out his army in order of battle.

Spendius likewise, being joined by the Africans, descended into the plain, and advanced to engage the enemy. The fight was obstinate: but the Carthaginians at last prevailed. The elephants performed great service in the action: and Naravasus signalized himself above all the army. About ten thousand of the enemy were killed, and four thousand taken. Spendius and Autaritus saved themselves by flight. When the action was ended, as many of the prisoners as were willing to serve among the Carthaginians, were received into the army: and Amilcar, having ordered the rest to be brought before him, informed them, that they should now be pardoned for all that was past, and be permitted to depart to what place soever their several inclinations led them; but that if ever again they were found in arms against the Carthaginians, they must then expect to be treated with the last severity.

About this time, the mercenaries that were garrisoned in Sardinia, being encouraged by the example of Spendius and Matho, revolted from their duty; and having shut up their general Bostar in the citadel, destroyed him and all his countrymen. The Carthaginians sent Hanno to reduce them with an army. But these troops also joined the party of the rebels: and Hanno having fallen alive into their hands, was immediately nailed to a cross. They afterwards put to death all the Carthaginians that were in the place, by new and unusual tortures. And having seized the principal towns, they maintained themselves by force in the

possession of the island. But some time afterwards, when they had engaged in some disputes against the people of the country, the latter drove them from the island, and forced them to fly to Italy for refuge. In this manner was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians: an island famous for its size, fertility, and number of inhabitants; and so fully celebrated on these accounts by many writers, that it is not necessary to repeat in this place what has already been observed and confessed by others.

Matho, Spendius, and Autaritus, jealous of the effects of Amilcar's gentle treatment of the prisoners, and fearing lest the soldiers, seduced by that show of clemency, should run to embrace the pardon that was offered, resolved to engage the multitude in some horrid and inhuman action, which might render their minds quite furious and implacable towards the Carthaginians. For this purpose, having called the troops together, they introduced among them a courier, as bringing letters from the rebels in Sardinia. The contents of these were, to advise them to look more carefully after Gesco and his companions, whom they had seized at Tunis; for that there were some persons in the camp, who were concerting measures with the Carthaginians to set them free. Spendius immediately laid hold on this occasion to harangue the assembly. He conjured them to give no credit to the affected lenity of Amilcar: that his intention was not so much to save the prisoners whom he had taken, as to seduce by that show of mercy the

whole army into his power, that he might afterwards include them all in one common punishment. He exhorted them to guard Gesco with all imaginable care: that the escape of a man so eminent, and of such abilities in war, would not only make them appear contemptible to the enemy, but might also prove the entire ruin of their affairs; since if he once should find himself at liberty, he would not fail to turn against them, and become their most formidable enemy. He had scarcely ended, when a second courier entered, as if sent from Tunis, with letters of the same advice and import. Upon this, Autaritus rose up to speak. He observed to them, that they could now have no view of safety, but in rejecting every thing that looked towards an accommodation with the Carthaginians: that in proportion as any were suspended in their thoughts by the hopes of pardon, they must by consequence become less sincere and steady in the cause in which they were engaged. He advised them to place their only confidence in those whose sentiments were most severe and bitter against the Carthaginians; and to consider all besides as enemies and traitors. In conclusion, he urged it as his opinion, that Gesco, and the rest that were prisoners with him, should presently be put to death in torture: and that the same treatment should be also shown to all the Carthaginians, who should from that time fall into their hands.

Of all the chiefs, Autaritus was able to make the greatest impression in these assemblies, because he

had learned to speak in the Punic language; which the long continuance of the war had rendered so familiar to the soldiers, that they used it for the most part on all occasions of common intercourse and civility. His opinion, therefore, was received with general acclamations, and assented to with eagerness. Yet some of every nation, moved by the remembrance of the kindnesses which they had received from Gesco, came forwards in the assembly, and began to beg, that at least the torture might be spared. As they all spoke together, and each in the language of his country, they were not presently understood. But no sooner was it declared, that they were pleading against the punishment, and one of the assembly had called out, *kill, kill* them all, than they were instantly overwhelmed with stones by the furious multitude, and their bodies carried off by their companions, as if they had been slaughtered by some savage beasts. Spendius and the soldiers then took Gesco, together with the rest of the Carthaginian prisoners, in number about seven hundred; and having conducted them to a little distance without the camp, cut off their hands, beginning first with Gesco: the same whom they had proclaimed not long before to be their benefactor and their friend, and chosen as the judge of all their wrongs and differences. They afterwads tore away the scalp from the heads of these unhappy men; and having broken and miserably mangled all their limbs, cast them still breathing into a pit together.

The news of this horrible transaction affected the Carthaginians with the deepest grief. They ordered their generals Hanno and Amilcar to take some speedy and effectual vengeance upon the murtherers of their countrymen. They likewise sent some heralds to those impious wretches, desiring leave to remove their bodies. But the rebels returned for answer, that they should from that time send neither herald nor ambassador to their camp, on pain of their being punished with the same cruel death. They also made a law for the time to come, by which it was resolved, that all the Carthaginians that were taken should lose their lives in torture, and their allies have first their hands cut off, and be then sent back in that condition to the camp. And this was punctually observed and executed.

Whoever makes reflection upon these horrid cruelties, will easily be convinced, that if the human body is sometimes invaded by certain corrupt and ulcerous humours which resist all remedy, the minds of men are also not less liable to some disorders that prove as obstinate and fatal. And as in the former case, the very medicines which are designed to effect a cure, often serve only to inflame and irritate the parts to which they are applied, and even quicken the progress of the evil; yet, on the other hand, if the disease be totally neglected, the corruption soon spreads itself through all the neighbouring parts, infecting every thing within its reach, till the whole body becomes unsound: just so it happens to the mind, whenever

it is tainted with those dark and malignant passions, which render man more impious and savage even than the beasts themselves. If you offer to men in this condition the softening remedies of clemency and pardon, they presently suspect it to be mere fraud and artifice; their diffidence grows stronger, and their aversion to you is more deeply rooted than before. But if you resist their violence, and oppose revenge to cruelty, there is then no crime too horrible, no attempt too monstrous for them to engage in. They exult and glory in their impieties, and by degrees divest themselves of every sentiment and passion that distinguish human nature. It is not to be doubted, but that these disorders are chiefly owing to a bad education, and impure manners; though there are many other causes, which may sometimes assist to bring them on: among which none is so likely to be effectual, as the insolence and rapaciousness of public governors. The truth of these remarks is evident from all that now passed among the mercenaries; and more particularly, from the conduct of their chief commanders.

Amilcar being now in the highest degree incensed against the enemy, and finding himself too weak to encounter with their unbounded rage and madness, invited Hanno to come and join him: hoping by means of their united forces to put a speedy end to the war. And being persuaded, that nothing less than the entire extirpation of these wretches could bring the affair to any effectual conclusion, he ordered all those that

should fall within the reach of the sword in battle, to be instantly destroyed; and such as were at any time brought prisoners to be cast alive to the elephants. The Carthaginians were now beginning to flatter themselves with better hopes, when on a sudden their whole prospect was fatally reversed. The generals were no sooner joined, than they were found to differ from each other in all their sentiments. And to such a height was this dissension raised between them, that they not only neglected every fair occasion of doing hurt to the enemy, but even exposed their own troops to frequent attacks and losses, by their mutual jealousies and contests. The Carthaginians, therefore, were forced to send orders, that one of them should quit the army; but left it to the troops to make the choice. It happened also, about the same time, that the convoys that were sailing to the army from Emporia, a place from whence they usually drew their largest supplies of corn and other necessaries, were all sunk in the ocean by a storm. Sardinia likewise, which, in times of danger or necessity, had always furnished liberally to their wants, was now revolted from them. But the severest stroke of all was the loss of Utica and Hippo. For among all the African cities, these two alone had remained unshaken in their duty; not only in the beginning of the present war, but during the time also of Agathocles, and when the Romans invaded Afric; and had, on all occasions, served and supported the republic with singular affection and fidelity. Yet now, they not only em-

braced the party of the rebels, without any kind of pretext or excuse, but showed even an uncommon zeal and activity in the cause; expressing, at the same time, the most implacable enmity and hatred against the Carthaginians. They seized the troops that had been sent among them for their defence, which were not fewer than five hundred men, and put them all to death, together with their commanders, and cast them without the walls. Nor would they even grant permission for their bodies to be buried, though this was requested by the Carthaginians. This situation of affairs so much raised the hopes of Spendius and Matho that they resolved to lay siege to Carthage.

Amilcar being joined by Annibal, who was sent to command in the room of Hanno, whom the army had displaced when the differences between the chiefs were referred to their decision, marched his troops through the country, endeavouring to cut off all supplies from the enemy. In the execution of this design, Naravasus and his cavalry were of great service to him; as indeed they were upon all occasions of the war. Such then was the state of the armies in the field.

But the Carthaginians, being thus on every side closely invested by their enemies, were forced to have recourse to the states that were in alliance with them. Hiero, whose attention was fixed upon the war, had all along complied with every thing that was requested of him. But at this time, especially, he applied himself to serve them with all imaginable zeal; as, judging that his interest re-

quired him, in order to preserve his own dominions and his alliance with the Romans, to assist in saving the Carthaginians from destruction; lest the conquerors should become too powerful to be controlled in any future projects. In this he certainly was guided by the dictates of good sense and prudence. For these conjectures are by no means to be slighted; nor ought we ever to permit any growing power to raise itself to such a degree of strength, as to be able to tear from us without resistance even our natural undisputed rights.

The Romans also punctually observed the terms of the late treaty which they had made with Carthage, and espoused their interests with zeal. At first, indeed, an accident had happened which threatened to embroil anew the two republics. Some persons, sailing from the ports of Italy to Afric, had conveyed supplies to the camp of the mercenaries. The Carthaginians seized on these, who were in number about five hundred, and threw them into prison. The Romans were greatly offended at this proceeding; but as the men were all immediately released again upon the first demand, they were so much pleased and softened by that compliance, that they not only sent back all the Carthaginian prisoners that were left from the Sicilian war, but from that time cheerfully assisted the republic with every office of humanity and friendship. They gave permission to their merchants to export all kinds of necessaries to Carthage; at the same time prohibiting them from carrying any to the enemy. They refused to invade Sardinia,

though invited to it by the mercenaries that had revolted there. And when the inhabitants of Utica offered to put them in possession of that city, they rejected the proposal, and adhered religiously to their treaty. By the help of all these succours, the Carthaginians were enabled to sustain the siege; while Spendius and Matho were themselves no less besieged; for Amilcar had intercepted all provisions from their camp; and at last reduced them to such extremity that they were forced to raise the siege.

Some time afterwards these generals, having drawn together the bravest of their forces, to the number of fifty thousand, among whom was Zarxas, an African, with the troops under his command, resumed their first design, of following Amilcar close in all his marches, and attending to the motions of his army. Their chief care was, to avoid the plains, from apprehensions of the elephants and cavalry; and to possess themselves, before the enemy, of all the mountainous defiles and narrow passes. In acts of courage and enterprising boldness, they showed themselves to be in no point inferior to the Carthaginians; but their want of skill was often fatal to them. Upon this occasion, the difference was clearly seen, between a conduct that is built upon the rules of military science, and an irregular and unskilful method of making war. For Amilcar would sometimes contrive to separate small bodies from their army, and, like an artful chess-player, enclosing them on every side, by that means destroy them. Sometimes, when his mo-

tions seemed to promise a general engagement, he drew them into ambuscades of which they had no suspicion. In a word, he was ever ready to attack them both by night and day, when they least expected his approach. Great numbers of them were thus destroyed; and as many as were taken alive were thrown to the elephants. At last, coming upon them by surprise, he fixed his camp near them in a place that was very proper for his own forces, but incommodious to the rebels. In this situation, not daring to risk a battle, nor able to escape, by reason of the intrenchments which Amilcar had extended round them, they were reduced to so great extremity by famine, that they were forced to feed upon each other: as if the Deity had designed to inflict a punishment upon them that might be equal in its horror and impiety to the crimes which they had committed against their fellow-creatures. But if they wanted courage to venture on an engagement, in which they were sure of being defeated, and exposed to a cruel punishment if taken, they were much less able to entertain any thoughts of treaty or accommodation, when they reflected upon their past transactions. Their only hopes were in the succours which they expected would arrive from Tunis; for with this hope their chiefs continued still to flatter them. Under this assurance, they submitted yet for some time longer to practice this horrible barbarity against each other. But when they had impiously devoured all their prisoners and slaves, and no

succours were arrived, the multitude grew impatient of their misery, and began to threaten their chiefs. Spendius, therefore, with Autáritus and Zàrxas, resolved to go themselves to the enemy, and treat of peace. Having first dispatched a herald, and obtained a safe conduct, they went accordingly to the Carthaginian camp, and concluded a treaty with Amilcar upon these conditions: "That the Carthaginians should choose from among the enemy ten persons, whomsoever they thought proper, and that the rest should be dismissed, each with his single garment." Amilcar then said, that in consequence of the treaty, he made choice of those that were there present. Thus the Carthaginians got into their power Spendius and Autaritus, and the rest of their officers of greatest eminence.

The Africans, who were ignorant of the terms of the treaty, no sooner found that their chiefs were made prisoners, than they ran tumultuously to arms, in order to resent the supposed treachery. But Amilcar, surrounding them with the elephants, utterly destroyed them all, to the amount of more than forty thousand men. The place where this action happened was called the Saw, because the figure of it somewhat resembled that instrument. By this victory, Amilcar raised the hopes of his countrymen a second time, when they had almost begun to despair of safety. He then marched through the country, with Annibal and Naravasus; and having received the Africans, who were ready every where to submit, and recovered most of the

principal towns to their party, they next advanced to lay siege to Tunis, into which Matho had retired with all his forces.

Annibal fixed his camp before the city, on that side of it which looked towards Carthage; while Amilcar posted himself on the opposite side. They then took Spendius, and the rest of the prisoners, and carrying them near the walls, crucified them there, in sight of the enemy. But Matho, perceiving that Annibal, elated by the past success, was remiss and negligent in his post, sallied out upon him, and attacking the intrenchments, killed a great number of the Carthaginians, and forced the rest to fly out of the camp. All the baggage was lost, and Annibal himself taken prisoner. This last was immediately conducted to the cross of Spendius, and fixed alive upon it; after he had first been forced to suffer the most cruel torments. They killed also thirty of the noblest Carthaginians round Spendius's body. As if fortune had taken unusual pains, to afford alternately to either party, the means of retaliating upon the other by the most inhuman methods of revenge.

The distance of the two camps prevented Amilcar from being informed in time of what had happened. Nor was he able, when he knew it, to send any succours, on account of the difficulties of the way that lay between. He therefore, immediately decamped, and marching along the Macar, sat down near the mouth of that river.

The Carthaginians had just begun to recover new life, and were entertaining better hopes, when

this unhappy affair threw them again into no small dejection and amazement. They did not, however, neglect the care of their safety; but choosing thirty of the senators, they sent them away to Amilcar, together with Hanno, the former general, and all the citizens that were left of age to bear arms; so that this was considered as their last and only effort. They earnestly recommended it to the senators, to use all their power to reconcile the generals, and to engage them to regard only the exigencies of the republic, and act together with such harmony as the state of affairs required. After many conferences and debates, this was at last effected. Hanno and Amilcar were constrained to agree in sentiments, and yielded up their differences to the public good. From this time all things went prosperously for the Carthaginians; who gained continually some advantage over the enemy, in a variety of little combats, ambuscades, pursuits, both in the neighbourhood of Leptis, and in other places; till Matho, finding himself so greatly harassed and distressed, was determined to engage in a decisive action. The Carthaginians, on their side, showed no less eagerness. Both parties, therefore, summoned all their allies; recalled their garrisons from the towns; and resolved to risk the whole upon a single battle. When all things were ready, the generals, by agreement, drew out their forces, and the fight began. The victory was on the side of the Carthaginians. The greatest part of the Africans were killed in the action; the rest escaped to a certain city that was near, but surrendered

themselves in a short time after. Matho was taken prisoner. All the parts of Afric soon submitted to the conquerors, except the cities of Utica and Hippo; which alone were forced to disclaim all thoughts of peace, because their past behaviour had left them no hopes of pardon. Of such importance is it, in dissensions of this kind, to observe a moderate conduct, and abstain from all such excesses as are too great for mercy. But no sooner had Hanno invested one of them, and Amilcar the other, than they were forced to surrender at discretion. Thus the war, which had threatened entire destruction to the Carthaginians, was now ended in reducing all the parts of Afric to their former obedience, and in punishing the authors of it; for the youth of the city, after they had led the prisoners in triumph, inflicted upon Matho and the rest every kind of indignity and torture that invention could contrive.

Such was the conclusion of the war between the Carthaginians and their mercenaries, after a continuance of three years and about four months; a war by far the most impious and bloody of any that we find in history.

About this time the Romans, invited, as we have already mentioned, by the mercenaries that had revolted in Sardinia, resolved to take possession of that island; and when the Carthaginians began to show their resentment of this proceeding, and were preparing to oppose by force the rebels that had thus robbed them of their rights, the Romans presently declared war against them; pretending that

their preparations were not so much designed against the people of Sardinia as against themselves. The Carthaginians, who had been just before delivered, when they least expected it, from a most dreadful war, and were by no means able, in their present circumstances, to contend against the Romans, yielded to the necessity of the times, and not only gave up Sardinia, but consented also to pay twelve hundred talents, rather than be involved in a war which they were too weak at that time to sustain.

BOOK THE SECOND.

CHAPTER I.

WE showed in the preceding book at what time it was that the Romans, after they had fully settled the affairs of Italy, began first to extend their views abroad; the manner in which they passed over into Sicily; and the reasons that induced them to declare war against the Carthaginians, in order to drive them from that island. We took notice also of the time in which they first employed a naval armament; and recounted all that had happened to the two republics in the progress of the war; in the end of which the Carthaginians were forced to abandon Sicily, and leave to the Romans the sovereignty and possession of all the island, those parts alone excepted which belonged to Hiero. We next related, in what manner the Carthaginian mercenaries revolted from their duty, and kindled that which was called the African war. We saw to how monstrous a height their impieties were raised; with all the unnatural excesses, and dreadful circumstances that attended them; till the Carthaginians became at last superior to their enemies. We now go on, to give a concise and general abstract of the chief events which followed these transactions, agreeably to our first design.

As soon as the Carthaginians had quieted their domestic troubles, they sent Amilcar Barcas with

an army into Spain. Amilcar, taking with him Annibal his son, who was then about nine years old, passed the Straits between the Pillars of Hercules, and in the course of almost nine years which he spent in that country, greatly extended the dominions of the republic; reducing many different nations to the Carthaginian yoke, some by persuasion and some by force; and at last ended his life in a manner worthy of his former great exploits. For being engaged in battle with a certain people distinguished by their bravery and strength, and who had brought a very numerous army against him into the field, he fell nobly in the action, after he had shown amazing proofs of hardiness and courage. The Carthaginians made choice of Asdrubal to succeed him, who was general of the triremes, and nearly allied in blood to Amilcar.

About this time it was that the Romans prepared to invade Illyria, and, for the first time, sent their armies into those parts of Europe. An event which must be carefully considered and attended to by those who are inclined to enter into our design, and comprehend in its whole extent the gradual progress and advancement of the greatness of this empire. The expedition, then, owed its birth to the cause which I am going to relate.

Agron, king of Illyria, the son of Pleuratus, whose forces both by land and sea were greater than those of any of his predecessors, was gained with large sums of money by Demetrius, the father of Philip, to send relief to the Mydionians, who were besieged by the Ætolians. For when the

Ætolians had employed in vain all the methods of persuasion, to prevail upon this people to unite themselves to their republic, they resolved to subdue them to their laws by force. Having, therefore, drawn together a numerous army, they invested the city, and pressed it closely; employing against it all kinds of machines, and every method of attack. When the place, reduced to great extremity, was every day expected to surrender, the prætor of the Ætolians, reflecting that the time was also drawing near in which the magistrates were usually elected, and that his place must soon be yielded to a successor, called together an assembly of the people, and represented to them, that as he had all along sustained the chief fatigue and burthen of the siege, it was highly reasonable that he alone should possess the right of distributing the spoil, and the honour of having his name inscribed upon the trophies, whenever the city should be taken. But as this motion was opposed by many, and especially by those who had any hopes of gaining the prætorship for themselves, who insisted that no judgement should be given before the event, but the whole be reserved entire, till they should see upon whom fortune intended to bestow that honour; it was at last resolved, that if the new magistrate should take the city, the distribution of the spoil and the inscription of the trophies should be adjuged to him, in conjunction with the prætor of the former year.

When the affair was thus determined, and the very following day was the time appointed for the

new prætor to be elected and to enter into his office, according to the custom of the Ætolians; a hundred barks, having on board five thousand Illyrians, arrived in the night, and cast anchor as near the city as was possible. At break of day the troops were disembarked in great haste and silence; and having ranged themselves in order of battle after the manner of their country, they marched, divided into cohorts, towards the camp of the enemy. The Ætolians were thrown at first into some kind of consternation, by an attempt so bold and hardy, and which they had not in the least expected. But that spirit of arrogance and haughty fierceness, by which this people had been long distinguished, and their confidence in the strength and number of their forces, soon took place, and in some degree dispelled their fears. They drew up the greater part of the cavalry, together with the heavy-armed troops, upon the plain before the camp; and having, at the same time, possessed themselves of certain eminences that stood commodious for the action, they posted the rest of the cavalry upon them, with the light-armed forces. But these, being first attacked, were not able to stand against the numbers and close order of the enemy; who dispersed them with little difficulty, and forced the cavalry also to retreat back to the heavy-armed troops. The Illyrians then came pouring down with violence from the eminences upon the troops that were drawn up in battle on the plain; and being, at the same time, assisted by the Mydionians from the town, they made their

attack with such success that the Ætolians were completely routed. Many of them were killed in the action; and a greater number taken, together with all the arms and baggage. When the Illyrians had thus happily executed the orders of their king, they loaded their vessels with the spoils, and steered their course back again towards their own country.

The Mydionians, having obtained their safety in a manner so strange and unexpected, called together an assembly of the people, and, among other public resolutions, made also a decree concerning the inscription of the trophies; in which, following the example of the Ætolians, they adjudged it in common to the prætor that was then in office, and to those who should afterwards be elected to it; as if fortune had designed to give a most conspicuous proof of her power in all human affairs, by thus enabling the Mydionians to retort upon their enemies the very act and manner of disgrace which but a little time before had been decreed against themselves. What happened now to the Ætolians may serve also to instruct us, never to deliberate upon the future as if it were already arrived, nor build any certain expectations on events which, perhaps, may take a very contrary turn from what at first they seem to promise; but in all human affairs, and especially in those that relate to war, to leave always some room to fortune, and to accidents which cannot be foreseen.

When the fleet was returned to Illyria, and had given an account to the king of their success, Agron being overjoyed that his troops had given some

check to the insolence and haughty spirit of the Ætolians, indulged himself in feasts and banquets to so great excess, that he was seized with a pleurisy, of which he died in a few days after. His wife Teuta took possession of the kingdom, and governed it with the assistance of her friends. This queen, who in her disposition was a perfect woman, dazzled with the splendour of the late success, and utterly regardless of all the states around her, at first permitted private men among her subjects to fit out ships for piracy; and afterwards, having drawn together a very considerable fleet, with an army not inferior to that which was employed in the former expedition, she gave commission to her generals, to exercise hostilities upon every nation without reserve. Their first descent was made upon the coasts of Elis and Messenia; which were, indeed, at all times more exposed to insults from the Illyrians than any other countries. For as their coast was of great extent, and their principal towns also situated far within the land, it was easy for the enemy to over-run and lay waste the country, before any effectual succours could be sent to their relief. At this time it happened, that the Illyrians had one day advanced as far as to Phœnice, a town of Epirus, in search of provisions; and finding there a body of Gallic troops, in number about eight hundred, whom the Epirots had retained in their service, they immediately began to concert measures with them for surprising the town. The Gauls soon consented to the project; and the Illyrians, having landed their troops, and

being joined by the soldiers of the garrison, made themselves masters of the place upon the first assault.

As soon as the Epirots had received the news of what had happened, they drew together an army with great diligence; and, marching towards Phœnice, they there encamped, having in their front the river that runs before the town; and for their greater safety, they removed the planks of the bridge that was upon it. Being afterwards informed that Scerdilaidas was advancing by land against them, at the head of five thousand Illyrians, and that he designed to take his route along the passes of Antigonia, they sent away one part of their army to secure that city, while the rest lay quiet in their post; indulging themselves in full security in the plenty of the country, and neglecting even to place the necessary guards about the camp. The Illyrians, having heard of the division which the enemy had made of their forces, and of the negligence that now reigned among them, began their march by night, and laying planks across the bridge, passed the river without resistance; and having possessed themselves of a strong and advantageous post, they continued there till break of day. In the morning both armies drew up their forces in order of battle, in sight of the town. The Epirots were defeated in the engagement; many of them being killed, and a greater number taken prisoners. The rest directed their flight towards Atintania, and escaped.

The Epirots, after this ill success, finding them-

selves too weak to repel the enemy, and recover what they had lost, implored assistance from the Ætolians and Achæans; who, in compassion to the desperate state of their affairs, raised an army for their relief, and marched toward Helicranum. The Illyrians that had seized Phœnice, being now joined by the troops that were brought by Scerdilaidas, came also to the same place, intending to offer battle to the enemy. But as the ground was not commodious for their design, and because they had about this time also received letters from the queen, pressing them to return with all possible diligence, to reduce some towns that had revolted to the Dardanians, they wasted all the province, and afterwards consented to make peace with the Epirots; restoring their city to them for a sum of money, and releasing all the inhabitants that were free. And having sent the slaves on board their vessels, together with the rest of their booty, they sailed away to Illyria: while Scerdilaidas, with the troops that were under his command, took his route back again through the passes of Antigonia. The success of this invasion struck no small terror into all the Greeks that inhabited the coast. For when they saw that the strongest and most powerful town of all Epirus had fallen so suddenly into the hands of the enemy, they no longer trembled for their lands and country only, as in former times; but began to fear, that there would now be no security either for themselves or any of their cities.

The Epirots, thus rescued from destruction when

they had scarcely any hopes of safety left, were so far from showing any resentment of the injuries which they had suffered, and so forgetful likewise of what they owed to their deliverers, that they sent ambassadors to Teuta, and, in conjunction with the Arcanians, entered into an alliance with her. And from this time they constantly supported and assisted the Illyrians, in opposition to all the interests of the Achæans and Ætolians: affording, by this declared ingratitude towards their friends and benefactors, a no less signal instance of their want of sense and judgement, than that which had appeared in their former conduct. Whenever we fall into any of those calamities which are naturally incident to mankind, and from which no care or foresight could have saved us, the fault is justly charged on fortune, or an enemy. But when our sufferings are purely the result of our own indiscreet and foolish conduct, the blame can be imputed only to ourselves. And as the strokes of fortune usually excite the pity of mankind, who seem willing to partake in our distresses, and are ready to lend us their assistance; so on the other hand, an open and deliberate folly cannot fail to draw after it the censure and reproaches of all who view it in its proper light. And this was plainly the treatment, which the Epirots, at this time merited in the eyes of Greece. For, in the first place, the common and well-known character of the Gauls might have rendered them more cautious of intrusting any of that nation with the defence of a noble city, whose wealth and flourishing condition

must continually tempt them by strong incitements to revolt. But this body of troops especially were men, whose temper and designs deserved to have been watched with more than ordinary care. For they not only had been driven from their country by the people of their own nation, on account of some acts of treachery and violence which they had committed against their kindred and common tribes; but when the Carthaginians, who were at that time pressed by the war of Sicily, had received about three thousand of them into their pay, and stationed them in Agrigentum, they took occasion, from some dissensions that arose between the soldiers and their chief commanders on the subject of their pay, to pillage that very city which they had been engaged to protect and guard from insult. Being afterwards in garrison at Eryx, while the Romans were besieging it, they formed a project for delivering up the town and inhabitants to the enemy: and when the treason was discovered, they went over in a body to the Roman camp. Yet among these also, they not long afterwards betrayed their trust; and plundered the temple of Erycinian Venus. As soon therefore as the war was ended, the Romans, having seen such proofs of their abandoned profligacy, stripped them of their arms, and putting them on board some vessels, banished them all out of Italy. These were the troops to whom the Epirots now committed the defence of their government and country; and trusted the most flourishing of all their cities to their care: so that in justice, themselves alone

must be considered as the chief and only cause of the misfortunes that ensued. A conduct so repugnant to all sense and reason deserved not to pass without some reflection: and it may serve hereafter as a caution to all states, never to admit too strong a garrison within their cities, especially if it be composed of strangers and barbarians.

The Illyrians had in former times very frequently molested vessels that were sailing from the ports of Italy. But while they had possession of Phœnice, they sent out large detachments from their fleet, and made depredations every where upon the Roman merchants: killing great numbers of them, and carrying many into slavery. The Romans had hitherto paid no great regard to the complaints that had been offered on this subject. But at this time these complaints were brought in such numbers to the senate, that they resolved to send Caius and Lucius Coruncanius ambassadors to Teuta, to demand some clear account of these transactions.

The queen, when she saw the beauty and immense quantity of the spoils which her fleet had brought back from Phœnice, the most opulent town of all Epirus, had been struck with admiration; and was the more confirmed in her intentions, of continuing that kind of war against the states of Greece. But some domestic commotions gave a stop to the present execution of that design, and forced her to employ her whole attention to bring back the rebels to their duty. The greater part of these being soon reduced, she was

laying siege to Issa; the only town of her dominions that still refused to submit to her authority.

To this place came the Roman ambassadors; and having gained a time of audience, they recounted all the injuries which their people had received from the Illyrians. The queen assumed high airs of disdain and fierceness during the whole time of their discourse. And when it was ended, she replied, that she would take care that her state in general should afford no matter of complaint hereafter to the Romans; but that it was not the custom in Illyria, for their kings to restrain their private subjects from endeavouring to enrich themselves upon the sea. The youngest of these ambassadors was unable to bear this haughtiness: and, with a freedom which could not have been condemned if it had been more in season, he answered, "But among the Romans, O queen, it is one of their best and noblest customs, to exact public reparation for private wrongs; and at all times to redress the complaints of their subjects: and we shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to force you shortly to reform the kingly customs of Illyria." The queen received this answer like a true woman; with much absurd passion and resentment: which carried her to such excess, that she ordered the ambassadors to be pursued as they were returning home, and, in defiance of the law of nations, killed the person who had spoken those words. The Romans, being greatly enraged by so daring and flagitious an

affront, immediately levy troops, get ready a fleet, and make all the necessary preparations for war.

In the beginning of the spring, the Illyrians, having drawn together a greater number of vessels than before, sailed away to invade the coasts of Greece. One part of the fleet steered their course to Corcyra: while the rest cast anchor in the port of Epidamnus, on pretence to take in water and provisions. But their true intention was, to make themselves masters of the town. The Epidamnians received them without suspicion, and neglected all precaution. A party entered, dressed in an under garment only, and carrying pitchers in their hands, as if they came for water. But they had swords concealed within the pitchers; with which they attacked and killed the guards that were posted at the gate, and took possession of it. And being at the same time joined, as it had been concerted, by a larger body of forces from the ships, they made themselves masters of a great part of the walls without much difficulty. But the Epidamnians, though taken by surprise, when they were in no apprehension of an enemy, resisted with such bravery and vigour, that, after a very long and obstinate dispute, they at last forced the Illyrians to retire from the town. Thus they recovered by their valour, what their negligence had almost lost; and were instructed by this accident, to use greater care and circumspection in all future times.

The Illyrians, being thus repulsed, made haste to get out to sea; and having overtaken the rest of

the fleet, they sail together to Corcyra, disembark their troops, and lay siege to the city. The Corcyreans were under no small consternation; and finding themselves too weak to encounter with so great a force, they sent to the Ætolians and Achæans imploring their assistance. The inhabitants of Apollonia and Epidamnus likewise deputed messengers to the same states; conjuring them to interpose with some speedy and effectual succours, and not permit the Illyrians to dispossess them of their towns and natural country. The Achæans and Ætolians consented readily to this request. And having, in a few days, equipped at their joint charge ten ships of war that belonged to the Achæans, they steered their course towards Corcyra, hoping to raise the siege. But the Illyrians having received seven ships of war from the Acarnanians, in consequence of their alliance with them, sailed out and engaged the enemy near the island Paxus. The fight was equal between the Acarnanians, and that part of the Achæan fleet that was engaged against them; nor was any harm sustained, except that some were wounded on either side. But the Illyrians, having tied their vessels four and four together, came on to the engagement with much seeming negligence, and even presented their flank to the enemy, as if to aid them in their attack, and render it more effectual. But no sooner were they grappled close, and the beaks of the Achæan ships had fixed them fast to the sides of the vessels that were thus bound together, than the Illyrians, entering along the decks of the enemy, overpowered

them by the number of their soldiers, took four of their quadriremes, and sunk one quinquereme to the bottom. In this latter, perished Marcus the Carynian, whose whole life had been distinguished by a zealous and close attachment to all the interests of the Achæan Commonwealth. When those that were engaged against the Acarnanians saw what had happened to the rest, they immediately prepared to fly, trusting to the celerity of their ships: and having the advantage of a fresh and favourable wind, they sailed back again to their own country, and escaped without any loss. The Illyrians were much elated by this victory, and received no farther interruption in the siege. But the Corcyreans, being quite disheartened by the ill state of their affairs, and despairing of all means of safety, sustained the siege but a short time afterwards, and then submitting to the enemy, received a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The Illyrians then steered away to sea, and returning again to Epidamnus, prepared to lay siege to that city.

About this time, one of the Roman consuls, Caius Fulvius, set out to prosecute the war, with a fleet of two hundred ships; while his colleague Aulus Postumius began his march at the head of the land forces. The former of these had resolved to sail in all haste to Corcyra; flattering himself, that he might perhaps arrive before the siege was ended. And though he was disappointed in that hope, yet he chose still to hold on his course; not only for the sake of getting more perfect information concerning all that had happened there, but

also that he might make trial of the reality and importance of some advices, which had been sent to Rome by Demetrius; who, finding that Teuta had conceived some jealousy of his conduct, and dreading the effects of her resentment, had privately offered to the Romans, to deliver Corcyra into their hands, with every thing besides that was within the reach of his authority. The Corcyreans saw with pleasure the arrival of the fleet, and with the consent of Demetrius delivered up the garrison to the Romans, and put themselves under their protection; as judging this to be the only measure by which they could hereafter be secure against the lawless attacks and insults of the Illyrians. The Romans then sailed away to Apollonia, taking Demetrius with them, by whose advice they were chiefly guided during the rest of the war. The other consul, having embarked the troops at Brundisium, arrived also about the same time at Apollonia. His army consisted of twenty thousand foot, and two thousand horse. The inhabitants received them without any difficulty, and submitted themselves entirely to their discretion. But the consuls, on the news that Epidamnus was invested, immediately hastened their march that way. The Illyrians, being informed of their approach, raised the siege in disorder, and fled. The Romans, having received the Epidamnians also into their protection, advanced farther into Illyria, and reduced the Ardyæans. They now were met by deputations from many different towns and districts. Among these were the Atintanians, and Parthinians; who offer-

ed to receive their laws. The Romans admitted them all to terms of friendship and alliance; and continued their march to Issa, which was besieged by the Illyrians. And having raised the siege, and taken the inhabitants under their protection, they then sailed along the coast, and took many towns by storm. But in the attack of one of these, called Nutria, they lost not only a great number of their soldiers, but some tribunes also, and a quæstor. They took likewise twenty boats, that were returning with plunder collected in the country. A part of the army that was employed in the siege of Issa, having declared for the interests of Demetrius, retired to Pharos, and were permitted to be safe. The rest fled in disorder, and escaped to Arbon. The queen herself, with very few attendants, got safe to Rizon; a little town of considerable strength, which stood at a distance from the sea, upon a river of the same name.

The Romans after this success, by which they had greatly enlarged the dominions of Demetrius, having prevailed on many cities of Illyria to receive him as their master, took the route back again to Epidamnus, with the fleet and army. Fulvius then returned to Rome, and carried with him the greater part of all the forces. But Postumius, having drawn together forty vessels, and raised some troops among the neighbouring towns, resolved to pass the winter there, that he might be ready, in case of danger, to repress all commotions that might arise among the Ardyæans, and the rest of

the people who had submitted, and put themselves under the protection of the Romans.

But in the beginning of the spring, ambassadors arrived at Rome from Teuta, and agreed to a peace upon these conditions: "That the queen should pay a certain tribute, and abandon all Illyria, a few places only excepted; and, which was of the greatest importance to all the states of Greece, that he should never after that time sail beyond Lissus with more than two frigates, and those unarmed."

The treaty being thus concluded, Postumius sent ambassadors to the Achæans and Ætolians, to acquaint them with the causes of the war, the progress and circumstances of it, and the terms of the peace which they had made. The ambassadors were received with great respect and favour by the two republics; and from thence they sailed away to Corcyra. The Greeks were delivered by this treaty out of no small terror; for the Illyrians were the common enemies of all.

Such was the first expedition of the Romans into Illyria and the neighbouring parts of Europe; which gave birth also to the first correspondence, in the way of embassy, between that republic and the states of Greece. From this beginning, they took occasion to depute, within a short time afterwards, another embassy to Corinth and to Athens. And it was on that occasion, that the Corinthians first admitted the Romans to be present at the Isthmian games.

CHAP. II.

DURING this time Asdrubal, for it was here that we left the affairs of Spain, conducted all things in his government with great dexterity and wisdom; enlarging the power, and advancing the interests of his republic in that country, both by the whole course of his administration in it, and more particularly by building that city, which by some is called Carthage, and by others the New City; whose situation with respect both to Spain and Afric rendered it a place of the greatest moment and importance. We shall take a proper occasion to describe more fully the advantages of this situation, and the use that may be made of it, in governing the affairs of those two countries. The Romans could not behold so sudden an increase of power without the greatest apprehensions. They saw the necessity of turning their thoughts to Spain; and resolved to raise themselves from that state of indolence and inactivity, which had as it were shut their eyes, and prevented them from paying a due attention to the progress of their enemies. At this time, however, being themselves in almost daily expectation of an invasion from the Gauls, they neither dared to declare war against the Carthaginians, nor demand any hard conditions from them; but chose rather to have recourse to mild and gentle measures, till their arms had freed them from the

apprehension of an enemy, whose situation in their very neighbourhood not only rendered their sovereignty in Italy precarious, but even threatened to deprive them of their own natural and proper country. They sent, therefore, to Asdrubal, and concluded a treaty with him, by which, no mention being made of the rest of Spain, it only was agreed, that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army. This being settled, the Romans immediately turned their arms against the Gauls.

It will by no means be a useless task, nor foreign to the design of this introduction, to give here a short account of this people, from the time of their first settlement in Italy. For besides that the subject itself is curious, and such as well deserves the pains of being particularly considered, it is also a point of the last importance, that we should in this place previously be acquainted with it, in order to gain a right conception what the country was into which Annibal afterwards led his army, and what the forces, by whose assistance he attempted to subvert the Roman empire. We shall first describe the nature of the country, and its situation with respect to the other parts of Italy; that when we have thus acquired a knowledge of the places, we may be able more easily to comprehend whatever was great and worthy of our notice, in the transactions that happened in them.

The whole of Italy resembles a triangle in its figure. The eastern side is bounded by the Ionian sea and Adriatic Gulf; the south and west by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas. The third side, to-

wards the north, is terminated by a chain of mountains called the Alps; which, beginning near Massilia, and the places above the Sardinian sea, extend without any interruption to within a very little distance of the inmost extremity of the Adriatic, and are considered as the base of the triangle. At the foot of these mountains, on the southern side, lie those plains, of which we are now to speak; which, both in their fertility and wide extent, are far superior to any other part of Europe that have been yet discovered. These plains form also the figure of a triangle; the top of which is made by the junction of the Alps and Apennines, a little above Massilia. The northern side is bounded by the Alps, to the length of two thousand and two hundred stadia; the southern, by the Apennines, to the extent of three thousand and six hundred. The coast of the Adriatic forms the base of this figure, and contains in length, from Sena to the inmost part of the Gulf, almost two thousand and five hundred stadia. So that the whole plains together include a space of near ten thousand stadia in circumference.

The fertility of this country is greater than can be well expressed. They have grain of all kinds in such abundance that, even in our times, a Sicilian bushel of wheat is sold there for four oboli; and of barley, for two. For a firkin of wine, they exchange an equal measure of barley. Panick also, and millet, are found among them in so great plenty, that nothing can exceed it. Their forests, which, at certain distances, are spread over all the country,

afford so large a quantity of acorns, that though great numbers of swine are constantly consumed by the inhabitants of Italy, as well in the uses of private families, as for the supply of their armies, yet are they chiefly furnished with them from these plains. Such, in a word, is the cheapness and the plenty of all common necessaries, that when travellers stop to take refreshment in their inns, instead of settling by agreement the prices of any particular provisions, they only fix a certain rate for every person. This rarely exceeds the fourth part of an obolus; and for this small expense, they are supplied in full abundance with all things that are requisite. The numbers of the people by whom these plains are filled, the size and comeliness of their bodies, and their prowess in war, may be fully understood from those great actions for which they are justly celebrated. Both sides of the Alps, as far as the ascent is easy, are inhabited by different nations. On that side, which looks towards the north and the river Rhone, dwell those that are called the Transalpine Gauls. On the other side, the Taurisci, and Agones, and other various tribes. The Transalpine Gauls derived their origin from the same common stock with the rest, and obtained that appellation from their situation only; because they fixed themselves beyond the Alps. The tops of these mountains, on account of the steepness of the ascent, and the perpetual snows with which they are covered, have hitherto remained without inhabitants. From the place where the Apennine mountains first begin, a little above Massilia, and

from their junction with the Alps, the country on the side of the Tyrrhenian sea quite down to Pisæ, the first town of Tyrrhenia to the west, and that also on the side towards the plains, as far as to the confines of the Arretinians, was all inhabited by the Ligurians. Adjoining to these were the Tyrrhenians, and next to them the Umbrians, situated on both sides of the mountains. In this place the Apennine, at the distance of about five hundred stadia from the Adriatic, leaves these plains, and turning suddenly to the right, directs its course towards the Sicilian sea, dividing the rest of Italy in the middle; so that what remains to complete the southern side of this triangle is formed by the plains themselves; which are continued, from the point where the Apennine turns away, quite down to Sena, a town upon the Adriatic coast.

The river Po, celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus, takes its source among the Alpine mountains, near the upper point of the triangle which we have now described, and first bends its stream towards the south, till it has gained the plains. Afterwards flowing eastward, it runs to empty itself by two mouths into the Adriatic Gulf. It divides these plains into two unequal parts; the largest of which is that which lies extended between the Adriatic and the Alps. In the quantity of its waters, it far exceeds the rest of the rivers of Italy. For all the streams that descend from the Alps and Apennines, are discharged into the channel of the Po. About the time, especially, when the Dog star first appears, and the melted snows flow down

in great abundance from these mountains, the fulness of its stream is remarkably great and beautiful. This river is navigable from the mouth which is called Olane, to the distance of two thousand stadia within the land. From its first sources it flows in one single channel as far as to the country of the Trigobali; and there, breaking into a double stream, runs, as we have said, to discharge itself by two mouths into the sea. The first of these is called Padoa, the other Olane; the last of which affords a safe and commodious port for ships, not inferior to any upon the Adriatic coast. This river is called Bodencus, by the natives of the country.

There is no need to add to our description of this river, the many sad and tragical fables with which the Greeks have filled their histories, of the fall of Phaëton; the tears of the poplars; and that race of black men who live upon the river, and are said still to wear the habit of mourning, in memory of Phaëton's death. A close discussion of such stories would very ill suit with the design of this introduction. But perhaps we shall take some fairer occasion in another place, to consider them in as full a manner as the subject may require, if it be only for the sake of showing some proofs of the inaccuracy of Timæus, with regard to the places which we have been describing.

These plains were formerly inhabited by the Tyrrhenians; who gained great fame by their exploits in the country round Capua and Nola, which, at that time, was called the Phlegræan Fields. Whatever, therefore, we read in history concerning the

ancient dynasties and fortunes of this people, must be all referred, not to the country which they possess at present, but to the plains just mentioned; whose fertility and wide extent afforded them the means of becoming great and powerful. But the Gauls, who often visited this country for the sake of commerce, and had seen its beauty with a jealous eye, found occasion, from some slight pretence, to fall suddenly upon the Tyrrhenians with a powerful army, when they were in no expectation of an enemy; and having driven them from their native seats, they took possession of all the country that was round the Po. The first part of it, which lay nearest to the sources of the river, was seized on by the Laians and Lebecians. Next to these were the Insubrians, a great and powerful nation; and after them, the Cenomans. Below all these, and nearest to the Adriatic, were the Venetians: a very ancient people, whose dress and manners greatly resembled those of the Gauls, though they used a different language. This is that nation of whom the tragic poets have recorded so many monstrous fables. On the other side of the Po, the first in order, and the nearest to the Apennines, were the Ananes; and next to these, the Boii. Between the Boii and the Adriatic were the Lingonian Gauls; and lower down, upon the coast, the Senones.

These were the principal nations that were seated in that tract of country which we have now described. Their manner of life was extremely plain and simple. They had no walled towns, nor any kind of furniture in their hamlets. The ground was

their constant bed, and flesh their chief food. Their sole employment was agriculture and war. All other sciences and arts were utterly unknown among them. Their wealth consisted in gold and cattle; because these alone were at all times most easily removed from place to place, as occasion might require. But that which engaged their greatest care, was to procure a numerous train of followers, all ready to support their interests, and execute their commands. For every one among them was strong and formidable, in proportion only to the number of these dependants.

From the time of their first settlement in these plains, the Gauls not only maintained themselves in safe possession of the country, from whence they had driven the Tyrrhenians, but by the terror of their arms forced many of the neighbouring nations also to receive their yoke. Some time afterwards, having defeated the Romans and their allies in a set engagement, and pursued them, during a flight of three days' continuance, to the very gates of Rome, they made themselves masters of all the city, the capitol alone excepted. But when they heard that the Venetians, taking occasion from their absence, had entered their territories with an army, they consented to a treaty with the Romans, restored their city to them, and returned back again to their own country. They were afterwards for some time engaged in domestic wars. Some of the people also that lived among the Alps, envying them the possession of a country that was so much better than their own, turned their arms against them,

and made frequent incursions upon their territory. During this time the Romans had full leisure to recover by degrees their wasted strength; and to reduce the Latins, who had a second time revolted.

Thirty years after the time when Rome was taken, the Gauls advanced with a powerful army as far as Alba. The Romans, being thus attacked when they had no apprehension of a war, and not having time to draw together the troops of their allies, were afraid to take the field. But twelve years afterwards, when they were again invaded by as great a force, having received timely notice of the design, and being joined by their confederates, they marched out against the enemy with great alacrity and confidence, designing to engage in a decisive battle. But the Gauls were struck with terror at their approach; and as their army was distracted also by dissensions, they retreated, or rather fled, with great precipitation back again to their own country, and remained quiet during the course of thirteen years. And having then remarked the great increase and progress of the Roman power, they consented to a league of peace.

During thirty years they firmly adhered to the conditions of this treaty; but being then threatened with a war from the Transalpine Gauls, and apprehending that the consequences of it might prove fatal to them, they prevailed upon those nations, partly by large presents, and partly also by pleading their descent from one common stock, to desist from their design, and to join their forces with them against the Romans. They march together through

Tyrrhenia; and being assisted also by a people of that country, ravage the Roman borders, and return safely back again with the spoil. But no sooner were they arrived in their own country, than some disputes arose among them concerning the division of the plunder; which were carried to so great excess, that they lost the most considerable part, not only of the booty, but of their army likewise. Such disorders are, upon these occasions, very frequent among the Gauls; especially when they are filled with feasting, and their senses lost in wine.

Four years afterwards, the Gauls, in conjunction with the Samnites, engaged the Romans in battle, in the country of the Camertines, and killed great numbers of them. The Romans, incensed by this defeat, drew together all their forces; and having met the enemy, within a few days after the former action, in the district of the Sentinates, they destroyed the greatest part of their army, and forced the rest to fly homewards in disorder. About ten years afterwards, they returned again with a very great force, and laid siege to Arretium. The Romans attempted to raise the siege; but were defeated in an engagement before the city, and the consul Lucius killed. M. Curius, who succeeded him in office, sent to treat with the enemy concerning the redemption of the prisoners. But the Gauls, in defiance of the laws of nations, killed the messengers. The Romans, being greatly enraged by an action so perfidious, raise a numerous army, and march immediately into Gaul. The Senones advance against them, but are defeated in a set en-

gagement. The greater part of them were destroyed in the action; and the Romans, having forced the rest to leave their habitations, seized the country into their hands. This was the part of Gaul to which they, for the first time, sent a colony; and built a city which was called Sena, from the name of the former inhabitants. We have already spoken of the situation of this place; which stands upon the Adriatic coast, in the extremity of those plains that are watered by the Po.

The extirpation of the Senones alarmed the Boian Gauls with apprehensions of being next involved in the same destruction. They, therefore, drew together all their forces; and having prevailed on the Tyrrhenians also to assist them, they marched out and engaged the Romans, near the lake called Vadimon; but the greater part of the Tyrrhenians were killed in the action, and a small number only of the Boians saved themselves by flight. Notwithstanding this ill success, they joined their forces again together in the following year; armed all the youth that were of sufficient age; and ventured on a second battle. But their defeat was so entire that, in spite of all their obstinacy and reluctance, they were forced to sue for peace, and accept conditions from the Romans. These transactions happened three years before Pyrrhus invaded Italy, and five years before the memorable overthrow of the Gauls at Delphi. For Fortune, about this time, seemed to have infected all the Gallic nations with a spirit of war, which proved every where fatal to them.

The Romans derived two advantages of very great importance from these wars. For first, as they had so often been defeated by the Gauls they had nothing left, either to apprehend or suffer, more dreadful than that which they had before experienced; so that in all their contests against Pyrrhus they performed the part of skilful and well-practised combatants. The other advantage was, that having given a timely check to the ambition and the restless spirit of the Gauls, they had afterwards full leisure to join all their forces, and employ the whole strength of the republic, first against Pyrrhus, when he invaded their dominions, and afterwards against the Carthaginians in the war of Sicily.

During forty-five years after their last defeat, the Gauls punctually observed the conditions of the peace, and gave no disturbance to the Romans. But when those who had beheld the past calamities had, in the course of time, left the world, the race of young men that succeeded in their place, being hot and violent in their disposition, unused to hardships, and unpractised in misfortunes, began, as it naturally happens in such circumstances, to sow the seeds of fresh commotions. They took up matter of offence against the Romans upon the slightest pretexts; and engaged the Gauls that lived beyond the Alps to assist them with their forces. But as this design had been concerted privately between the chiefs alone, without the approbation or the knowledge of the multitude, the Transalpine Gauls no sooner were advanced as far as Ariminum with

their army, than the people among the Boians, having conceived a jealousy of their intentions, rose tumultuously against their chiefs, killed their two kings, Galatus and Ates, and opposed the march of the strangers, engaging them in a set battle, in which great slaughter ensued on both sides. The Romans, alarmed by the first account of this invasion, had ordered the legions to take the field; but when they heard that the Gauls had thus defeated and destroyed each other, they returned back again with their forces.

Five years after this event, in the consulship of M. Lepidus, the lands of Picenum, from whence the Senones had been often driven out, were divided among the Romans by lot, in consequence of a law proposed for that purpose by Flaminius, in favour of the people. But this measure, as it proved afterwards one of the chief causes of the corruption of the Roman manners, was also the occasion of the wars that now followed with the Gauls. For all that people in general, and especially the Boians, who lay nearest to the Roman borders, conceived great jealousy from this proceeding; which seemed plainly to declare, that the design of the Romans was not so much to extend their conquests, and reduce them to pay obedience to their laws, as utterly to exterminate and destroy them. The Boians, therefore, and the Insubrians, the most numerous and powerful of all these nations, agreed to unite their forces; and sent ambassadors also to the Gauls who lived upon the Alps, and along the Rhone. These were called Gæsatæ, because their

custom was, to serve in armies for a certain hire; for this is what the name imports. The ambassadors gave large sums of gold to the two kings, Concolitanus and Anerœstus, in order to gain them to their party, and excite them to a war against the Romans. They set before their eyes the wealth and flourishing condition of that empire, and the immense treasures which must accrue from the conquest of so great and powerful a people. They promised, that themselves would bear an equal part in all the dangers of the war. They reminded them of those great exploits which their ancestors had performed against the same people. That they not only had defeated them in battle but had taken Rome itself upon the first assault, and obtained all the riches of the place. And that when they had kept possession of the city during seven whole months, in mere grace and favour they restored it to the Romans, and returned back again to their country safe and unhurt, and loaded with spoil of every kind. This discourse excited in the minds of all the chiefs so great an eagerness and impatience for the war, that they soon drew together an army, which, in the number of the troops, as well as from the bravery and distinguished characters of the men who served among them, far exceeded any that ever had been known in former times to march from this part of Gaul.

The Romans, having been informed in part of these preparations, and partly conjecturing what would happen, were seized with no small consternation. They used all diligence in raising troops;

filled their magazines with provisions, and other necessary stores, and often led their forces to the frontiers of their country, as if the Gauls already were arrived, when they had not even yet begun their march.

In the mean while, these commotions afforded full time and leisure to the Carthaginians to extend their conquests, and to secure the acquisitions which they had gained in Spain. For the Romans were forced, as we have said, to neglect that country till they had first reduced an enemy who alarmed them with the apprehensions of a nearer danger, and hung close upon their very borders. They, therefore, were content with having set some bounds to the progress of the Carthaginians, by the treaty that was made with Asdrubal; and, as the circumstances of the times required, turned their whole thoughts and care upon the present war.

It was now eight years after the division of the Picenian lands, when the Gæsatæ passed the Alps with a numerous army, completely furnished and equipped, and advanced along the Po. They were joined by the Boians and Insubrians, who persisted firmly in their first design. But the Venetians and the Cenomans, having been gained by some ambassadors that were deputed to them, had made an alliance with the Romans. The Gauls, therefore, were obliged to leave a part of their forces behind them in the country, to keep those nations under due restraint; while the rest continued their route towards Tyrrhenia. Their numbers were,

fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and chariots.

As soon as the Romans were informed that the Gauls had passed the Alps, they sent away the consul L. Æmilius with an army to Ariminum, to oppose the entrance of the enemy on that side. One of the prætors was sent to command in Tyrrhenia: for C. Atilius, the other consul, had sailed with some forces to Sardinia some time before. The people all were under the greatest consternation, and dreaded every thing that was terrible and fatal. Nor were these fears unreasonable. What they had formerly suffered from the Gauls were always present to their minds. In apprehension of the same misfortune, they make haste to draw together their troops, and raise new levies: send notice to their allies, to be in readiness to join them; and order public enrolments to be made, of all the men in their dominions that were of age to bear arms. They resolved that the armies of the consuls should be composed of the choicest and the most considerable part of all their forces. Their magazines were filled with corn, and furnished with all kinds of military stores, in much greater abundance than had been ever known before. All manner of supplies were readily sent in from every quarter. For the alarm had spread through all the states of Italy, and filled all the inhabitants with terror. They no longer considered themselves as allies, that were invited to sustain the Roman cause; or thought that this invasion

was designed against the power of that republic only: but rather regarded the Gauls as their common enemies; whose approach portended the last destruction to themselves, their towns, and all their territories. They complied, therefore, with the greatest cheerfulness with every thing that was desired or exacted from them.

But we shall here pause awhile, to give a more minute detail of the strength and preparations of the Romans, and of the numbers of their troops. For from hence we shall be able to discern with truth, what was the condition of this republic, when Annibal had the boldness to invade it: and what the forces, which that general not only dared to encounter in the field, but also gained such eminent advantages against them, as threw the Romans into very desperate circumstances.

The armies that were under the command of the consuls, consisted of four Roman legions, each of which contained five thousand and two hundred foot, and three hundred horse; besides the troops of the allies, which amounted to thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse. The Sabines and Tyrrhenians had raised for the present exigency above fifty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, which were stationed upon the frontiers of Tyrrhenia, under the conduct of a prætor. Twenty thousand Umbrians and Sarsinates came also from the Apennines; together with an equal number of Cenomans and Venetians. These were posted upon the Gallic borders, with design to make incursions into the territory of the Boians,

and constrain that people to return again, and defend their own country. Such were the forces that were disposed upon the frontiers. They had also drawn together an army in the neighbourhood of Rome, to cover the city from surprise, and to be held in readiness against all accidents. It consisted of twenty thousand Roman foot, and fifteen hundred horse: besides thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse, from the allies. The numbers that were severally enrolled in the public registers were as follows. Among the Latins, eighty thousand foot, and five thousand horse. Among the Samnites, seventy thousand foot, and seven thousand horse. The Iapygians and Mesapygians sent the names of fifty thousand foot, and sixteen thousand horse: the Lucanians, thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse. The Marsians, Marucinians, Ferentinians, and Vestinians, brought twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse. In Sicily, and at Tarentum, there were also two legions; each of which consisted of four thousand and two hundred foot, with two hundred horse. The numbers of the Romans and Campanians, enrolled together, were two hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty-three thousand horse. Thus the armies that were disposed abroad upon the frontiers, consisted of near a hundred and fifty thousand foot, with about seven thousand horse. And the entire numbers of those that were capable of bearing arms, both among the Romans and their allies, were seven hundred thousand foot, and seventy thousand horse. Such

were the forces of this republic, when Annibal had the boldness to penetrate into the very heart of Italy, with an army which scarcely equalled twenty thousand men. But this is a point, which we shall be able to show in a clearer light, in the subsequent parts of this history.

The Gauls, having entered Tyrrhenia, wasted all the country without resistance; and at last directed their march towards Rome. But when they had advanced as far as Clusium, which is about three days' journey distant from the city, they were informed, that the army, which had at first been posted upon the frontiers of Tyrrhenia, was following close behind, and ready to overtake them. They therefore directed their route back again in haste, with a design to meet and engage them. The two armies arrived in sight about the time of sunset, and encamped at a moderate distance from each other. But when night came on, the Gauls, having lighted all their fires, and left the cavalry behind them in the camp, with orders, that when they had just shown themselves to the enemy in the morning, they should immediately pursue the route which they were going to take, retreated unperceived to Fæsula, and there encamped: designing to receive their horse as they came up, and to fall suddenly from thence upon the Romans. As soon as it was day, the Romans, perceiving that the cavalry alone was left in sight, persuaded themselves that the Gauls had already fled; and began to follow in all haste, along the road by which the horse now retreated.

But as soon as they approached the main body of the enemy, the Gauls suddenly appeared, and fell upon them. The action was for some time warm and obstinate. But the Gauls, superior both in bravery and numbers, at last obtained the victory. Six thousand Romans were destroyed in the place: the rest escaped by flight. The greater part of these, having gained a neighbouring eminence, seated themselves upon it. The Gauls at first designed to attack them immediately in this post. But as they had been much exhausted and fatigued by the march which they had made the night before, and were impatient to take some refreshment and repose, they placed a part of their cavalry only round the hill, and resolved to force it in the morning, in case that the Romans should then refuse to surrender at discretion.

It happened, that Lucius Æmilius, who was at first encamped on the side of the Adriatic sea, but had hastened his march from thence, upon the news that the Gauls had taken their route through Tyrrhenia, and were advanced almost to Rome, arrived now most fortunately in the very moment when his assistance was chiefly wanted, and fixed his camp at a small distance only from the enemy. The Romans that had saved themselves upon the hill, having perceived his fires, and guessing the occasion of them, resumed their courage, and sent some men unarmed, in the night, through the forest, to acquaint the consul with what had happened to them. Æmilius, finding that there was no time left to deliberate, immediately began his

march towards the hill, at the head of all the cavalry; having commanded the tribunes to follow with the infantry at break of day. The Gauls, on their part, also perceived the fires, and conjecturing that the enemy was near, called together a council of their chiefs. In this assembly Anerœstus, one of the kings, observed to them, "that as they had gained so immense a booty, both in slaves, and cattle, and spoil of every kind, it seemed to be by no means prudent to venture on a battle, which must expose them to the danger of being stripped of all; that they rather should resolve to return again directly to their country, while there was yet time to retreat with safety: and that, when they had lightened the army of its treasure, they might again take the field, if it should then be thought expedient, and renew the war against the Romans." These sentiments were readily embraced by all. They decamped therefore before break of day, and took their route back again through Tyrrhenia, marching along the coast. The consul Lucius, though he had increased his army with the troops that were saved upon the hill, was unwilling to venture on a set engagement; and rather chose to follow close upon the enemy, with design to seize such opportunities as chance should offer for attacking them with some advantage, and recovering part of the booty.

At this very time, Atilius, the other consul, returning from Sardinia, had disembarked his troops at Pisæ, and was marching towards Rome,

by a route directly opposite to that which the Gauls had taken. The latter had now almost reached the town of Telamon, upon the coast of Tyrrhenia, when some of their foragers were met by the foremost of the Roman troops: and being carried prisoners to the consul, and examined by him, they informed him of all that had been transacted, and of the approach of both the armies: that the Gauls were extremely near; and Æmilius following close behind them. The consul was surprised at an event so strange, and greatly overjoyed to find, that he had fallen thus happily upon the enemy, and enclosed them between two armies. He commanded the tribunes to draw up the troops in battle; to extend their front as much as the nature of the ground would suffer, without disturbing the order of their march: and to move slowly towards the enemy. And having observed an eminence that overlooked the road along which the Gauls must necessarily pass, he made haste, at the head of all the cavalry, to seize that post; in the hope, that by being the first to begin the action, he should secure to himself the chief honour of the victory. The Gauls, who as yet were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius, and imagined only that the other consul had stretched his march before them in the night, in order to possess himself of all the advantageous posts, detached their cavalry, together with a part of their light-armed troops, to force the Romans from the hill. But being soon acquainted with the truth, by one of the prisoners that were taken, they immediately ranged their in-

fantry in order of battle: and that their disposition might be suited to the present exigency, they gave to their whole army a double front; that thus they might be able to sustain at once the attack of those that were coming upon them from behind, and of those whom they now likewise knew to be advancing in front against them.

Though Æmilius had been before informed, that these legions had arrived at Pisæ, he had conceived no kind of expectation that they were yet so near. But being now assured of their approach by what passed upon the hill, he presently sent away his cavalry to the place, to assist the combatants: and having also ranged his infantry in order of battle after the usual manner, he advanced against the enemy.

Among the Gauls, the Gæsatæ, and after them the Insubrians, composed the front behind, that was turned towards Æmilius. The Taurisci and the Boians formed the opposite front, and stood ready to receive the attack of Atilius and his legions. The chariots were placed in the extremity of either wing. The plunder had been all removed to a neighbouring hill, and a detachment was left to guard it. The army, being thus formed in double front, was not only terrible to behold, but very proper also for action. The Boians and Insubrians wore the breeches of their country, and were covered with light military vests. But the Gæsatæ, who were both vain and fearless, being apprehensive that the bushes which grew upon the place might be entangled in their habits, and

obstruct their motions, threw away all covering, and keeping their arms only, presented themselves naked to the enemy. The fight was begun by the horse upon the hill, in the clear view of all the armies. For the numbers that were engaged were very great; the whole cavalry having run together in promiscuous crowds from all sides to the combat. In this action, the consul Caius, while he advanced without sufficient caution too far among the enemy, lost his life; and his head was carried to the Gallic kings. The Romans, however, maintained the fight with so much firmness, that they gained at last a perfect victory, and kept entire possession of their post.

The infantry now approached each other: offering to view a spectacle, which must needs appear most strange and singular, I do not say to those alone that were present at it, but to all who can at this time form in their minds a distinct conception of the scene. For certainly an engagement between three different armies at once must strike with many circumstances, which are wholly different from those of other combats, both in the appearance, and in the course of action. Nor is it easy even now to determine, whether the advantages, which the Gauls derived from this disposition of their forces, were not greater than the danger to which they were exposed. For though they were attacked on both sides, yet as their army was formed with a double front, they were not only able to oppose both enemies at once, but also mutually to protect and cover each other from

any attack behind. But the chief advantage was, and which is indeed peculiar to this kind of disposition, that there was no place or room for flight, nor any hopes of safety but in victory.

The Romans were elated with no small joy, when they saw that they had thus enclosed the enemy as in a snare. But, on the other hand, the appearance of the Gallic forces, and the unusual noise with which they advanced to action, struck them with great amazement. For, besides their horns and trumpets, the number of which was almost infinite, the whole army broke together into such loud and continued cries, that the neighbouring places every where resounded, and seemed to join their voices with the shouts and clamour of the instruments and soldiers. The very looks and motions also of the Gauls, that stood naked in the front, and were distinguished by their comeliness and strength, greatly increased the terror. In the foremost ranks, the combatants were all adorned with chains of gold about their necks and hands. The Romans fixed their eyes with eagerness upon these: and if the appearance of the enemy disheartened them with fear, the prospect of so rich a spoil served only to inflame their courage.

The light-armed forces of the Romans, advancing first, as their custom is, to the front of all the army, began the fight by discharging a close and formidable shower of darts and javelins. The Gauls that were in the ranks behind, were in part secured against these weapons, by their breeches,

and their military vests. But those that stood naked in the front, were thrown into great disorder and confusion, by an attack which they had not at all expected, and which they knew not how to obviate or resist. For the Gallic buckler was too small to cover them: and as their bodies were also naked, and of the largest size, the javelins that were thrown made their entrance more effectually, and in greater numbers. To turn the attack against these men, was a thing impossible: by reason of the distance from whence they fought. Nor was it easy to force their way through so thick a storm of darts. In this perplexed and wretched situation, some of them, being reduced at last to a state of senseless rage and madness, threw themselves among the enemy, and rushed voluntarily upon death: while the rest fell back upon their friends; treading down the ranks behind them, and exhibiting in their faces all the marks of consternation and extreme dismay. Thus the fierce and daring spirit of the Gæsatæ was effectually checked and rendered useless, even in the first onset by the Roman javelins.

The Romans, having made the signal for their light-armed forces to retire, moved forwards with the legions. Against these, the Insubrians, Boians, and Taurisci, succeeded to the fight; and sustained it with the greatest obstinacy. Though closely pressed, and most dreadfully wounded, yet still they maintained their ground, and resisted with amazing force. Nor were they in any point inferior to the Romans, except in the advantage of

their weapons. For as the Gallic buckler was of a smaller size, so their swords likewise were formed to strike only with the edge; whereas the Roman swords were made both to push, and strike. But when the horse came pouring down upon them from the hill, and attacked their flank, the victory was soon determined. The infantry were slaughtered in their ranks, while the cavalry precipitately fled. Forty thousand Gauls were slain; and ten thousand taken prisoners. Among the last was Concolitanus, one of their kings. The other king, Aneröestus, escaped with a few attendants to a neighbouring place; and there killed himself, with his companions. The consul, having collected together all the spoil, sent it away to Rome, and restored the plunder to the people from whom it had been taken. He then led his army through Liguria into the Boian territory: and having satiated his soldiers with the plunder of the country, he returned to Rome within a few days afterwards, and hung up in the capitol the standards, bracelets, and golden collars. The rest of the spoil, together with the prisoners, was reserved to adorn his triumph. Such was the fatal end of this invasion; which had threatened ruin and extreme destruction to all the states of Italy, and especially to the Romans.

The Romans, elated by a victory so signal and complete, were persuaded, that they should now be able to drive the Gauls entirely out of all the country round the Po. They make great preparations, and having raised a numerous army, send

it away under the command of the new consuls, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius. The Boians were terrified by their approach, and surrendered at discretion. But by reason of the rains that fell afterwards in great abundance, and because a dreadful pestilence raged also in the Roman camp, the rest of the season passed over without any action.

The consuls of the following year, P. Furius and C. Flaminius, led the army a second time into Gaul, through the country of the Anamares, who were situated at no great distance from Massilia; and having first gained that people to their alliance, they advanced into the territory of the Insubrians, near the place where the Addua falls into the Po. But because they had suffered greatly from the enemy, both as they passed the river, and while they were employed in their encampment, they were forced to remain for some time quiet without attempting any thing; and afterwards made a treaty with the Insubrians, by which they consented to leave the country. But when they had marched for some days round the borders of the province, they passed the river Clusius, and came into the district of the Ananes their allies: and having increased their army with the forces of the country, they again invaded the Insubrians, on the other side towards the Alps, and spread fire and devastation over all their lands and villages. When the Insubrians saw, that the Romans were thus determined in their hatred, and not likely to be moved from their designs against

them, they resolved to try the fortune of a general engagement. Having therefore brought together all their military ensigns, and among the rest, the golden standards from the temple of Minerva, which were called the Immoveable, and having raised an army of full fifty thousand men, and furnished it with every kind of necessary stores, they marched in terrible array, as if assured of victory, and encamped before the enemy.

As the Romans were much inferior in their numbers, they at first designed to take the assistance of the Gallic troops, that were with them in the camp. But when they had considered on the other hand, that this people all were noted for their fraud and perfidy, and that the present contest was against an enemy of the same race and nation, it seemed most prudent not to trust them in so critical and dangerous a conjuncture. They forced them therefore to pass the river, and broke all the bridges, keeping their own army still on this side. By this precaution, they not only were secure against all treason from the Gauls, but laid their own troops also under the necessity of sustaining the battle bravely to the last. For as they had now a river in the rear that was not fordable, there were no hopes of safety for them but in victory. When this was done, they made the necessary dispositions for the engagement.

Upon this occasion, the Romans used a very wise and sensible expedient, which was first suggested by the tribunes, who also instructed all the army, and every soldier in particular, in the man-

ner in which it should be practised. They had remarked in all their former combats, that the Gauls were always fierce, impetuous, and very formidable, in their first attack: but that their swords were such as could make but one single stroke; by the force of which they were so bent and twisted, that unless the soldiers could have leisure to rest them upon the ground, and with the assistance of their feet recover them to their former shape, the second stroke was wholly without effect. They took, therefore, the pikes from the triarii, that were in the last line of the army, and distributed them among the cohorts of the first: with orders, that they should begin the attack with these, and afterwards use their swords. They then advanced in order of battle against the front of the enemy. The Gauls, by making their first stroke upon the pikes, rendered their swords unfit for any farther use. The Romans then ran forwards with their swords, and pressing close upon them, deprived them even of the power of attempting any second stroke. For as the Gallic swords were only formed to give a falling blow, a certain distance was always necessary for that purpose. But the Romans, who were armed with swords that were sharpened at the point, were able to direct their thrusts against the breasts and faces of the enemy, and gave wound after wound without remission, so that the greater part of all this numerous army was at last destroyed upon the place.

As the success in this engagement was chiefly to

be ascribed to the prudent foresight of the tribunes, so on the other hand, the conduct of the consul Flaminius seems to deserve some censure. For, by having ranged his troops in battle upon the very banks of the river, so that there was no space left sufficient for the cohorts to retreat, he deprived the Romans of one advantage, of which they make great use in all their combats. If the enemy had gained but the least ground upon them in the action, the whole army must have been pushed into the river. But the courage and dexterity of the Romans saved them from this disgrace, and carried the victory to their side, in the manner which we have now described. They then returned back to Rome, loaded with various spoils, and with rich booty of every kind in great abundance.

After this defeat, the Gauls sued for peace, and offered to submit to any conditions. But the consuls of the following year, M. Claudius and Cn. Cornelius, prevailed to have all thoughts of peace rejected. The Gauls, being thus disappointed in their hopes, resolved to make a last and desperate effort. They sent a second time to the Gæsatæ; and having hired a body of their troops, to the amount of thirty thousand men, they kept themselves in readiness, and waited for the arrival of the Romans. In the beginning of the spring, the consuls led the army into the Insubrian territory, and encamped before Acerræ, which stood between the Alps and the river Po. As they had secured, upon their first arrival, all the advantage-

ous posts, the Gauls were unable to throw any relief into the place. But, in order to force the Romans to raise the siege, they sent a part of their army into the country of the Anares, beyond the Po, and laid siege to a town that was called Castidium. As soon as the Romans heard of this attempt, the consul Claudius, taking with him the cavalry, together with a part also of the legions, marched in all haste to succour the besieged. The Gauls, being informed of their approach, raise the siege, and advance in order of battle against the enemy. When they came in sight, the Roman horse flew briskly to the charge. The Gauls for some time sustained their fury: but being afterwards surrounded by them, and attacked at once both in flank and rear, they were at last completely routed by the cavalry alone, and forced to fly in great disorder. Many of them were pushed into the river, and perished in the stream: but the greater part were destroyed by the enemy in the place.

After this action, the Romans became masters of Acerræ, and of all the stores that were laid up in it in very great quantity. For the Gauls had fled in haste to Mediolanum, the chief city of the Insubrians. Cornelius followed after them without delay, and presented himself before the town. The Gauls lay quiet and attempted nothing. But when the Romans had begun their march back again towards Acerræ, they then sallied out, and falling suddenly upon their rear, killed a great number of them, and forced some to fly. But the

consul, having ordered the advanced bodies of the army to return, encouraged them to stand, and repel the efforts of the enemy. The fight now grew warm and obstinate. For the Gauls, emboldened by their first success, for some time maintained their ground with firmness. At last, however, they were entirely broken and defeated, and obliged to fly towards the mountains. Cornelius pursued closely after them; plundered all the country; and took Mediolanum by storm. After these great losses, the chiefs of the Insubrians, despairing of any further means of safety, submitted their country and themselves to the Romans at discretion.

Such was the end of the Gallic wars: which, if we regard only the daring spirit and undaunted bravery of the combatants, the forces that were brought into the field, the battles that were fought, and the numbers that fell in those engagements, must certainly appear as great and formidable as any that are known in history. But, on the other hand, if we reflect upon the rashness, with which these expeditions were projected, or the absurd and senseless conduct, by which they severally were carried into execution, nothing will be found more trifling or contemptible. For the Gauls, I do not say most frequently, but even in every thing that they attempt, are hurried head-long by their passions, and never submit to the rule of reason. From hence it happened, that in a short time they were dispossessed of all the plains that are watered by the Po; some few places only, at

the foot of the Alps, excepted. I thought it necessary, therefore, to give some account of the conduct and the fortunes of this people, from their first settlement in the country, to the time of their final exclusion from it. Such incidents very properly belong to history; and well deserve to be transmitted to all future times. For from these, posterity may learn, what little cause there is to dread the rash and sudden expeditions of any of these barbarous tribes: and in how short a time their strongest forces may be dissipated, by those who are determined bravely to resist, and to struggle even to the latest hope, rather than be deprived of their just and natural rights. I am persuaded, that what historians have recorded of the expedition of the Persians into Greece, and of the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi, has served greatly to confirm and animate the Greeks, in the contests which they so often have sustained in defence of their common liberty. For whoever revolves in his mind the wonderful transactions of those times, and considers the vastness of the preparations, the bravery of the armies, and the almost infinite number of the forces, which were all vanquished and dispersed by the superior conduct of those troops, who were able to oppose sense to violence, and skill to rashness, will easily be assured, that no provision of arms or stores, no forces however numerous, can strike so great a terror into men that are brave and resolute, as to force them to abandon all thoughts of safety, or ever part with the hope of being able to defend

their country. With regard to the Gauls especially, their armies, even within these later times, have often spread the alarm among the states of Greece. And this was still a farther motive, by which I was inclined to give a short account of the events that happened among this people, even from the earliest period of their history. We now return to the place from whence we made this digression.

CHAP. III.

THE Carthaginian general Asdrubal, when he had now for eight years governed the affairs of Spain, and in the course of his administration greatly enlarged the sway of his republic, not so much by force of arms, as by his address, and dexterous management of the princes of the country, was one night murdered in his tent by a certain Gaul, in resentment of some private injuries. Annibal was at this time young: yet, because in all his actions he had shown great proofs of courage and capacity, the Carthaginians bestowed upon him the command of the army. He was no sooner invested with this charge, than it was clear to all who observed his conduct, that his intention was to make war upon the Romans; as indeed it happened not long afterwards. From this time therefore, suspicions, mutual jealousies, and com-

plaints, began to break out between the two republics. The Carthaginians, stung by the disgrace and losses which they had sustained in Sicily, looked earnestly for some occasion to revenge themselves upon their enemies. The Romans, on the other hand, watched all their motions, suspected their designs, and kept themselves upon their guard against them. When such were the sentiments on both sides, it was manifest to all men of judgement, that a war must soon ensue.

About this time the war commenced in Greece, in which the Achæans, in conjunction with king Philip and the rest of the allies, were engaged against the Ætolians. This was called the Social war.

We have hitherto been employed in giving such an abstract of the chief transactions both in Sicily and Afric, and of those events that were connected with them, as was agreeable to the design of these preliminary books. And thus we are arrived at that point of time, from whence we proposed to begin our history: the commencement of the second war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, which is usually called the war of Annibal, and the Social war now mentioned. But before we engage in the description of these wars, we shall give also some account of the affairs of Greece which preceded this period: that our introduction may be complete, and the way be opened to every part of the history that follows. For as my design is not to write the annals of any particular country, to relate the affairs of Persia

only or of Greece, as former historians have done, but to include in one general history all the known parts of the earth; a design, in which I was encouraged to engage by many circumstances that are peculiar to the present times, and which will more fully be explained hereafter; it seems necessary, that we first should take a short review of the past fortunes and condition of those states and countries that are chiefly celebrated in the world.

With regard indeed to the people of Asia, and to those of Ægypt, there is no need to look back beyond the times which we have just now mentioned. For the events that happened among them in a former age, have already been recorded by many writers, and are sufficiently known to all. Nor have they suffered, in these latter times, any change or revolution of so great importance, as might make it necessary to recount any of those actions that preceded. But we shall trace from a period more remote the fortunes of the royal house of Macedon, and those of the Achæan republic: the first of which, within the course even of our own times, has fallen to ruin; and the latter grown to an amazing height of power, through the consent and harmony of its several parts. For though great pains were formerly employed to engage the cities of Peloponnesus into this confederacy, yet the labour was without effect. The interests, or the ambition, of particular states still influenced all their actions: and stifled their attention to the common liberty. But in these days,

their union is so entire and perfect, that they are not only joined together in bonds of friendship and alliance, but even make use of the same laws, the same weights, coins, and measures, the same magistrates, counsellors, and judges: so that the inhabitants of this whole tract of Greece seem in all respects to form but one single city, except only that they are not enclosed within the circuit of the same walls. In every other point, both through the whole republic, and in every separate state, we find the most exact resemblance and conformity.

Let us first inquire then, by what means the name of Achæans came to be so generally received in all the parts of Peloponnesus; since those to whom this appellation originally belonged were far from being superior to the rest, either in the number of their cities, the extent or wealth of their territory, or the courage of their people. For both the Spartans and Arcadians are far more numerous, as well as in possession of a much larger tract of country; and in all the acts of valour and martial prowess, they are well known to be inferior to none of the states of Greece. From whence then has it happened, that not the people of these countries only, but all the rest of the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, are so well pleased to receive, not only their laws and form of government, but their very name also, from the Achæans? To ascribe all this to chance is, in a high degree, absurd and foolish. It would become us rather to search out some cause, since nothing happens without a cause; nor

even among those events which seem to be the most fortuitous. In my judgement, then, this cause is nothing else than that equality and liberty, in a word that democratical species of government, which is found more just and perfect in its kind among the Achæans than in any other state. This republic was at first composed of a small part only of the inhabitants of Peloponnesus; who voluntarily associated themselves into one body. But a greater number soon joined themselves to these; induced to it by persuasion, and the manifest advantages of such a union. And some, as opportunities arose, were forced into the confederacy, but were soon well satisfied with the violence by which they had been compelled to embrace so excellent a form of government. For the new citizens were suffered to enjoy all the rights and privileges that were permitted to the old. Every thing was equal among them all. Thus, by employing the means that were of all things most effectual for their purpose, equality and gentleness, they soon arrived at the point which they had in view. To this we must ascribe the growth and strength of the confederacy; and the flourishing condition which the people of Peloponnesus have from that time enjoyed.

This form of government was of very ancient date among the Achæans. Of this there are many proofs; but it will be sufficient to mention only one or two. After those disorders that happened in the part of Italy that was called Great Greece, in which the Pythagoreans were consumed in fire, together with the house in which they were assem-

bled, the whole country was thrown at once into a state of anarchy and wild confusion. For the chief men of every city had perished in that horrible destruction. The towns all were filled with tumult, slaughter, and the most dreadful outrages. Upon this occasion, though deputies were sent from almost all the states of Greece, to quiet their dissensions, and restore peace among them, the Achæans were the only people upon whose assistance and advice they consented to rely. Nor was this the only instance in which they showed their approbation of the institutions of this republic. For not long afterwards, they resolved to imitate the whole model of their government. In this design the people of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, associated themselves by mutual agreement into one confederacy, and built a temple for holding their common synods and assemblies, inscribing it to Jupiter Homorius. They adopted likewise all the laws and customs of the Achæans, and began to direct their whole administration by them. But Dionysius the Syracusan tyrant, and their barbarous neighbours, who were very strong and powerful, in a short time forced them to desist from the design.

When the Thebans, after the great and unexpected victory which they had obtained against the Lacedæmonians in the battle of Leuctra, began, with the surprise of all, to lay claim to the sovereignty of Greece, various troubles and commotions arose among the people of the country; and especially between the two contending parties: for

the one refused to submit as conquered, while the other persisted still to claim the victory. In these circumstances they at last agreed to yield all the points that were in dispute between them, to the sole judgement and decision of the Achæans. Nor was this preference obtained by any superiority of strength or power; for they were at that time the least of all the states of Greece; but was confessedly bestowed upon that integrity and love of virtue by which they were distinguished above all other people.

At this time, therefore, they were powerful in inclination only, and not from any real strength. Their government had not yet been able to acquire any considerable increase, for want of a chief that was capable of giving full accomplishment to their designs. For as often as any appeared among them, whose views and conduct were suspected to tend that way, they were immediately opposed in every enterprise, and checked in all their motions, either by the Lacedæmonians, or still more frequently by the kings of Macedon. But when they had at last found one, whose abilities were equal to the task, they then soon made known the inherent excellence and power of their republic, by carrying into execution that vast and glorious project, of uniting all the states of Peloponnesus to the body of their own confederacy. The first and chief author of this union was Aratus the Sicyonian. Philopœmen of Megalopolis, after many struggles, conducted it to its completion; and Lycortas, with others who pursued his measures, added to it its last firmness

and stability. We shall take occasion to relate their several actions, with the time and manner in which they were performed, as fully and particularly as the design of this history may require. We shall, indeed, both now and at all times hereafter, touch but lightly on the several parts of the administration of Aratus; because he has left behind him a very faithful and clear account of his own transactions. But in all that regards the rest, we shall enlarge more copiously, and survey their conduct with a nicer care. At present, in order to make this whole inquiry more easy to ourselves, as well as more intelligible to the reader, we shall look back to the time when the Achæans, after they had been broken into separate bodies by the kings of Macedon, first formed the resolution of uniting again their several cities into one community. For from this beginning their republic gradually enlarged its bounds and power, till it arrived at last at that state of perfect greatness in which it has been seen to flourish in these latter times.

It was in the hundred-twenty-fourth Olympiad that the Patrians and Dymæans associated themselves the first into this confederacy. In the same Olympiad, Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, all died. The state of the Achæans before this time was, in few words, as follows. Tisamenes, the son of Orestes, being driven from Sparta upon the return of the Heraclidæ, gained possession of Achaia by force, and was declared sovereign of the country. His descendants reigned after him in natural succession,

down to Ogyges. But when the children of this prince had ceased to make the laws the rule of their administration, and began to govern all things by their own arbitrary will, the Achæans changed the constitution from monarchy to a commonwealth. In this state they continued afterwards to the times of Alexander; and though different accidents might in some conjunctures introduce a temporary change in their affairs, yet, upon the whole, they still preserved the form of a genuine democracy. Their republic was composed of twelve cities; all of which now exist, except Olenus and Helice, which were swallowed by an inundation of the sea, not long before the battle of Leuctra. The names of the twelve were, Patræ, Dyme, Pharæ, Tritæa, Leontium, Ægira, Pellene, Ægium, Bura, Carynia, Olenus, and Helice. But after the death of Alexander, this union was dissolved by various contests and dissensions that were raised among them, chiefly through the arts of the kings of Macedon. Every city was now engaged in a separate interest, and no longer acted in concert with the whole. The effect of this discord was, that some of them received garrisons from Demetrius and Cassander, and afterwards from Antigonus Gonatas; and some were seized by tyrants; for Antigonus gave both establishment and support to a great number of these throughout all Greece. But in the hundred-twenty-fourth Olympiad, as we have already mentioned, they saw their error, and began to think of returning to their former state. This was the time in which Pyrrhus invaded Italy. Dyme, Pa-

træ, Pharæ, and Tritæa, were at first the only cities that agreed to unite themselves again in one community; and it is on that account that there is now no monument remaining of this new confederacy. About five years afterwards, the people of Ægium drove out the garrison, and joined their city to the league. Their example soon was followed by the Burians, who killed their tyrant, and afterwards by the Carynians also. For when Iseas, the tyrant of Carynia, saw that by the management of Marcus and the Achæans, the garrison was driven out of Ægium, and the tyrant of the Burians killed, and that their forces were preparing to invest his territory upon every side, he laid down his royalty, and, having obtained a promise of life and safety, associated his city to the confederacy.

Some, perhaps, will be solicitous to know the motives, by which I have been led back to this early period. My design then was, first, that I might mark precisely the time and manner, in which this second confederacy commenced; and what were the cities which laid the first foundation of that establishment, which has subsisted even to the present times: and in the second place, that the state and real circumstances of the facts themselves might declare the truth of what we have affirmed, concerning the genius and the spirit of the Achæan commonwealth. For from these it will be evident, that that equality and liberty, upon which the republic first was founded, have been the chief causes of its great increase. To which we may also add, the constancy and unshaken reso-

lution, with which they never cease to wage perpetual war against all those who, either by their own power, or with the assistance of the neighbouring kings, attempt to force their cities into slavery. Upon these principles, and by this conduct, they brought their work to its desired perfection: using partly their own strength, and partly that of their allies. For all the assistance, which they received afterwards from these, was applied solely to promote the grand purpose of their government. And even after those great exploits, which they performed jointly with the Romans, they were not in the least ambitious of obtaining any private advantage to themselves; nor ever claimed any other reward for all their services, than the establishment of the common liberty, in the union of all the states of Peloponnesus. The truth of these remarks will, I say, be confirmed beyond all doubt, by the recital of the facts.

The cities, which we have just now mentioned, remained under this form of government during the course of twenty-five years: in which time, they elected annually, two prætors, and a common secretary. But afterwards, they chose to place the whole administration in one single prætor. The first who obtained that honour, was Marcus of Carynia. Four years after this prætorship, Aratus the Sicyonian, though he was then no more than twenty years old, by his bravery and courage gave liberty to his country, and joined it to the Achæan league; for he had always greatly

admired the constitution of this republic. Eight years afterwards, being himself elected prætor of the Achæans for the second time, he found means to take Acrocorinthus by surprise, in which Antigonus had then a garrison. By gaining this important place, he delivered all the people of Peloponnesus from no small apprehensions; restored the Corinthians to their liberty; and engaged them to become a part of the Achæan government. In the course of the same year, he made himself master of the city of Megara by some secret management, and joined it likewise to the confederacy. This was the year before the final defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily; which forced them to abandon all the island, and pay a tribute to the Romans. Thus Aratus, in a short time, greatly enlarged the growing power of the Achæans: and ever afterwards, as long as he was employed in the administration of their affairs, his conduct was uniform and constant, and never deviated from the points which he had at first in view: to drive the Macedonians out of Peloponnesus; to destroy the tyrants every where; and restore to the people all their natural rights, and that common liberty which their ancestors had before enjoyed.

During the life-time of Antigonus Gonatas, it was a task of no small difficulty, to resist on one hand the intrigues and artful policy of that prince, and the rapaciousness and bold ambition of the Ætolians on the other. For these two powers had advanced so far together in their unjust attempts, that they even formed the project of a league, for

the entire destruction of the Achæans. But Aratus, by his wisdom and indefatigable pains, effectually broke and frustrated the design.

After the death of this prince, the Achæans entered into a treaty of alliance with the Ætolians, and assisted them in the war against Demetrius. By this compliance, all past jealousies were removed: and their former enmity gave place to confidence and friendship. When Demetrius was also dead, after a reign of ten years only, and about the time in which the Romans first passed into Illyria, the Achæans found this conjuncture to be highly favourable to them for advancing their designs. For all the tyrants of Peloponnesus were now disheartened, and diffident of their future safety. They had lost their master and their chief: the sovereign, by whom they were supported and maintained in pay. On the other hand Aratus urged them close: and showed his resolution to abolish every tyranny. He promised great rewards and honours to those that would voluntarily submit: and threatened ruin and extreme punishment to all such as should refuse. By these means they were all engaged to divest themselves of the royal power; to restore liberty to their several cities; and to unite them to the Achæan league. Lysiadas, the tyrant of Megalopolis, whose wise discernment taught him to foresee what would shortly happen, had resigned his dignity, and joined his country to the republic, even in the life-time of Demetrius. His example was now followed by Aristomachus, the tyrant of Ar-

gos: and by Xeno and Cleonymus, the tyrants of the Hermionians and Phliasians.

The Ætolians, who were by nature rapacious and unjust, could not behold without envy this great increase of the Achæan power and strength. They began to flatter themselves with secret hopes of breaking the confederacy, and enriching themselves with the spoil. As they had formerly shared with Alexander the towns of Acarnania, and had afterwards formed the project of dividing also between Antigonus Gonatas and themselves the cities of Achaia, they were now persuaded, that it would be no hard task to carry into execution this last design. With this view, they resolved to concert the matter first in private with Antigonus, the guardian of young Philip, and with Cleomenes king of Lacedæmon, and to demand assistance from those princes. They knew that Antigonus at this time governed Macedon in full security; and that he was the declared and open enemy of the Achæans, because they had taken Acrocorinthus from him by surprise. They imagined therefore, that if they could once inspire the Lacedæmonians with the same hostile disposition, and engage them into this design, the Achæans, attacked at once on every side as occasion should direct, must necessarily sink beneath the efforts of their united forces. In truth, the prospect of success seemed very fair and promising. But in concerting this project, one circumstance of great moment was forgot. For it never once occurred to their reflection, that Aratus was the man, who

was to oppose all their measures, and counteract their motions: a man, whose abilities were superior to every difficulty. And indeed so effectually did he oppose them, defeating all their counsels, and turning their projects to their own destruction, that this unjust and unprovoked attack, instead of accomplishing any part of that which was intended from it, served only to give new life and vigour to the Achæan commonwealth. We shall give a distinct and clear account of the manner in which the whole was then conducted.

When Aratus saw, that the Ætolians were restrained by shame, from declaring themselves the open enemies of the Achæans, from whom they had received great services in the war against Demetrius; yet that they were acting in private concert with the Lacedæmonians, and had suffered their jealousy, and their hatred of the Achæans, to carry them to such excess, that when Cleomenes had taken by surprise Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, which were at that time not only in alliance with the Ætolians, but associated also to their government, they not only showed no resentment of this insult, but even yielded to him the full possession of those cities; when he saw, that a nation, whose character it was to declare war upon the slightest pretexts, even against those from whom they had received no wrong, was now on a sudden so much changed, that they not only bore with patience an attack made upon them in direct breach of treaties, but were even content to give up all their claim to three cities of import-

ance, that by means of this new strength Cleomenes might be able to maintain the war against the Achæans: when Aratus, I say, and the rest of the chiefs of the republic, had fully considered and debated all these circumstances, the result of their deliberations was, that they would not yet take arms avowedly against any power, but only hold themselves in readiness to oppose all attempts that should be made against them. This was their first determination. But some time afterwards, when Cleomenes had built the fortress, called Athenæum, in the Megalopolitan territory, and began to act against them in a hostile manner without reserve, the Achæans then called a general council, and it was there resolved, that war should be declared against the Lacedæmonians.

Such was the beginning of that which is called the Cleomenic war. The Achæans at first designed to employ their own proper forces only, in defence of their state and country. For it seemed less honourable, to owe their safety to a foreign army: and they were willing also to preserve the friendship of king Ptolemy; to whom they were indebted for many favours; and who on that account might perhaps show some resentment, if they now invited any other power to their assistance. But as the war began to advance fast upon them, and was pressed with equal vigour and dexterity by Cleomenes, who had subverted the lawful constitution of his country, and established a tyranny in Sparta, Aratus, having carefully weighed the danger, and made due re-

flection also upon the daring spirit, and malicious disposition of the Ætolians, perceived that it was necessary to have recourse in time to some expedient, which might divert the fatal consequences that were in view. In this design, he turned his eyes towards Antigonus, whom he knew to be a prince of perfect judgement and experience; at all times ready to make alliances, as occasion should require; and punctual in observing them when made. But he remembered also, that kings naturally bear neither enmity nor friendship towards any; but are in both determined by the rule of interest alone. He resolved therefore to explain at large to Antigonus the dangers that would probably arise, even against himself, from the present situation of affairs in Greece; and endeavour by that mean to draw him from his party, and engage him to join his forces with the Achæans. It was requisite, however, that he should keep this resolution for some time secret. For he knew, that if it should be once discovered, Cleomenes and the Ætolians would employ every art to defeat his purpose. He was apprehensive also, that it might too much depress the courage of his countrymen, if he should seem to despair of saving the republic by its own genuine forces: and more especially, if he should now apply for succour to the Macedonians, whom they always had regarded as their enemies. In the conduct therefore of this whole design, he was forced to employ the greatest secrecy and caution; and both to speak and act, in a manner very opposite

to his real sentiments. And from hence it happens, that many circumstances, which relate to this transaction, are omitted in his memoirs.

When he saw, then, that the Megalopolitans were the first and greatest sufferers in the war, both because their country lay nearest to Lacedæmon, and because the Achæans were themselves too much embarrassed to send the succours to them that were necessary; when he considered also, that this people were already favourably disposed towards the house of Macedon, on account of some good offices which they had received from Philip the son of Amyntas; he made no doubt, but that as soon as the war should become too heavy for their strength, they would immediately have recourse to Antigonus and the Macedonians. He sent therefore for Nicophanes and Cercidas; two Megalopolitans, who had formerly been connected with his family by the ties of hospitality; and who by their abilities were very capable of promoting his design. To these he privately disclosed his project: and, through their means, soon afterwards engaged the Megalopolitans to send some deputies to the Achæan States, requesting their permission to invite Antigonus to their assistance. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves appointed for the embassy: and their instructions were, to proceed without delay to the court of Macedon, in case that the Achæans should approve of the design.

The Achæans yielded their consent: and the deputies began their journey without delay, and

were admitted to a conference with the king. With respect to their own particular country, they spoke in a few words only, what the occasion seemed barely to require. But they enlarged more copiously upon the general situation of affairs in Greece; according to the instructions, which they had received in private from Aratus. They explained the views of the Ætolians and Cleomenes; showed the tendency of their designs; and warned the king of the fatal consequences that were likely to result from this confederacy. For though the Achæans only were most imminently threatened, yet the danger must at last extend even to Antigonus himself. It was clear to every judgement, that the Achæans could not long maintain their ground, against the efforts of two so powerful enemies. Nor was it less clear and evident, that Cleomenes and the Ætolians would never be contented with the conquest of the Achæans only. For such was the disposition of the Ætolians, that the bounds not only of Peloponnesus, but even of Greece itself, would be thought too narrow for their rapaciousness and wild ambition. And though the whole design and purpose of Cleomenes seemed at present to aim at nothing more, than the supreme command in Peloponnesus, yet when this should be once obtained, there was no room to doubt, but that he would immediately enlarge his views, and endeavour to seize the sovereignty of the rest of Greece; at which he could never arrive, but by the ruin of the Macedonian monarchy. They therefore ad-

vised the king, to turn his thoughts upon the future: and to consider with himself, whether it would not be far more suited to his interests, to join his forces with the Achæans and Bœotians, and contend with Cleomenes in Peloponnesus for the supreme command of Greece, than, by neglecting at this time to save a great and powerful nation, to be forced at last to maintain a war in the very heart of Thessaly, and defend his own proper kingdom, against the united forces of the Ætolians and Bœotians, the Lacedæmonians and Achæans. They farther added, that if the Ætolians, softened by the remembrance of the services which they had received from the Achæans in the war against Demetrius, should forbear to take arms against them, they would themselves stand singly against the efforts of Cleomenes, and should want no foreign succours, unless the fortune of the war should prove in all points contrary to their hopes. But in case that the success should fail to answer their endeavours, or the Ætolians declare themselves their enemies, they then earnestly besought Antigonus, that he would interpose without delay, and give safety to the states of Peloponnesus, while there was yet time to save them. With regard to any terms of caution and security, they assured the king, that Aratus would take care to find such expedients, as should fully satisfy all parties: and that he would send him notice also of the time, in which it would be seasonable for him to begin his march to their assistance.

Antigonus was convinced that this kind of rea-

soning was perfectly just and solid; and began to apply his whole attention to the affairs that were before him. He sent letters to the Megalopolitans, assuring them that he was ready to assist them with his forces, in case that the Achæans should approve of the design.

When Nicophanes and Cercidas were returned, and had delivered the letters, and made report of the favourable inclinations of the king, the Megalopolitans, being greatly pleased with their success, sent in all haste to the council of the Achæans, and pressed them to invite Antigonus without delay, and leave to him the whole conduct of the war. Aratus likewise, when he had heard in private from Nicophanes of the disposition which the king had shown with respect both to the Achæans and himself, was beyond measure filled with joy. He now perceived, that he had not bestowed his pains upon a vain or fruitless project: and that Antigonus was by no means so entirely alienated from him, as the Ætolians had believed. He judged it also to be a most happy circumstance, that the Megalopolitans, in referring to Antigonus the care of their affairs, had resolved to use the mediation of the Achæan states. For his first wish was, that there might be no want at all of foreign succours. But if necessity should force them to have recourse to any such assistance, he rather chose, that the application should be made by all the states of Achaia, than by himself. For there seemed to be some cause to fear, that if Antigonus, when he had first subdued the

Lacedæmonians and Cleomenes, should engage in any ill designs against the republic of the Achæans, the blame would all be imputed to him alone: since all men would consider such a conduct as the effect of a just resentment, for the injury that had been done to the Macedonians by Aratus, in taking Acrocorinthus from them. When the Megalopolitans therefore had shown the letters in the council of the Achæans, and conjured them to invite Antigonus to their assistance without delay; and when the people began to declare aloud their readiness to comply with this request, Aratus came forwards in the assembly, and spoke largely in praise of the zeal and good inclinations of Antigonus, and commended also the disposition of the people. But he exhorted them in the most earnest and pathetic manner, "to employ in the first place their utmost efforts, and endeavour by every expedient, to defend their cities and their country, by their own genuine forces: that both their honour and their interest required it from them: and in case that fortune should fail to give success to their endeavours, that it would then be early enough to implore the assistance of their friends, when they had first been forced to abandon all hopes of safety from themselves."

These sentiments were applauded by the whole assembly. They resolved, therefore, to adhere to this opinion, and sustain the war alone. But some time afterwards, when king Ptolemy, being persuaded that the Lacedæmonians would be able to assist him more effectually than the Achæans

in the designs which he had formed against the kings of Macedon, had rejected the alliance of the Achæans, and engaged to furnish Cleomenes with such supplies, as might enable him to carry on the war against Antigonus; when the Achæans had been surprised by Cleomenes upon their march, and suffered great loss near Lycæum; when they had also been a second time defeated in the Laodician plains near Megalopolis, in which action Leusiadas was slain; and lastly, when they had suffered a complete and dreadful overthrow in a general engagement, at a place called Hecatombæum in the Dymean territory; their affairs were then so desperate, that, without any new delay, they with one voice agreed to invite Antigonus to their assistance. Aratus sent his own son to the king to settle the terms of their agreement. But there was one point which caused no small embarrassment. It was not probable, that Antigonus would march to their relief, unless Acrocorinthus should be first restored, and the city of Corinth likewise yielded to him for his place of arms. But the Achæans would not venture to surrender Corinth, without the consent of the inhabitants. Some little delay was therefore made in their deliberations, till an expedient could be found, and such sureties offered, as might satisfy the king.

In the mean time Cleomenes, having spread great terror every where by those victories that have now been mentioned, advanced at leisure through the country; drawing the cities to submission, some by gentle means, and some by force.

In this manner he gained Caphyæ, Pellene, Pheneum, Argos, Phlius, Cleone, Epidaurus, Hermiona, Trœzen, and lastly Corinth, and then went and encamped before Sicyon. Happily these rapid conquests freed the Achæans from that great difficulty which had obstructed all their measures. For no sooner had the inhabitants of Corinth commanded all the Achæans to leave the city, and sent a deputation to Cleomenes to invite him to take possession of it, than Aratus, having now obtained a fair and honest pretext, surrendered Acrocorinthus to Antigonus. Thus he wiped away at once all remembrance of his former offence against the house of Macedon; gave a strong assurance of the sincerity of his intentions, with regard to the present treaty; and furnished the Macedonians with a commodious place of arms for the approaching war.

CHAP. IV.

AS soon as Cleomenes heard, that the Achæans had concluded a treaty with Antigonus, he marched from before Sicyon, and encamped upon the isthmus. He cast up an intrenchment round all the space that lay between Acrocorinthus and the Onian mountains: and persuaded himself, that he was now secure of obtaining the sovereignty of Peloponnesus.

Antigonus had long ago completed all his preparations, and waited only for the proper time of action, as Aratus had advised. But when he saw the rapid progress of Cleomenes, he began to apprehend, that this prince would soon advance, and attack him even in the very heart of Thessaly. He sent word therefore to the Achæans, that they should be punctual in the execution of the measures that had been concerted; and himself began his march with the army towards the isthmus, through Eubœa. For the Ætolians, among other expedients which they contrived to prevent Antigonus from lending any assistance to the Achæans, had sent him notice, that his army should have no passage through Thermopylæ; and in case he should attempt to march that way, that they would oppose him by force of arms.

While Antigonus and Cleomenes lay in opposite camps upon the isthmus, the one watching his opportunity to pass into Peloponnesus, the other ready to oppose his entrance, the Achæans, though much weakened by their losses, still maintained their courage, and resolved to pursue the war with vigour. And when Aristotle, a citizen of Argos, had formed a party in the place against Cleomenes, they immediately sent away Timoxenus with a body of forces, who made themselves masters of the city. This happy accident gave instantly a new face to their affairs. For so effectually did it depress the ardour of Cleomenes, and damp the courage of his army, that though this general was possessed of all the advantageous

posts, and furnished with supplies of every kind in greater abundance than Antigonus; though he was far more bold and enterprising than that prince, and more strongly animated by the love of glory; yet no sooner had he received the news that Argos was taken by the Achæans, than he at once abandoned all his conquests, and rather fled than retreated, homewards; as if he had feared, that the enemy would soon surround him on every side. In his way, he found means to enter Argos, and for some time had hopes of recovering the city, but was at last repulsed. For as the Achæans maintained their post with courage, so the inhabitants especially resisted with a more than common force and obstinacy, as if they had designed to make atonement for their past offence, in having embraced his party. When this attempt had failed, he continued his route through Mantinea, and returned again to Sparta.

Antigonus now entered Peloponnesus without resistance; took possession of Acrocorinthus; and advanced with great celerity to Argos: from whence, when he had first bestowed high commendations upon the courage of the inhabitants, and settled the affairs of the city, he continued his march towards Arcadia. He drove out the garrisons from all the forts that had been built by Cleomenes, in the territory of the Ægians and Belminates, and filled them with the troops of Megalopolis. He went afterwards to Ægium, and was present in the council of the Achæan states. He there showed at large the motives of his conduct:

proposed his sentiments with regard to the future operations of the war, and was declared the general in chief of the allies.

After some time spent in winter quarters in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, as the spring now advanced, he again began his march with the forces, and arrived in three days before Tegea: and being joined there by the Achæans, he immediately invested the town. The siege was pushed by the Macedonians with so much vigour, as well by mining as by the other methods of attack, that the inhabitants in a short time lost all hope, and submitted at discretion. Antigonus, having secured the place by a sufficient garrison, advanced in haste towards Laconia. When he approached the frontiers, he engaged the Lacedæmonians, who were there encamped, in some light skirmishes, hoping to draw on a general battle. But having received notice by his spies, that the garrison of Orchomenus had retired from the place and joined Cleomenes, he immediately decamped, and directing his march that way, took the town in the first assault. He next laid siege to Mantinea, which was struck with terror, and surrendered. Marching from thence, he gained Heræa and Telphussa, which were yielded voluntarily to him by the inhabitants; and afterwards, as the summer now was past, returned again to Ægium, to be present at the council of the states. He sent away the Macedonians to take their winter quarters in their own country, while himself staid behind at Ægium, to

deliberate with the Achæans on the measures that were proper to be pursued.

When Cleomenes saw, that the Macedonians were dismissed, and that Antigonus was left in Ægium with only the mercenary troops; that he was distant full three days' journey from Megalopolis; that this city, on account both of its great extent, and the small number of the inhabitants, could not easily be guarded against an enemy; that at this time especially, it actually was guarded with less attention than before, because Antigonus was near; and that the greater part of the citizens, who were of age to bear arms, had been already lost, in the engagements near Lycæum and the Laodician plains; he found means, with the assistance of some Messenian exiles, who at that time resided in the place, to enter the city privately by night. But when day appeared, the inhabitants maintained their ground with so much bravery, that he found himself in the greatest danger, not only of being forced back again with loss, but of suffering an entire defeat: as it had happened to him about three months before, when he made the same attempt, and entered the city in the part that was called Colæum. At this time, however, as his forces were very numerous, and had seized on all the advantageous posts, he at last accomplished his design; drove out the Megalopolitans; and made himself master of the place: which he immediately pillaged and destroyed with so much bitterness of rage and fury,

as left no hope, that it ever could again be inhabited. This severe treatment seems to have flowed from no other cause than the mere resentment of Cleomenes: who was enraged to find, that among all the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians, not one could be prevailed upon at this conjuncture to embrace his interests, and betray the liberties of his fellow-citizens. Among the Clitorians indeed, a generous people, and passionately fond of freedom, there was found a single traitor, named Thearces, whose baseness seemed to cast some infamy upon his country. But the Clitorians upon that account very reasonably deny, that he derived his birth from them, and declare him to have been the spurious and deserted offspring of a soldier from Orchomenus.

In composing this part of my history, as I have chiefly followed Aratus for my guide, and drawn my materials from him, and as many persons are inclined to prefer Phylarchus, who gives a very different account of these transactions, I think it necessary to bestow in this place some little observation upon the talents and capacity of this historian; that his relations, which indeed are fabulous and false, may no longer possess that credit, which ought only to be paid to those that are genuine and true.

This writer then, through every part of his performance, has shown abundant proofs of haste, inaccuracy, want of judgement, and discernment. But it is not my design to enter into a critical examination of them all. I shall, at present, con-

sider his accounts of those transactions only, which fall within the period of the Cleomenic war. And these, indeed, will be sufficient, not only to explain his sentiments, and the temper with which he wrote, but to show also in what degree he was possessed of those abilities that are requisite for such an undertaking.

In order to expose the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, and of Aratus and the Achæans, he relates, that the Mantineans, after they had been conquered by them, were punished in a manner the most severe: and that the largest and most ancient city of all Arcadia was condemned to struggle with such calamities as filled the Greeks with astonishment and horror, and melted them into tears. He then endeavours to move his readers to compassion, and force them even to feel the sufferings which he relates: setting in view before them the companies of unhappy women, joined together in embraces, striking their bare bosoms and tearing their dishevelled hair, and describing the lamentations and the tears of husbands and their wives, who, together with their children and their aged parents, were dragged away in promiscuous crowds to slavery. Thus it is that in every part of his work, his chief pains and art are constantly employed in painting scenes of misery and horror. But surely there is no need to use many words, to explode a kind of writing so mean and womanish. Let us consider rather, what is the genuine and proper character, and what the peculiar use, of history.

A historian then, instead of endeavouring, like the writers of tragedy, to strike the reader with admiration or with terror, instead of dressing up probable speeches, and enumerating all the circumstances that might possibly have followed after every accident, should be satisfied with giving a bare relation of such facts and discourses as really happened, though perhaps they may contain nothing great or elevated. For the nature and design of tragedy are very different from those of history. The business of the former is, to strike and captivate the minds of the hearers for the present moment, by such representations as are barely probable: whereas history professes to give lessons of improvement even to future times, by relating such discourses and events as are strictly true. In the one, therefore, the probable, though false, may be sufficient to conduct us to the end in view, which is amusement and delight; but the other, whose proper work is to convey instruction, must be always built on truth.

In recounting all these dismal accidents, Phylarchus is for the most part silent also with respect to the cause and motives by which they were occasioned. And yet, unless we are previously informed of these, it is not possible to know whether the case can reasonably lay claim either to our indignation or our pity. It is, for instance, a lamentable spectacle, to see a free man whipped with rods. But when this is the proper punishment of his crimes, it must be allowed to have happened justly to him; and whenever it is done

for the sake of discipline and reformation, we even applaud those persons who inflict it. To take away the life of a citizen, is considered as a most horrid crime, and such as calls for the severest vengeance. Yet a man may openly destroy an adulterer or a robber, without any fear of being punished for it. And those who rescue their country from a traitor or a tyrant, are even thought worthy of the greatest honours. It is manifest, therefore, that in order to pass a perfect judgement on any action, instead of barely contemplating the act itself, we should examine the causes that produced it, together with the intention and the views of those by whom it was done: for, agreeably to the difference that is found in these, the action will be likewise different.

With regard to the fact which occasioned these reflections, the truth is as follows. The Mantineans, without any provocation or excuse, had deserted the Achæan confederacy, and delivered up their country and themselves, first to the Ætolians, and afterwards to Cleomenes, and were joined by him to the Lacedæmonian state. In these circumstances, about four years before the arrival of Antigonus, they were conquered by the Achæans, with the assistance of a party that Aratus had gained within the city. But so far were they from being exposed at this time to any severe or cruel treatment in resentment of their offence, that, on the contrary, all Greece talked loudly of the sudden change which seemed to have been effected in the disposition of these people towards each other.

For when Aratus had made himself master of the city, he strictly forbade his soldiers to touch any of the goods of the inhabitants. And having afterwards called the people together, he exhorted them to resume their courage, and remain satisfied in their present state: for that as long as they would consider themselves as a part of the Achæan government, they might live in perfect freedom and security. An indulgence so unexpected, and which so far exceeded all their hopes, changed at once the inclinations of the Mantineans. They no longer remembered the friends whom they had lost in battle, or the dangers to which themselves had been exposed; but embraced the Achæans, who so lately were their enemies; admitted them to their houses and their feasts; and strove to express their joy by every act of hospitality and kindness. And this indeed was highly reasonable. For certainly no people ever fell into the hands of a more merciful or more generous enemy; or escaped, with so little difficulty, from those calamities that are esteemed the greatest in human life. A happiness which they entirely owed to the humanity of Aratus andthe Achæans.

Some time afterwards this people, being disturbed by some intestine tumults, and apprehensive also of some danger from the Lacedæmonians and Ætolians, requested from the Achæans a garrison for their security. The Achæans chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens; who all left their country and their fortunes, and went and resided in Mantinea, to watch over the liberties and safety

of that city. They added also to them a body of two hundred mercenaries. But the Mantineans not long afterwards, taking occasion from some new dissensions which broke out among them, called in the Lacedæmonians, delivered their city to them, and killed all the Achæans that were in the place. A perfidy, more horrible and impious than can be well expressed. For though they had resolved to disclaim the friendship of the Achæans, and forget all the favours which they had received from their republic, yet they ought at least to have sent home unhurt those troops which they had before admitted as allies; since by the laws of nations this indulgence is always granted even to an enemy. But the Mantineans resolved to violate these laws; insult the common rights of mankind; and perpetrate an inexpiable crime; that by such a conduct, they might be able more strongly to assure Cleomenes of their zeal and close attachment to his cause. This action surely might, in justice, draw after it the heaviest resentment. To embrue their hands in the blood of those by whom themselves, when they had fallen into their power not long before, were dismissed with pardon; and who at this very moment were employed in defending the liberties and safety of their city: what, let me ask, would have been the proper punishment for such a crime? It will, perhaps, be said, that as soon as they were conquered, they should have been sold for slaves, together with their wives and children. But this is no more than what is usually permitted by the laws of war, even against those

who have not been guilty of any uncommon wickedness. The Mantineans, therefore, deserved to be treated in some more rigorous manner. And if they had even been involved in all that wretchedness which is described at large by Phylarchus, it would have been so far from exciting the Greeks to sympathy and compassion, that on the contrary they must have applauded those who took care not to leave so great a crime unpunished. But in truth the whole which they suffered was, that their goods were pillaged, and the citizens exposed to sale. It is clear, therefore, that Phylarchus, in order to surprise and strike the reader, has invented not only a mere heap of falsehoods, but such falsehoods too as bear not any show of probability; while, through an excess of ignorance, he makes no mention of a fact that was coincident with that which he relates, and which might very properly have been connected with it. For when the Achæans, at this very time, had taken the town of Tegea by storm, they used none of the same severity towards the inhabitants. Yet if the sufferings of the Mantineans had been the bare effect of a cruel disposition in their enemies, it seems reasonable to suppose, that the people of Tegea would have been treated also with equal rigour. But as the Mantineans alone were punished with severity, it is manifest beyond all doubt that the conduct of the Achæans must, of necessity, be ascribed to some other cause.

In another place he relates, that Aristomachus, a man of an illustrious family, descended from a line of tyrants, and who was himself tyrant of Ar-

gos, having fallen alive into the hands of Antigonus and the Achæans, was conducted to Cenchreæ, and there put to death in tortures the most merciless and cruel that ever were inflicted upon man. And then, after his usual manner, he goes on to describe the loud and moving lamentations of the unhappy sufferer, which were heard at midnight through all the neighbourhood; that some were struck with horror, while some doubted of the fact; and that others, inflamed with indignation, ran in crowds towards the house from whence the cries proceeded. But let us pass over these scenes of terror and amazement, which have already been sufficiently exposed. In my judgement then, though Aristomachus had been guilty of no offence against the Achæans, the whole tenour of his life, and the wicked tyranny which he had exercised upon his country, might very deservedly have drawn upon him the severest punishment. Yet Phylarchus, with design to throw a greater splendour on his character, and more effectually to raise the indignation of the reader, declares, not only that he was himself a tyrant, but that he was descended also from a race of tyrants; an accusation in itself the heaviest that can be well conceived. For the very name of tyrant includes the full extent of wickedness, and implies the commission of every kind of crime which man can perpetrate. But in truth if he had been forced to suffer the most cruel punishment, as this historian relates, he never could have made by it a due atonement for the transactions of one single day; the day when Aratus en-

tered Argos with a body of Achæans, and gloriously exerted all his efforts to restore liberty to the city; but was forced at last to retire, because his party within the walls were restrained from joining him, through apprehension of the tyrant. For Aristomachus, on pretence that the inhabitants were secretly engaged in the design, and had favoured the entrance of the Achæans, seized eighty of the chief among the citizens, and caused them to be put to death in torture, even before the eyes of their friends and families.

I forbear to relate the whole of his flagitious life, with the crimes which his ancestors before him had committed. The task would be too tedious. If at last then he was forced to suffer in some degree that cruel treatment which he had practised against others, this surely cannot be esteemed too severe or shocking. It should rather raise our indignation if such a man had died, without being first exposed to any kind of vengeance or calamity. Nor ought it to be censured as an instance of injustice in Antigonus and Aratus, that when they had fairly taken him in war, they put him to death in torture; since if they had treated him with the same severity even during the time of peace, the action must have been applauded by all men of sense.

But if, besides his other crimes, he was guilty likewise of the worst ingratitude and perfidy towards the Achæans, what punishment will he then be thought to have deserved? Yet this was in truth the fact. For when the death of Demetrius had left him naked and defenceless, so that he was

constrained to lay down his sovereignty, he found, beyond all his hopes, a safe and honourable refuge in the generous clemency of the Achæans; who not only covered him from the punishment that was due to his past tyranny, but received him into their republic, and even yielded to him the greatest honours of the state; for he was raised to be their general and prætor. But no sooner had he conceived some hopes of recovering again his former fortune by the assistance of Cleomenes, than he forgot at once all the kindness that had been shown towards him; separated his country from the confederacy; and joined himself to the enemy, at the very time when the Achæans were in greatest want of his assistance. After such a baseness, instead of being put to a cruel death by night at Cenchreæ, as Phylarchus relates, he should rather have been led through all the towns of Peloponnesus, exposed to every kind of torture and indignity, and afterwards have been deprived of life. But in truth, this man, after all his wickedness, was only thrown into the sea, for some crimes that he committed during his stay at Cenchreæ.

This historian seems to have been persuaded, that acts of violence or injustice were those which chiefly merited his attention. Hence it is that he exaggerates, and relates in the fullest and most pathetic manner, the sufferings of the Mantineans, but makes no mention of that glorious firmness which appeared in the conduct of the Megalopolitans at this conjuncture. As if history should rather be employed in describing bad actions than

those that are laudable and virtuous, or that the reader would find less matter of instruction in such examples as deserve to be admired and imitated, than in those which are fit only to be detested and avoided. In his account of the taking of Megalopolis he relates, that Cleomenes not only preserved the town from being pillaged, but sent letters also to the Megalopolitans, who had retired to Messene, and offered to restore their city to them on condition only that they would embrace his interests. And this is done with design to extol the magnanimity of Cleomenes, and his moderation towards his enemies. He then adds, that the Megalopolitans refused to hear the letters to the end, and were hardly restrained from stoning the messengers who brought them. But here his relation is concluded. With respect to all that should afterwards have followed, he is entirely silent; neglecting the most fair occasion of performing that which is, indeed, the peculiar work of history: I mean, the task of recording a great and noble instance of uncommon constancy and resolution, and of recommending it to our praise and imitation. For if every public testimony by which we declare our affection and steady zeal for the interests of our allies, be esteemed a thing highly laudable and virtuous; if those who can see their country wasted, or choose to sustain the miseries of a siege rather than desert their friends, be thought worthy not only of applause but of the greatest rewards and honours, what then must be our opinion of the Megalopolitans? how admirable their conduct, and how great their cha-

racter! They saw their lands laid waste and pillaged by Cleomenes, and themselves constrained to abandon all their territory, for their attachment to the interests of the Achæans. Yet when beyond all hope they might have been again restored to their city and former fortunes, they chose still to be deprived of their estates, their sepulchres, temples, country; the dearest and most valuable possessions, of all that belonged to man; rather than betray that faith by which they had bound themselves to their allies. Can any thing be conceived more great and generous than such a resolution? Or could any action better have deserved the attention of a historian; or have been more proper and effectual to excite his readers, punctually to observe all treaties, and to concur with their allies in all things that may strengthen their confederacy, and fix their government upon solid grounds? But Phylarchus passes over the whole in silence; blind to merit the most illustrious; and through want of judgement unable to discern what actions best deserve his notice.

In another place he affirms, that the Lacedæmonians gained a booty of six thousand talents from the spoils of Megalopolis; and that two thousand of them were, by the customary distribution, allotted to Cleomenes. It must surely seem a matter of surprise that this writer should thus be found to want even that common knowledge, concerning the wealth and abilities of the Greeks, with which every historian should especially be acquainted. For, not to speak of those calamitous times in

which the fortunes of this people were continually wasted by their wars against the kings of Macedon, and by civil wars among themselves, I may venture to declare that, even in the present age, when they live together in perfect peace and union, and possess all things in the greatest plenty, the sale of all the effects and riches of the whole province of Peloponnesus, the inhabitants alone excepted, would by no means be sufficient to produce so large a sum. That this is no vain surmise, but an opinion founded upon truth and reason, will most evidently appear, if we consider only the following fact, which is well established in history, and sufficiently known to all. When the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, designed to attack the Lacedæmonians, and had raised an army of ten thousand men, with a fleet of a hundred triremes, in order to defray the expenses of the war, it was resolved to impose a tribute, proportioned to the estate of every citizen. For this purpose, when an estimate had been made of all the wealth and goods, the houses and lands of Attica, the whole was found to amount to no more than five thousand seven hundred and fifty talents. From hence then we may very reasonably collect the truth of what I have affirmed concerning the people of Peloponnesus.

But with regard to the spoils of Megalopolis, we never can suppose with any show of probability, that they exceeded, even at the highest valuation, three hundred talents; since it is acknowledged, that the greater part, as well of the slaves as free

citizens, escaped to Messene. With respect to this opinion likewise, the following instance must be allowed to be decisive. The Mantineans, both in wealth and numbers, are confessed even by Phylarchus himself to be inferior to none of the people of Arcadia. Yet when their city was surrendered after a siege, so that not a single person could escape, nor any part of their effects be easily concealed, the whole value of the plunder, with the inhabitants themselves included, amounted to no greater sum than that which I have mentioned.

What he afterwards relates is still more wonderful. That ten days before the action, a messenger came from Ptolemy, to acquaint Cleomenes that the king would no longer furnish money for the war, but advised him to make peace with Antigonus; and that Cleomenes, when he had received this message, resolved immediately to force the enemy to a battle, before the troops should be informed of what had happened, because he was by no means able from his own revenues to support and pay the army. Yet if Cleomenes had so lately gained six thousand talents, he surpassed even Ptolemy himself in wealth. And if he had possessed three hundred only, he might still have sustained the war against Antigonus, without any difficulty or distress. To affirm, therefore, that Cleomenes was master of so great riches, and at the same time to declare, that he depended entirely on king Ptolemy for the necessary charges of the war, is a fault so gross, that it betrays the greatest want of judgement and capacity. Absurdities of the same kind

with those that have been mentioned, are every where to be found in this historian; not in his accounts of these times only, but in every part of his performance. But these, which I have here examined, will be sufficient for the present purpose.

CHAP. V.

AFTER the reduction of Megalopolis, and while Antigonus lay in winter quarters in the city of Argos, Cleomenes, having drawn his troops together in the beginning of the spring, and encouraged them as the occasion required, immediately began his march, and threw himself into the midst of the Argian territory, with design to lay waste and plunder it. This step was thought by many to be much too bold and hazardous; because the entrance to the country lay through passes that were very strong and difficult. But others, of a better judgement, were persuaded that the attempt was both wise and safe. For Cleomenes was, in the first place, well assured, that as the Macedonian forces were now dismissed, his march into the province would be perfectly secure from danger. He considered also that when the inhabitants of Argos should behold the country wasted to their very walls, they would not fail to express their discontent by loud clamours against Antigonus; that if this prince, unable to

withstand the reproaches of the multitude, should draw out his troops and venture on a battle, the Lacedæmonians might be sure to gain an easy victory; and, on the other hand, if Antigonus should remain unmoved, and still keep himself behind the walls, he hoped at least that the attempt itself would serve to check the spirits of the enemy, and raise the courage of his own troops; and that afterwards he might retreat with safety. The event fully answered all his expectations. The people, enraged to see their country ruined, ran together in crowds, and threw out bitter invectives against the king. But Antigonus supported all their insults with such steadiness as was worthy of a general and a prince; and being determined not to suffer any motives to prevail against the dictates of sense and reason, he remained quiet within the city. Cleomenes, therefore, pursuing his design, wasted all the country; and having struck the enemy with no small terror, and greatly animated his own troops against the future dangers of the war, he returned back to Sparta without any loss.

On the approach of summer, when the Macedonians and Achæans had again taken the field, Antigonus began his march with all the forces, and directed his route towards Laconia. His army was composed of a phalanx of Macedonians, which consisted of ten thousand men; of three thousand Macedonian peltastæ, and three hundred horse; one thousand Agrianians; as many Gauls; of other mercenaries, three thousand foot and three hundred horse; the same number of Achæans, all

select men; with a thousand Megalopolitans, armed after the Macedonian manner, and commanded by Cercidas, a citizen of Megalopolis. Among the allies, the Bœotians sent two thousand foot, and two hundred horse; the Epirots one thousand foot, and fifty horse; and the Acarnanians the same number. Besides these, there were sixteen hundred Illyrians, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. So that the whole army consisted of about twenty-eight thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse.

Cleomenes, in expectation that the enemy would advance towards him, secured the other passages, by placing guards, cutting down trees, and casting up intrenchments, and then went and encamped near the place called Selasia with all his forces, which amounted to twenty thousand men. For he had rightly judged, that this was the side by which Antigonus would attempt to force his entrance. This pass is formed by two mountains, Eva and Olympus. Between them runs the river Oenus; along the banks of which lies the road to Sparta. Cleomenes, having thrown up an intrenchment before these mountains, stationed the allies upon mount Eva, under the command of his brother Euclidas; while himself took his post upon Olympus, with the Lacedæmonians, and one part of the mercenaries. The rest of the mercenaries, together with the cavalry, were disposed in the plain below, on both sides of the road, along the river.

When Antigonus arrived, and had seen the

strength of the posts in which the enemy were lodged, and that Cleomenes had assigned to every part of his army the station that was most commodious for it, with so true a skill and judgement, that the whole, being equally prepared both for attack and for defence, seemed not unlike to a company of gladiators, all standing in their proper attitudes, and ready to engage; in a word, when he had seen, not only that the troops were disposed in the most advantageous manner to receive an enemy, but that the camp also was so strong on every side that it could not be attacked without great danger; he resolved to remain for some time quiet, and not yet attempt to draw the enemy to a battle. He fixed his camp, therefore, at a moderate distance from them; having the river Gorgylus in his front.

In this situation he remained for some days; examining with great attention the nature and the situation of the several posts, as well as the strength, temper, and condition of the armies. Sometimes, by making a show of having some design, he alarmed the expectations of the enemy, and made them attentive to his motions. But he soon found, that all his arts and stratagems were useless. For such was the care and vigilance of Cleomenes, who was still upon his guard wherever the danger seemed to threaten, that every part of the camp was secure from insult. At last, these generals, whom nature seemed to have formed alike both in sentiments and courage, agreed by joint consent to make the experiment of a decisive action.

To the forces that were stationed upon mount Eva, Antigonus opposed the Macedonians who were armed with brazen bucklers, and the Illyrians, ranged together in alternate cohorts, and commanded by Alexander, the son of Acmetus, and by Demetrius of Pharos. The second line was composed of the Acarnanians and Cretans; who were followed by two thousand Achæans, as a body of reserve. The cavalry, under the command of Alexander, was ranged along the river, opposite to the cavalry of the enemy, and was supported by a thousand Achæan foot, and the same number of Megalopolitans. The king himself, with the Macedonians and the mercenaries, conducted the attack against Cleomenes upon mount Olympus. The mercenaries composed the first line; and after them followed the Macedonians, formed in the double phalanx, one part of which was ranged behind the other, for the narrowness of the ground would admit no other disposition. The Illyrians, who had passed the river in the night, and stood in order, covered from the sight of the enemy, at the foot of mount Eva, were commanded to march up the mountain, and begin the attack as soon as they should see an ensign of linen raised upon mount Olympus; and the signal for the cavalry and the Megalopolitans was to be a vest of purple hoisted near the king.

When the time of the attack was come, the necessary orders distributed among the troops, and the signal given to the Illyrians, they immediately all showed themselves, and marched up the moun-

tain to charge the enemy. But the light-armed forces, that were placed among the cavalry of Cleomenes, having observed that the Achæans, as they were labouring to gain the summit of the hill, were not covered or supported from behind, advanced and fell suddenly upon their rear. And thus these troops, having Euclidas above them, ready to attack their front, and being at the same time pressed by the mercenaries behind, who ran forwards to the charge with great force and fury, were thrown into extreme danger. Philopœmen of Megalopolis, perceiving what had happened, and being well aware of the consequences of it, communicated his apprehensions to the generals. And when these paid no regard to his advice, because he was at that time extremely young, and had borne no command in the army, he called aloud to his countrymen to follow him, and threw himself briskly upon the cavalry of the enemy. The mercenaries, that were engaged with the rear, hearing the noise, and seeing what had happened, immediately left the charge, and hastened back again to their former post, to support and assist their cavalry. By this means the Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest of the troops that were marching up the mountain, being freed from the obstacle that had embarrassed and retarded them, advanced boldly against the enemy; so that the success, which afterwards was gained on this side against Euclidas, was entirely to be ascribed to the discernment and wise conduct of Philopœmen. And it is reported, that when the battle was ended, Antigonus, dissembling his know-

ledge of the truth, demanded of Alexander, who commanded the cavalry, why he had begun the combat before the signal was made for it; and that when Alexander denied that he had done it, and said that a young man, a Megalopolitan, had given the charge in opposition to his orders, the king replied; "That young man then, by seizing the proper time for action, performed the part of a prudent and experienced general, and you, the general, the part of an ignorant young man."

With regard to Euclidas, he totally neglected the advantages which his situation gave him. For when he saw the enemy ascending the hill towards him, he should, in prudence, have advanced, and met them on the way; should have fallen upon them, and disturbed their ranks; and afterwards have retired again to the top of the hill. And thus, when he had first spread disorder through the ranks, and taken from them that superiority which was peculiar to their arms, and to the manner in which they were ranged in battle, he might then, with the advantage of his post, have gained an easy victory against them. But so far was he from pursuing any of these measures, that, on the contrary, his troops stood still in their first station, as if assured of conquest; and seemed to have been persuaded, that if the enemy were permitted to gain the summit, this would only serve to render their flight back again more precipitate and fatal. But the event proved different from their expectations.

For as the enemy advanced against them in close order, their ranks being all entire, Euclidas, for want of sufficient room behind for his army to retire or change their place, was thrown into the greatest difficulties, and forced to maintain the fight upon the very edge of the hill. In this situation, his troops could not long stand against the heavy arms and unbroken disposition of the enemy; but, as the Illyrians still pressed forwards, they still gave ground before them, and were at last constrained to take their flight along the steep and craggy sides of the mountain. Their disorder was then complete, and a general route ensued.

During this time the cavalry on both sides were engaged. The Achæans, whose liberty was especially the subject of the contest, all exerted their bravest efforts. But Philopœmen signalized himself above the rest; and when his horse was killed under him in the action, he continued to fight on foot, till he had received a wound which passed through both his thighs.

The two kings began the combat upon mount Olympus with the light-armed troops and mercenaries, which amounted on either side to about five thousand men. The action, which was sometimes general, and sometimes maintained in parties, was remarkably warm and vigorous. For as the troops remembered that they stood beneath the eyes of their respective sovereigns, and in full sight of both the armies, rank with rank, and man with man, all sustained the fight with the utmost

bravery and spirit. But when Cleomenes perceived, that his brother was entirely routed, and that the cavalry in the plain began to give ground likewise, being apprehensive that the enemy would soon attack him from every quarter, he resolved to level all his works, and draw out his forces in front on one side of the camp. The trumpets on both sides gave the signal for the light-armed troops to retire from the space that was between the armies. The phalanxes come forward with loud cries, turn their spears, and advance to the charge. The dispute was long and obstinate. Sometimes the Macedonians were repulsed by the bravery and vigour of the Lacedæmonians: and sometimes these gave ground, unable to stand against the shock of the Macedonian phalanx. At last the troops of Antigonus, crowding close together the points of all their spears, and advancing against the enemy with all that weight and violence which are peculiar to the double phalanx, forced them out of their intrenchments. The whole army fled in disorder, and a general slaughter ensued. But Cleomenes, with a few horsemen that attended him, escaped to Sparta, and from thence, as soon as night came on, went down to Gythium; and finding there some vessels, which by his orders had been long kept in readiness against all accidents, he presently embarked, together with his friends, and sailed away to Alexandria.

Antigonus made himself master of Sparta upon his first approach. He treated the inhabitants with the greatest generosity and clemency, and

restored to them their ancient government. But some days afterwards, having received information that the Illyrians had entered Macedon, and were plundering the country, he left the city, and directed his march back again with all his forces. So contrary are the events of things to all human foresight, even in affairs of the greatest moment. For if Cleomenes had declined a battle but for a few days only, or if after his retreat he had remained at Sparta, in expectation of some favourable accident, he might still have held possession of his kingdom.

Antigonus, arriving at Tegea, restored the city to its former state. Two days afterwards, he came to Argos, and was present at the Nemean games. And when he had there received, both from the Achæan republic in general, and from every particular city, such applause and honours as might serve to render his name illustrious to all posterity, he continued his march in haste towards Macedon; surprised the Illyrians in the country; engaged them in battle; and gave them an entire defeat. But the cries and shouts which he made with more than usual vehemence, to animate his soldiers during the time of the action, were followed by a great discharge of blood, which threw him into a disorder, that was fatal to him in a short time after. Thus were the Greeks deprived of a prince, upon whom they had built the highest expectations; not so much on account of his skill in war, as because he had shown himself, in all his conduct, to be a man of strict in-

tegrity, and a true friend to virtue. At his death he left the kingdom to Philip the son of Demetrius.

As these transactions are connected with the period from whence I am to begin my History, I judged it to be proper, or rather necessary, in pursuing my first design, to relate them copiously and distinctly, that it might be from thence discerned, what was at that time the condition of the Macedonians and the Greeks. About the same time, Ptolemy also died of some disease, and Ptolemy Philopator succeeded to his kingdom. Seleucus, the son of Seleucus Callinicus who was also surnamed Pogon, being likewise dead, his brother Antiochus reigned in Syria. For it is remarkable, that as those who first obtained these kingdoms after Alexander, I mean Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, all left the world in the hundred-twenty-fourth Olympiad, so the princes just now mentioned died all together likewise in the hundred-thirty-ninth.

Thus, then, have we finished the foundation of our history, and shown in the course of this introduction, at what time, in what manner, and upon what pretences, the Romans, after they had subdued the several parts of Italy, began first to extend their views abroad, and even contended with the Carthaginians for the empire of the sea; and have also fully explained the condition and former fortunes, of the Greeks, Macedonians, and Carthaginians. As we are now, therefore, arrived at the point which we had first in view, the com-

mencement of the social war in Greece, of the war of Annibal against the Romans, and of that between the kings of Asia for the sovereignty of Cœle-syria, we shall here close this book, having brought to their conclusion the transactions which immediately preceded these wars, and seen the deaths of all the princes who conducted them.

BOOK THE THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

IT was mentioned in the first of the two preceding books, that we had fixed the beginning of our history, at the commencement of the social war; the war of Annibal; and that between Antiochus and Ptolemy, for the sovereignty of Cœle-syria. In the same book, we took occasion also to explain the reasons that inclined us to look back to an earlier age, and to relate, in the way of introduction, the chief of those transactions which preceded this period. We now go on to give a clear and distinct description of these wars, together with the causes to which they owed both their rise and greatness; but shall first premise a short account of the design and subject of our work.

The chief intention then of this history is to show, at what time, in what manner, and from what causes, the whole known world became subject to the Roman power. And since this great event had a known beginning, and is allowed to have been completed likewise in a determinate course of time, it will be useful first to recapitulate all the chief transactions which passed between the commencement of it and its completion. From this method, the reader will be able to acquire at once a right conception of all that we

have undertaken to describe. For in the study of history, as in every other kind of science, as a general view of the whole enables the mind to form a truer judgement on the several parts, so on the other hand, a distinct survey of all the parts is also no less necessary for the right comprehension of the whole. We have already sufficiently explained the general form and purpose of our work, and shown the bounds of its extent. With regard to the several parts, the first in order are the wars just mentioned; the last, the subversion of the Macedonian empire; and these together include a period of fifty-three years; which, in the number of great and wonderful events that were then produced, far surpasses any equal portion of time before it. In relating these transactions, we shall observe the following order, beginning at the hundred-fortieth Olympiad.

Having first explained the causes of the war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, which is most frequently called the war of Annibal, we shall show in what manner this general entered Italy, and gave so great a shock to the empire of the Romans, that they began to fear that they should soon be dispossessed even of their proper country and seat of government: while their enemies, elate with a success which had exceeded all their hopes, were persuaded that Rome itself must fall, as soon as they should once appear before it. We shall then speak of the alliance that was made by Philip with the Carthaginians, as soon as he had ended his war with the Ætolians, and settled the

affairs of Greece. Next will follow the disputes between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, and the war that ensued between them for the sovereignty of Cœle-syria: together with the war, which Prusias and the Rhodians made upon the people of Byzantium; with design to force them to desist from exacting certain duties, which they were accustomed to demand from all vessels that sailed into the Pontus. In this place we shall pause awhile, to take a view of the form and constitution of the Roman government: and in the course of our inquiry shall endeavour to demonstrate, that the peculiar temperament and spirit of their republic supplied the chief and most effectual means, by which this people were enabled, not only to acquire the sovereignty of Italy and Sicily, and to reduce the Gauls and Spaniards to their yoke, but to subdue the Carthaginians also, and when they had completed this great conquest, to form the project of obtaining universal empire. We shall add, likewise, a short digression, concerning the fate of Hiero's kingdom in Sicily; and afterwards go on to speak of those commotions that were raised in Ægypt, after the death of Ptolemy, by Philip and Antiochus: the wicked arts by which those princes attempted to share between themselves the dominions of the infant king; and the manner, in which the former of them invaded Ægypt, Samos, and Caria; and the latter, Cœle-syria and Phœnice. We then shall make a general recapitulation of all that was transacted by the Carthaginians and the Romans,

in Spain, Sicily, and Afric; and from thence shall again remove the history to Greece, which now became the scene of new disorders. And having first run through the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians against king Philip, we shall next describe the war that followed between the Romans and this prince; together with the causes, circumstances, and conclusion of it. After these events, we shall relate, in what manner the Ætolians, urged by their resentment, called Antiochus from Asia, and gave occasion to the war between the Achæans and the Romans. And having explained the causes of that war, and seen the entrance of Antiochus into Europe, we shall then show the manner in which he fled back again from Greece; and afterwards, when he had suffered an entire defeat, was forced to abandon all the country on this side of mount Taurus. Next will follow the victories, by which the Romans gave an effectual check to the insolence of the Gauls; secured to themselves the sovereignty of the citerior Asia; and delivered the people of that country from the dread of being again exposed to the violence and savage fury of those barbarians. We shall then give some account of the misfortunes, in which the Ætolians and Cephallenians were involved, and of the war which Eumenes sustained against Prusias and the Gauls of Greece; together with that of Ariarathes against Pharnaces. And after some discourse concerning the union, and form of government, of the confederate cities of Peloponnesus, which will be attended also with

some remarks upon the growth and flourishing conditions of the republic of the Rhodians, we shall, in the last place, take a short review of all that has been before related; and conclude the whole with the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes into Ægypt, and the war with Perseus, which was followed by the entire subversion of the Macedonian empire.

In the course of these events, we shall be able clearly to discern, by what kind of conduct the Romans gradually enlarged the limits of their power, till they had gained the sovereignty of the world. Now, if the bare contemplation of good and ill success could of itself enable us to form a right judgement on the conduct either of states or private men, we should here close our history, agreeably to our first design. For the period of fifty-three years, which contains the whole progress and advancement of the Roman greatness, is here concluded; and from this time, as all were ready to acknowledge, nothing more remained, than to receive laws from this republic, and yield an absolute submission to its sway. But the view only of the manner in which wars are terminated can never lead us into a complete and perfect knowledge, either of the conquerors, or the conquered nations: since, in many instances, the most eminent and signal victories, through an injudicious use and application of them, have proved fatal and pernicious; as, on the other hand, the heaviest ills of fortune, when supported with constancy and courage, are frequently converted into

great advantage. On this account, it will be useful likewise to review the policy, which the Romans afterwards observed, in governing the countries that were thus subdued; and to consider also, what were the sentiments of the conquered states, with respect to the conduct of their masters: at the same time describing the various characters and inclinations of particular men, and laying open their tempers and designs, as well in private life, as in the affairs of government. From these inquiries, the people of the present times will be enabled to discern, how far their interest requires them to continue still in their dependence on the Romans; and posterity may also fully understand the whole civil policy of this great republic, and pass a right judgement on its defects and excellencies. And from hence, indeed, will arise the chief advantages that are to be expected from this history, with regard both to the present, and to future times. For it ought never to be supposed, either by those who preside in states, or those who are willing to decide with truth concerning the manner in which they are administered, that the sole end of making war is victory. No wise man ever attacked his neighbours for the sake only of returning superior from the field. The design of navigation is not barely to be transported from place to place. Nor is any art or science practised with a view simply to acquire a knowledge in it. In all human actions, there is still some end proposed, either of pleasure, honour, or advantage, consequent to our pains and labour. To render

therefore this history complete and perfect, it will be necessary to lay open and explain the circumstances and condition of each several people, from the time when the contest was decided which gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world, to the rise of new commotions and disorders. And as these too were of great importance, and attended with many uncommon incidents; and as I was myself engaged in the execution of some of them, in the conduct and contrivance of others, and was an eye-witness of almost all; I shall undertake the task of relating them at large, and begin as it were another history. The chief of these transactions were the expeditions of the Romans against the Celtiberians and Vaccæans: the war which the Carthaginians made against Massanissa, a sovereign prince of Afric; and that between Attalus and Prusias in Asia. We shall also see the manner in which Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, was driven from his dominions by Orofernes, assisted by Demetrius, and again by his own address recovered his paternal rights. We shall see Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, after he had reigned twelve years in Syria, deprived of his kingdom and his life, by the conspiracy of the other kings. About the same time, the Romans absolved those Greeks, that were accused of having secretly excited the war of Perseus, and permitted them to return to their own country. And not long afterwards the same Romans made war again upon the Carthaginians: at first intending to force them to remove the seat of their republic; but

afterwards with design to exterminate both their name and government, for reasons which I shall there endeavour to explain. And lastly, when the Macedonians had about this time broken their alliance with the Romans, and the Lacedæmonians were also separated from the Peloponnesian league, the ill fate of Greece received at once both its beginning and full accomplishment, in the loss of the common liberty.

Such is the design of this work: which, with the favourable aid of fortune, I hope to carry to its destined end. But if my expectation should be frustrated, either through the shortness of my life, or the infirmities that are incident to mankind, yet I am persuaded that a subject so curious and important cannot fail to excite the attention of many able writers, who will esteem it a task well worthy of their pains, to finish what I shall leave imperfect.

As we have thus enumerated all the chief events of which we intend to treat, and given the reader a just conception both of the general plan of our work, and of its several parts, it is now time to remember what we have proposed, and to enter upon the beginning of our subject.

AMONG the writers that have transmitted to us the history of Annibal, there are some who assign two causes of the second war between the Carthaginians and the Romans. The first, they say, was the siege of Saguntum; and the other, the passage of the Carthaginians over the river

Iberus, in direct breach of treaties. Now, that these two incidents were the beginning of the war, I shall readily allow; but by no means that they were the causes of it. It might with equal reason be affirmed, that the first irruption of Alexander into Asia, was the cause of his war against the Persians; and the arrival of Antiochus with an army at Demetrias, the cause of that war which followed with the Romans. Yet nothing can be more absurd or false. For it is certain that Alexander, and indeed his father Philip, had long before this time formed the project of an expedition into Persia, and made great preparations for it: and the Ætolians likewise were no less fixed in their design to excite a war against the Romans, before Antiochus came into Greece. Such mistakes arise from not remembering, that a distinction should be always made between the cause and pretext, and the beginning, of a war; and that the first of these are in order always antecedent to the latter. To speak justly, the beginning is the first step towards the execution of any project, after it has been determined. The cause is previous to all determination. It is something that first suggests the project to the mind, that inclines us to examine it; to deliberate, determine, and at last to carry it into execution. I will endeavour more clearly to explain my meaning by the following examples. The causes of the war against the Persians are obvious, and easy to be understood. The first was the retreat of the Greeks under the command of Xenophon; who,

in their return from the upper provinces of Asia, traversed the whole country of their enemies, without being encountered by any force that was able to stand before them. The other was, the irruption of Agesilaus, king of Sparta, into Asia; where he found no strength sufficient to obstruct his progress; though, indeed, the troubles that were then raised in Greece, constrained him to abandon his designs, and return back again without performing any action of importance. For Philip, having revolved these things in his mind, and compared the softness and effeminacy of the Asiatics with his own skill in war, and with the bravery of the Macedonian soldiers, and being invited also by the richness of the prize that was before him, had no sooner fully gained the favour of the states of Greece, than he resolved to turn his arms against the Persians, and began, with eagerness, to make all the preparations that were necessary for this design: at the same time declaring, that his purpose was, to avenge the injuries which the Greeks had received from Persia. It is clear, therefore, that the things first mentioned were the causes of the Persian war, as the last was the pretext; and that the first entrance of Alexander into Asia was the beginning of it. In the same manner also, the resentment of the Ætolians must be considered as the cause of the war between Antiochus and the Romans. For this people, as we have already mentioned, being persuaded that the Romans, at the time of the conclusion of their war with Philip, had treated them in many points with great

contempt and scorn, invited Antiochus into Greece, and resolved to attempt and suffer every thing, rather than leave their indignation unappeased. The pretext by which Antiochus and the Ætolians endeavoured to engage the several cities into their design, and which indeed was founded neither on truth nor reason, was to restore liberty to Greece. And the beginning of the war was the arrival of Antiochus at Demetrias.

In making these reflections, it is not so much my intention to pass a censure upon those historians, as to instruct the political reader in a point which ought at all times to be viewed with great attention. For a statesman, that knows not how to trace the origin of events, and discern the different sources from whence they take their rise, may be compared with a physician, who neglects to inform himself of the causes of those distempers which he is called in to cure. The services of both are alike useless and contemptible. And as the latter must be wholly unacquainted with the proper means of restoring the body to its lost health and vigour, so neither can it be supposed, that the former should ever be able to have recourse to the necessary remedies, in the disorders that are incident to states. Our pains, therefore, can never better be employed than in searching out the causes of events. For the most trifling incidents frequently give birth to matters of the greatest moment and importance; and it is easier likewise, upon all occasions, to check or remedy an evil in

its commencement than when it has made some progress.

According to the Roman historian Fabius, it was the insatiable ambition of Asdrubal, and his love of power, which, together with the injury that was done to the Saguntines, were the causes of the war. For Asdrubal, says this writer, when he had first spread his conquests over a considerable part of Spain, returned to Carthage, and there formed the project of subverting the laws and liberty of his country, and of changing the government into a monarchy. But when the chief among the citizens had penetrated into his design, and were beginning to concert the proper measures to oppose it, he went back again to Spain, and, during the remainder of his life, governed the country by his own single will, and paid no regard to the senate of Carthage. He then adds; that Annibal, who from his infancy had been instructed in all the counsels of this general, and had carefully observed his conduct as a right pattern for himself, was no sooner invested with the supreme command in Spain, than he resolved to pursue in all things the same scheme of government; that, agreeably to this determination, he made war upon the Romans; consulting in it his own inclinations only, and not the interests of his country; that the Carthaginians were averse to the war; and that not one citizen of rank in the whole republic approved of his attacking the Saguntines. In the last place he relates, that as soon as Saguntum was destroyed,

the Romans sent some deputies to Carthage, to require that Annibal should be surrendered into their hands, and to declare war, in case that this demand should be refused. Let us then ask this writer, could the Carthaginians, if they were in truth dissatisfied with that which Annibal had done, ever hope to find an occasion more favourable to all their sentiments, or any expedient more just and advantageous, than what was now proposed; since by yielding to the demands of the Romans, and delivering up the author of the injury, they might at once have removed, in a specious manner, the man who was known to be an enemy to their state; secured their country from invasion; turned aside the dangers of the war that threatened them; and in a word, by a single decree only of the senate, might have taken an effectual and sufficient vengeance for all that had been now transacted? This is a question to which the Roman historian can make no reply. For so far were the Carthaginians from pursuing any of these measures, that, on the contrary, they maintained the war under the sole direction and care of Annibal, during the course of seventeen years; nor ever were inclined to bring it to a conclusion, till all hopes of success were lost, and the safety of their country rendered almost desperate.

With regard to my design in passing this censure on Fabius and his writings, I was not led to it by any apprehension that his accounts would otherwise gain credit with the reader. For his inaccuracy and want of judgement are every where so discern-

ible that they need not be particularly pointed out. But I was willing just to caution those who take his works into their hands, that they should consider always the facts themselves rather than the character of the writer. For there are some whose prejudices so strongly favour him, because he was a senator of Rome, and lived in the times of which he writes, that they admit, without any kind of doubt or hesitation, every thing which he relates. For my own part, as I do not think that his authority should be entirely disregarded, so neither can I allow it to have sufficient weight to decide in any point, unless it be supported also by the credibility of the facts. But it is time to finish this digression.

Among the true causes then of the second war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, the resentment and indignation of Amilcar Barcas, the father of Annibal, may justly be considered as one. Notwithstanding the ill success of this general in Sicily, his spirit remained unconquered; when he reflected that he had preserved the forces that were under his command at Eryx, still entire, and that all of them were animated by the same disposition as himself. After the last defeat of the Carthaginians by sea, which obliged them to sue for peace, he yielded indeed to the necessity of the times; but retained a strong desire of revenge, and only waited for an occasion to declare it. And in all probability his management would very suddenly have produced another war, if the disorders in which his country was then involved by the rebel-

lion of the mercenaries, had not engaged his whole attention.

No sooner were these troubles ended, than the Romans again declared war; and the Carthaginians, emboldened by the justice of their cause, seemed at first determined to accept it, as we mentioned in the former books; which the reader will find to be so necessary an introduction to this work, that, without their assistance, he will scarcely be able fully to comprehend either what I now write, or what hereafter may come to be related. But as their enemies paid no regard to this justice, the Carthaginians were forced to comply with what the times demanded; and, rather than submit to any hazard in their present circumstances, consented, though with great reluctance, to yield up Sardinia to the Romans, and to pay twelve hundred talents above the sum that had been before exacted from them.

These concessions are to be looked upon as the second, and indeed the principal cause of the war that followed. For Amilcar, observing that his own resentment was now strengthened by an equal degree of indignation in his fellow-citizens, had no sooner finished the destruction of the mercenaries, and secured the tranquillity of Carthage, than he applied all his thoughts to Spain; as the place from whence he might best procure the necessary supplies for an expedition against the Romans. And the great success which he met with in that country may be considered as the third cause of the war; because nothing but the strength and the resources

which the Carthaginians drew from thence could have inspired them with confidence to undertake it.

It might be shown by many arguments, that Amilcar was the first author and contriver of the second Punic war, though he died ten years before the commencement of it; but what I am going to relate will sufficiently prove it beyond all doubt. At the time when Annibal, after his defeat in Afric, and departure from his country, was entertained at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, having discovered the designs of the Ætolians, sent ambassadors to that prince, to sound his disposition and intentions. The ambassadors, perceiving that he inclined to the Ætolians, and was disposed to enter heartily into the war, endeavoured to inspire him with a jealousy of Annibal; and, to that end, showed a more than common respect to the Carthaginian. Their design succeeded: the king became doubtful of his truth; and his doubts grew stronger every day. At last, when they had one day found an opportunity of explaining their mutual discontent, Annibal, after he had in vain employed many arguments and protestations of his sincerity, went on to acquaint him: that when his father was offering sacrifice to Jupiter, just before his departure into Spain, he stood near him at the altar, being then but nine years old; and that when the libations and other rites were ended, Amilcar, having commanded the rest that were about the altar to retire, called him to him, caressed, and asked him, if he would attend him to the army; to which, when he cheerfully consented, and even requested

that he might go, with that sort of eagerness which belongs to children; his father led him to the altar, and commanded him to touch the victims, and to swear that he never would be a friend to the Romans. You may, therefore, continued he, rest assured, that when you are forming any designs against the Romans, I shall encourage and assist you with sincerity and zeal; but whenever you incline to terms of treaty or alliance with them, from that time let me advise you, not to seek for the evidence of information, but to mistrust me, and watch me carefully; for I shall still look out for every occasion of working mischief to that people. This discourse, which was delivered with that kind of passion which truth inspires, effectually removed all suspicion from the mind of Antiochus.

This, it must be acknowledged, is a manifest instance of Amilcar's hatred of the Romans, and of the projects which he at that time meditated; but the events that followed are a still clearer confirmation of both. For what can more strongly denote the violence as well as certainty of this disposition in Amilcar, than the conduct of his son-in-law Asdrubal, and Annibal his son; whom he had incited by his counsels and example to the most inveterate enmity against the same people that can be well conceived? The first, indeed, died, before he was able fully to discover his intentions to the world; but the other found the times more favourable to his purpose; and gave abundant proofs of his hereditary hatred in the strongest and most public manner. From hence we may learn how

necessary it is, that those who are intrusted with the administration of government, should make it one of the first objects of their care, to be well acquainted with the secret disposition and designs of any people with whom they conclude a peace, or make a new alliance; and observe whether their consent be yielded to the circumstances of the times, or whether it proceed from a perfect and sincere submission, that they may be always upon their guard against those who are influenced by the first motive, as men that wait only for a more seasonable opportunity of acting; and on the other hand, that they may repose an entire confidence in the others, esteem them their true friends and subjects, and employ them in any service that shall occur.

Such were the causes of the war of Annibal: let us now attend to the beginning of it.

It was not without great reluctance and concern that the Carthaginians had been forced to abandon Sicily. But the loss of Sardinia afterwards, together with the payment of a new and heavier tribute, added a still sharper sting to their resentment. No sooner, therefore, had they reduced beneath their power the most considerable part of Spain, than they listened with the utmost eagerness to every matter of complaint against the Romans. When Asdrubal was dead, who had governed the affairs of Spain after Amilcar, they for some time delayed to appoint his successor, till they could know the sentiments of the army. But when the news arrived, that the troops had with one consent

made choice of Annibal for their general, they called together an assembly of the people, and with one voice also confirmed the election. As soon as Annibal was invested with this dignity, he began his march to subdue the Olcades. And having encamped before Althæa, the strongest of their cities, he pressed the siege with so much vigour that he soon made himself master of the place. The neighbouring towns were struck with terror, and submitted. Annibal ransomed them all for money; and having, by that means, gained great stores of wealth, he returned to take his winter quarters at New Carthage. His treatment of those that were under his command was in every instance great and generous; and by the punctual payment of the military stipends, as well as by the promise also of large rewards for the time to come, he obtained the favour and esteem of all the troops, and filled them with the warmest hopes.

When the summer returned, having led his forces into the territory of the Vaccæans, he made himself master of Elmantica in the first assault. He took also the city of Arbucale by storm, but not till it had first sustained a siege, in which he often was reduced to great extremity; for the place was of large extent, and the inhabitants likewise, who were very numerous, defended themselves with the greatest bravery. After this success he was surprised at once, when he least expected it, by a danger that seemed likely to prove fatal to him. The Carpesians, the strongest and most powerful people of the country, had drawn together all their

forces, to intercept him in his return. They were joined by many also of the neighbouring nations, who had been animated to this attempt by the Elmanticans and Olcades, that had saved themselves by flight after the destruction of their cities. If the Carthaginians had been forced to engage in set battle against so great a force, their defeat must have been inevitable and complete. But Annibal, like a prudent and experienced general, retreated behind the Tagus; and having the river in his front, resolved to expect the barbarians there, and to dispute their passage. By the help of this advantage, and with the assistance also of his elephants, which were about forty in number, the success was such as exceeded even his hopes. The enemy came down with the greatest eagerness and haste; and plunged into the river in many parts at once. But no sooner had they gained the other side than they were met and trodden down in heaps by the elephants that were ranged along the bank. Great numbers of them also were destroyed in the passage over, by the Carthaginian cavalry; who were able more effectually to contend with the violence of the stream; and who fought also with no small advantage against the foot, that stood below them. Annibal then passed the river, charged the enemy, and gave them an entire defeat, though their numbers amounted to more than a hundred thousand men. After this signal victory there was not any people left on that side of the Iberus, except only the Saguntines, that was able to oppose the progress of the Carthaginians, or to appear against

them in the field. But Annibal, remembering carefully the counsels and the plan of conduct which his father Amilcar had recommended to him, delayed for some time longer to attack Saguntum; being determined not to give the Romans any plausible pretence for declaring war, till he had first secured his other conquests, and settled the country in such a state as was most proper for his design.

During this time the Saguntines, in apprehension of what soon afterwards ensued, sent frequent messengers to Rome, to inform the senate of the rapid progress and success of Annibal. The Romans had long neglected these advices; at last, however, they resolved to send some deputies into Spain, to inspect the truth. Annibal, having reduced the several nations against whom he had at that time turned his arms, was again come back, to take his winter quarters at New Carthage, which was the capital city, and seat of government, of the Carthaginians, in that part of Spain which was subject to their power. He there found the Roman deputies, and admitted them to an audience. They adjured him by the gods, not to offer any violence to the Saguntines, the allies of Rome; and to remain on that side of the Iberus, agreeably to the treaty made with Asdrubal. Annibal, who was at this time young and eager in his appetite for war, animated by his late success, and incited also by a long and habitual hatred of the Romans, replied, as if he had been a friend to the Saguntines; and complained to the ambassadors, that the Romans,

taking occasion from some disorders that had happened in the place not long before, and which were submitted to their decision, had by an arbitrary sentence condemned some of the magistrates to die. This injustice called aloud, he said, for his resentment; since the Carthaginians always had considered it as one of the most sacred customs of their country, to redress and avenge the injured. At the same time he sent to Carthage to know what measures he should take with respect to the Saguntines; who, through confidence in their alliance with the Romans, had offered violence, as he said, to some of the neighbouring people, that were under the protection of the republic. It is easy to remark, that in the whole of this proceeding he was hurried headlong by his passions, and not led by reason. Instead, therefore, of acknowledging the true motives of his conduct, he was forced to have recourse to absurd pretences, as it usually happens to men who are prevented by their prejudices from giving a fair attention to what is just and right. How much better would it have been, to have demanded of the Romans, that they should restore Sardinia, and yield back the tribute which, without any show of justice, they had extorted from the Carthaginians in the times of their distress? But now, by being wholly silent concerning that which might have been considered as a reasonable pretence for taking arms, and urging only those false and frivolous motives which respected the Saguntines, he seemed in the opinion of every one to enter into the war, not only in opposition to sound

sense and reason, but in express violation also of all the laws of justice.

The ambassadors, perceiving clearly that a war must follow, sailed away immediately to Carthage, in order to repeat again, before the senate, the same remonstrances which they had now made to Annibal. But they had no kind of apprehension that Italy would become the seat of the war, but expected rather, that all hostilities would be confined to Spain; and designed to use Saguntum as their place of arms. Under this persuasion the Roman senate, conceiving that the war would be long and difficult, and far removed from their own country, resolved in the first place to quiet those disorders that had now happened in Illyria.

For Demetrius of Pharos, forgetting all the favours which had been heaped upon him by the Romans, and even beginning to think meanly of their power, when he observed the consternation into which the Gauls had lately thrown them, and which was now renewed again by the preparations that were made by Annibal, from this time resolved to place all his hopes in the royal house of Macedon; to whose alliance and protection he had some kind of claim, because he had joined his forces with Antigonus, in the war against Cleomenes. Fixed in this design, he began to plunder and destroy the Roman cities in Illyria; and sailing with fifty armed frigates beyond Lissus in contempt of treaties, ravaged many of the Cyclade islands. As the house of Macedon was at this time strong and flourishing, the Romans conceived it to be highly

necessary, that they should secure against all danger those provinces that were situated to the east of Italy; and were persuaded, that it would then be early enough to oppose the motions of the Carthaginians, when they had first recovered the Illyrians from their folly, and chastised the ingratitude and rashness of Demetrius. But the event proved contrary to their hopes. For Annibal prevented them by his diligence; and having made himself master of Saguntum, he removed the scene of the war into the very heart of Italy, and brought it even to the gates of Rome.

CHAP. II.

IN the beginning of the spring, in the first year of the hundred-fortieth Olympiad, the Romans, pursuing the design that has now been mentioned, sent L. Æmilius with an army into Illyria. At the same time Annibal began his march from New Carthage towards Saguntum. This city is situated at the distance of about seven stadia from the sea; upon the foot of those mountains which form the frontiers of Iberia and Celtiberia. The country round it is distinguished by its richness and fertility, above all the other parts of Spain. Annibal, having encamped before the place, began to push the siege with the closest vigour. He saw, that from this conquest many advantages would arise

of the greatest moment with respect to the future execution of his designs. For first, as the Romans would then lose all hope of making Spain the theatre of the war, so by this success he was sure to strike a general terror into all the country, which would both render those that had submitted to the power of Carthage more tractable and steady in their duty, and make the rest, who were yet unconquered, more cautious of attempting any thing against him. He considered, likewise, that there would then be no enemy left behind him, to harass or retard his march; that the treasures of the city would procure, in the greatest plenty, such supplies as were necessary for the war; that the troops, by the taste of plunder, would be animated to a higher degree of ardour and alacrity; and in the last place, that the spoils, which he designed to send to Carthage, would secure to him the favour of his fellow-citizens at home. Urged by the hope of these advantages, he employed his utmost efforts in the siege; making himself an example to the army, and sharing with them in every labour and in every duty: sometimes encouraging the troops by words; and sometimes throwing himself the first into the greatest dangers. At last, when for eight months' continuance he had experienced every kind of fatigue and hardship, he took the place by storm, and gained an immense booty in money, slaves, and valuable goods. He reserved the money, as he had at first proposed, to assist him in the execution of his designs; distributed the slaves among his soldiers, in such proportion as was suited to each

man's services, and sent the rest of the spoil to Carthage. The consequence was such as he had foreseen, and fully answered all his expectations. The soldiers encountered danger with greater eagerness than before; the Carthaginians readily complied with every thing that was demanded of them; and from the treasure which he had gained, he drew many great advantages in the progress of the war.

As soon as Demetrius was informed of the preparations of the Romans, he placed a strong garrison in Dimalus, and furnished it with all the necessary stores. In the rest of the cities, he caused all the chief inhabitants that were averse to his interests, to be put to death; and placed the government in others, of whose fidelity he was well assured. And having selected, from the bravest of all his subjects, a body of six thousand men, he stationed them, under his own command, in Pharos. When the Roman consul, arriving in the country, perceived that the Illyrians had reposed their greatest confidence in the strength of Dimalus, and in the stores with which it was supplied, and that they esteemed it to be even impregnable, he resolved, in order to strike the enemy with terror, to make his first attempt upon that city. Having called together, therefore, all the officers, and exhorted each man severally to be strenuous in his duty, he advanced his works against the place in many parts at once, and pressed the siege with so great vigour, that after six days he took the town by storm. The rest of the cities on every side were

filled with consternation, and sent in haste, and submitted to the Romans. The consul received them all, upon such conditions as he judged convenient; and immediately sailed away, to attack Demetrius in Pharos. But when he heard, that the city was strongly fortified, and defended also by a numerous garrison, who were all chosen troops; and that large supplies had been laid up in it, as well of provisions, as of all the necessary stores of war, he began to apprehend, that a regular siege might engage him in a work of long continuance, and be attended with no small difficulty. He resolved, therefore, while the occasion favoured him, to employ the following stratagem. Having landed the greatest part of his troops by night upon the island, with orders to conceal themselves in the woods and other covered places, as soon as day appeared, he came sailing, in open view, with only twenty ships, into the harbour that lay nearest to the city. Demetrius saw their approach, and despising the smallness of their numbers, led out some troops towards the harbour, to oppose their landing. As the fight by degrees grew warm and obstinate, fresh forces still arrived from the city to support the former, till at last the whole garrison was engaged. At this time the Romans, that had landed in the night, having advanced through secret roads, appeared in sight; and seizing a strong eminence that stood between the city and the harbour, they posted themselves upon it, and cut off the return of the Illyrians to the city. Demetrius, perceiving what had happened, no longer endea-

voured to prevent the enemy from landing: but having collected all his troops together, and exhorted them to perform their duty, he marched towards the eminence in order of battle. When the Romans saw, that the Illyrians moved towards them with great alacrity, and in perfect order, they advanced on their part likewise, and charged them with unusual fury. At the same time, the troops also, that had just now landed, fell upon the rear. The Illyrians, being thus attacked on every side, were soon thrown into disorder and confusion, so that a general rout ensued. A small number of them fled towards the city: but the rest escaped through private roads, and concealed themselves in different parts of the island. Demetrius, having retreated to some vessels that had been provided by him against all accidents, and which lay at anchor in a private place, sailed away by night, and by a surprising kind of fortune arrived, without any accident, at the court of Philip, and there passed the remainder of his life. He was a man of a brave and daring spirit: but his courage was fierce and violent, and never conducted by the rule of reason. The manner therefore of his death was perfectly agreeable to this character, and to his former life. For in endeavouring to take Messene, by the command of Philip, he was hurried on so far by his impetuosity and want of temper, that he perished in the action, as we shall relate more fully in its proper place.

The consul, after this success, entered Pharos

without resistance, and razed it to the ground. And having made himself master of the other parts of Illyria, and settled the state of all the province agreeably to his first design, the summer being now ended, he returned to Rome, entered the city in triumph, and was received with all the acclamations and applause that were due to the great skill and courage which he had shown in the discharge of his commission.

CHAP. III.

WHEN the Romans received the news that Saguntum was taken, they by no means made it any part of their deliberations, whether they should enter into a war with Carthage; though some writers affirm the contrary: and have even transmitted to us the speeches that were made, on either side, in the course of the debate. But nothing can be more absurd and groundless than this conceit. For the Romans had, in fact, declared war a year before against the Carthaginians, in case that any violence should be offered to the Saguntines. How then can they, at this time, be supposed, when Saguntum was actually taken and destroyed, to have been at all divided in their sentiments, with respect to war or peace? What those historians afterwards relate, is no less de-

stitute of all support from truth or probability: "That the Romans were struck with the greatest consternation; and brought their sons of twelve years old into the senate, and communicated to them all the public counsels: and that these children observed the strictest secrecy with regard to what had passed, and concealed it even from their nearest friends." As if this people, besides the other peculiar benefits which they have received from fortune, were possessed also of the privilege of becoming wise from the very moment of their birth. But there is no need to employ many words to refute these idle stories of Chæreas and Sosilus: stories, suited only to the taste and judgement of the vulgar, among whom they first took their rise, and which disgrace the name of history.

As soon, then, as the Romans were informed of the destruction of Saguntum, they admitted no delay, but sent away their ambassadors, to propose two things to the Carthaginians; the first of which carried with it a diminution of their honour, as well as some injury to their state; and the other involved them at once in an affair of the greatest difficulty and danger. For their orders were, to demand that Annibal, and the rest of the chief commanders, should be delivered to the Romans; and, in case that this should be refused, instantly to declare war. When the ambassadors arrived at Carthage, they addressed the senate agreeably to these instructions. The Carthaginians received the alternative with no small pain:

and appointed the ablest member of their body to defend the late transactions. This person, in discharging his commission, passed over in silence the treaty that was made with Asdrubal; as if no such treaty had been ever made: or if there had, that it by no means could be thought to bind the senate, because it never had received their approbation or consent. Upon this head, he appealed to the example of the Romans themselves, and reminded them, that in the time of the Sicilian war, a treaty, which Lutatius had concluded with the Carthaginians, was afterwards declared by the Roman people to be void, as having been made without their knowledge and authority. But that which was chiefly urged, was the treaty that was fully settled between the two republics, at the end of the war in Sicily: in which, no mention was made of Spain. It was indeed declared, that no injury should be offered to the allies of either people; but the Carthaginians showed, that the Saguntines were not at that time in alliance with the Romans. On this point therefore they rested their whole defence; and recurred again and again to the words of the treaty. But the Romans altogether refused to enter into this debate. They said, that if Saguntum had still remained entire, such discussions might perhaps have been admitted, and the contest cleared by words. But as that city had been stormed and pillaged in contempt of treaties, it was now incumbent on them, either to remove the charge, of having directed, or connived at this injustice, by delivering up to

punishment the authors of it; or, on the other hand, by refusing to comply with this demand, to avow without reserve, that they were sharers in the guilt, and ready to await the consequences of it.

It may perhaps be useful to those who are at any time engaged in deliberations of a like nature and importance, to take a closer view of the true state and merits of this contest. With this design, and in order to free the reader also from those perplexities, in which the mistakes and prejudices of other historians will be likely to entangle him, we shall here set before his view the several treaties that had ever been concluded between the two republics, from the earliest times.

The first was of the age of Lucius Junius Brutus, and Marcus Horatius: who were created the first consuls, after the expulsion of the kings; and who consecrated the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This was twenty-eight years before Xerxes invaded Greece. I have given the sense of it, with all the skill and accuracy of which I am master: for the language that was used in those times, is so different from that which is now spoken among the Romans, that frequently the best interpreters, even after the closest application, are unable to explain it.

"Between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies, there shall be peace and alliance upon these conditions. Neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless compelled by bad wea-

ther or an enemy. And in case that they are forced beyond it, they shall not be allowed to take or purchase any thing, except what is barely necessary for refitting their vessels, or for sacrifice; and they shall depart within five days. The merchants, that shall offer any goods to sale in Sardinia, or any part of Afric, shall pay no customs, but only the usual fees to the scribe and crier; and the public faith shall be a security to the merchant, for whatever he shall sell in the presence of these officers. If any of the Romans land in that part of Sicily which belongs to the Carthaginians, they shall suffer no wrong or violence in any thing. The Carthaginians shall not offer any injury to the Ardeates, Antiates, Laurentines, Circæans, Tarracinians, or any other people of the Latins, that have submitted to the Roman jurisdiction. Nor shall they possess themselves of any city of the Latins that is not subject to the Romans. If any one of these be taken, it shall be delivered to the Romans in its entire state. The Carthaginians shall not build any fortress in the Latin territory: and if they land there in a hostile manner they shall depart before night."

This Fair Promontory stands on the north side of Carthage: and their design, as I imagine, in not permitting the Romans to sail forwards to the southward of it, was, that they might conceal from them the knowledge of the country that lay round Byzacium and the Little Syrtis; which, on account of its uncommon richness and fertility, was called, the MARKETS. But in case that they are forced

beyond it by rough weather, or an enemy, they then engage, indeed, to supply them with whatever may be wanted for refitting their vessels, or for sacrifice; but allow nothing to be taken beyond what is barely necessary: and enjoin them to depart within five days. But Carthage, and the other parts of Afric that stand on this side of the Fair Promontory, together with Sardinia likewise, and as much of Sicily as belonged to the Carthaginians, are left open to the Roman merchants: and the public faith is pledged for their security, and equitable treatment.

It is to be observed, that the Carthaginians here speak of Afric and Sardinia, as being entirely subject to their jurisdiction. But with regard to Sicily, the conditions of the treaty are expressly limited to those parts of the island only which are said to belong to Carthage. The Romans observe, on their part also, the same manner of expression, in speaking of the Latin territory: and no mention is made of the rest of Italy, which they had not at that time subdued.

There was afterwards another treaty, in which the Carthaginians included the Tyrians and the Uticeans: and to the Fair Promontory before mentioned, they now added Mastia and Tarseium; beyond which, it was not permitted to the Romans to sail in search of plunder, or to build any city. These are the words of the treaty.

"Between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, Uticeans, and their allies, there shall be peace and alliance upon these con-

ditions. The Romans shall not sail in search of plunder, nor carry on any traffic, nor build any city, beyond the Fair Promontory, Mastia, and Tarseium. If the Carthaginians take any city of the Latins, not belonging to the Roman jurisdiction, they may reserve to themselves the prisoners, with the rest of the booty, but shall restore the city. If any of the Carthaginians gain any captives, from a people that is allied, by a written treaty, with the Romans, though they are not the subjects of their empire, they shall not bring them into the Roman ports: in case they do so, the Romans shall be allowed to claim, and set them free. The same condition shall be observed also by the Romans: and when they land, in search of water, or provisions, upon any country that is subject to the Carthaginians, they shall be supplied with what is necessary, and then depart, without offering any violence to the allies and friends of Carthage. The breach of these conditions shall not be resented as a private injury, but be prosecuted as the public cause of either people. The Romans shall not carry on any trade, or build any city in Sardinia or in Afric: nor shall they even visit those countries, unless for the sake of getting provisions, or refitting their ships. If they are driven upon them by a storm, they shall depart within five days. In those parts of Sicily which belong to the Carthaginians, and in the city of Carthage, the Romans may expose their goods to sale, and do every thing that is permitted to the citizens of the

republic. The same indulgence shall be yielded to the Carthaginians at Rome."

In the second treaty, as in the former, the Carthaginians assert their entire right to Afric and Sardinia, and forbid the entrance of the Romans there, on any pretence. But in speaking of Sicily, they mention only so much of the island as had submitted to the power of Carthage. The Romans use also the same manner of expression, in that part of the treaty which regards the country of the Latins: where they stipulate, that the Carthaginians shall offer no injury to the Antiates, Ardeates, Tarracinians, and Circæans. These were the people who inhabited the maritime towns of Latium.

About the time when Pyrrhus invaded Italy, before the Carthaginians were engaged in the war of Sicily, a third treaty was concluded: in which, the conditions of the former two were all confirmed, together with this condition.

"If the Carthaginians or the Romans enter into any treaty with king Pyrrhus, this condition shall be inserted: that it shall be allowed to either people to send assistance to the other, if their country be invaded. That to whomsoever such assistance shall be sent, the Carthaginians shall be obliged to furnish vessels, both for the passage and return: but the pay of the troops shall be discharged by those, in whose service they are employed. The Carthaginians shall assist the Romans by sea, if it be necessary: but the naval

forces shall not be compelled to disembark against their own consent."

The first of these treaties was confirmed by oath, in the following manner. The Carthaginians swore by the Gods of their country; and the Romans by a stone, agreeably to an ancient custom; and by Mars Enyalius. The ceremony of swearing by a stone was thus performed. The person, that was appointed to this office, having first solemnly attested the public faith for the due observance of the treaty, took in his hands a stone, and pronounced the following words. "If I swear truly, may the Gods be propitious to me. But if I think, or act, any thing that is contrary to my oath, then let the rest enjoy in safety their country, laws, possessions, household-gods, and sepulchres; and let me alone be cast out from the society, as this stone is now cast away." At the same time he threw away the stone.

These treaties are still preserved on tables of brass, in the apartment of the Ædiles in the capitol. That Philinus never saw them, is not much to be wondered at: since, even in our times, many of the oldest men, both Carthaginians and Romans, who are thought to have made the closest search into the antiquities and history of their several countries, are ignorant that any such treaties now exist. But it seems a matter of just surprise, that this historian should venture to assert a fact, which is so clearly falsified and refuted by these genuine records: nor is it easy to conceive, upon what grounds he has done it. For

in the second book of his work, he affirms, that the Romans were, by an express convention, excluded from every part of Sicily, as the Carthaginians were from Italy; and that the first descent of the Romans upon the island was made in violation of their oaths, and in direct breach of what had thus been stipulated. Yet it is certain, that no traces of any such convention can any where be found. These mistakes were slightly mentioned in our preliminary books. But it was necessary, in this place, to enter into a more minute examination of them, because they have hitherto derived great weight from the authority of the writer, and misled many from the truth. If we reflect, indeed, on the design and purpose of that first expedition into Sicily; that it was to take the Mamertines under their protection; to defend a people, who, in seizing Rhegium and Messana, had been guilty of an act of flagrant perfidy; it must be acknowledged, that it will not altogether be an easy task, to excuse or justify the Romans. But to affirm, that this descent was made in violation of any treaty, is an instance of the greatest ignorance.

When the war of Sicily was ended, another treaty was concluded, in the following terms.

" The Carthaginians shall abandon Sicily, with all the islands that lie between Sicily and Italy. The allies of both republics shall be safe from violence. It shall not be permitted to either people, to exercise any act of power, build any fortress, or levy soldiers, in the territory of the other; nor

shall the allies of the one be received into any alliance with the other. The Carthaginians shall pay immediately one thousand talents, and two thousand two hundred more in the course of ten years; and they shall restore the Roman prisoners without ransom."

At the end of the African war, when the Romans had again declared war against Carthage, some new conditions were added to this treaty; by which the Carthaginians consented "to give up Sardinia, and to pay another sum of twelve hundred talents."

The last treaty, or convention, was that made with Asdrubal in Spain: by which it was stipulated, "that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army."

These are the several treaties that ever were concluded between the Carthaginians and the Romans, to the time of Annibal. It is easy to remark from these, that the first invasion of Sicily by the Romans was by no means made in violation of those engagements which they had sworn to observe. But on the other hand, when they declared war a second time against the Carthaginians, and forced them to yield up Sardinia, and to pay a heavier tribute; it must be owned, that they had no cause at all, nor any colour of justice for such proceeding: but basely took advantage of the distresses in which the republic was then involved. For with regard to that which is sometimes urged in their defence, that, in the time of the African war, some Roman merchants were injuriously treated by the Carthaginians; we have seen particularly in the

former book, that the Carthaginians, upon the first complaint, released all those that had been detained in their ports: and that the Romans, in acknowledgement of the favour that had been shown them by this compliance, immediately sent home, without any ransom, all the Carthaginian prisoners.

Since this, then, is the true state of things on both sides, it remains that we last inquire, whether the war must in justice be imputed to the Carthaginians or the Romans. We have already seen the reasons which the former urged in vindication of their conduct. Let us now consider those that have been advanced in opposition to them: not indeed by the Romans of that age, who were so greatly enraged at the destruction of Saguntum, that they could not even attend to any reasons, but by those of later times. It is said then, that the treaty made with Asdrubal was by no means to be disregarded, as the Carthaginians had the boldness to affirm; since it did not rest upon any such reserved condition as was found in the treaty of Lutatius, which ended with these express terms; "These conditions shall be firm and binding, in case that they be ratified by the Roman people;" but was fully and finally concluded by the authority of Asdrubal. And by this treaty it was stipulated, "that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army." It is also urged, that by the treaty which put an end to the war of Sicily, it was provided, "that no injury should be offered to the allies of either people:" that this was not to be understood, as the Carthaginians laboured to explain it, con-

cerning those alone, who were present at that time in alliance with them; for in that case, something of this kind would have been added; "No new alliance should be made by either people;" or, "The allies, which either people may hereafter make, shall not be included in the terms of the present treaty:" but that, as no such caution was inserted, it was manifest, that the security thus mentioned in the treaty related not to those alone who were at that time in the alliance of either people, but to all that should afterwards be admitted to it. And in truth, this way of reasoning seems to be perfectly just and solid. For it is not to be conceived that these two republics would have consented to any treaty that should deprive them of the power of receiving into their alliance such nations as occasions might present, or of defending them, when received, from every kind of injury. In a word, their whole intention may be thus explained. With respect to the people that were then in alliance with them, it is provided, that they shall be secure from violence, and that those who had embraced the protection of either state should not be admitted as allies of the other. And with regard to the allies that might afterwards be received, they seem to have been clearly enough designed in the following caution: "It shall not be permitted to either people to levy soldiers, or to exercise any act of power in the territories, or the allied provinces, of the other. On both sides, all shall be safe and free from injury."

Now the people of Saguntum, many years be-

fore the time of Annibal, had placed their city under the protection of the Romans. Of this there is undoubted evidence, in a fact that was acknowledged even by the Carthaginians themselves. For when their government was disturbed by some intestine tumults, the Saguntines, instead of having recourse to the Carthaginians, who were at that time settled in their neighbourhood, and had obtained great power in Spain, referred all their contests to the sole decision of the Romans, and with the help of their authority restored order to their state.

On the whole, then, it may fairly be concluded, that if the destruction of Saguntum was the cause of the war, it was unjustly entered into by the Carthaginians; that it was contrary to the treaty of Lutatius; which provided, that no injury should be offered to the allies of either people; and a manifest violation also of the convention made with Asdrubal; in which it was stipulated, that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army. But on the other hand, if the Carthaginians engaged in the war, because they had been forced to yield up Sardinia, and pay a second tribute; if they only seized the first favourable occasion of avenging all the insults and the losses which their enemies, taking advantage also of the times, had brought upon them; it must then be owned, that their conduct may well be vindicated, upon the principles of reason and of justice.

Among the undiscerning part of my readers, many perhaps will think, that I am too minute and

tedious in these inquiries. It is true, indeed, that a distinct and close survey of past events, though it might yield some entertainment to the curious, would, however, be of little use, if mankind were able of themselves, without the assistance of example, to repel effectually every stroke of fortune, and obviate the evils that are incident to life. But such is human nature, that this can by no means be affirmed, either of public societies, or of single men; since the most fair and flourishing condition is so subject to decay and change, that we can build no lasting expectations on it. And it is on this account, that the knowledge of past transactions ought to be esteemed not a mere amusement only, but rather an instructive and a necessary study. For unless we have made due reflection upon the conduct of men in former times, how shall we learn the arts of gaining allies and friends, when any danger threatens our country, or ourselves? If we meditate any conquest, or form any project of importance, how shall we be able, without this knowledge, to make choice of proper instruments for the execution of our designs? Or, in case that we are satisfied with our present states and fortunes, how shall we support ourselves by such lasting strength and credit, as may at all times guard our interests from every thing that would undermine and shake them? For those among whom we live, like actors on a stage, appear before us under such a dress, as best may suit with the present times, and with the characters which they assume. To these their words and actions are all accommodat-

ed; so that it is hardly possible to penetrate into their real sentiments, or draw out the truth to light, from the darkness under which it is industriously concealed. But in the accounts of former ages, the facts themselves disclose to us the real views, and genuine disposition of the actors. And from hence we are enabled to discern, in various circumstances, from whom we reasonably may expect good offices, favour, assistance, or the contrary; and to know with perfect certainty, what kind of persons may be induced to compassionate our distresses, defend our cause with zeal, and join us in avenging any injuries, to which we may have been exposed. A knowledge surely of the greatest use and benefit, both in the administration of public affairs, and in the conduct also of private life. But in order to gain this end, it will be necessary, that both the author and the reader, instead of being satisfied with a bare relation of events, should carefully consider all that passed both before and after, as well as at the time of each transaction. For if we take from history the motives to which every action owed its birth, the manner in which it was carried into execution, the end that was proposed, and whether the event was answerable or not to the first design; what remains is a mere exercise fit for schools, and not a work of science; and though it may afford perhaps some transient amusement to the mind, is not capable of yielding any sound instruction, or lasting service.

If any one should think, that few persons will be inclined either to buy, or read, this history, on ac-

count of the number and the bulk of the books which it contains, let him consider, that it is much less difficult, both to purchase and to read through forty books, which give a close and uninterrupted relation of the affairs of Italy, Sicily, and Afric, from the time of Pyrrhus, at which the history of Timæus is concluded, to the destruction of Carthage; and of all the great events that happened in the other parts of the world, from the flight of Cleomenes the Spartan, to the battle between the Achæans and the Romans near the Isthmus; than either to procure, or read, all the separate and particular histories of these transactions. For besides that they exceed in bulk the size of this work, it is certain also, that no real knowledge or improvement can be expected from them. For they not only differ from each other in their accounts of facts, but in general take no notice of many great events that were coincident with those which they relate; and from which, if all of them were ranged together, and comprehended under one single view, the mind would be enabled to form a far more perfect judgement of the truth, than it can ever gain from a distinct and separate survey of each. We may also add, that by the very nature of their works these writers are debarred from those inquiries, which are of the first and chief importance. For the most useful part of history, as we have already mentioned, is the knowledge of what passed before and after every great event; and especially of the causes that produced it. Thus for instance, the war of Philip gave occasion to that of Antiochus;

that of Annibal, to the war with Philip; and the war of Sicily to that of Annibal: and between these wars, a great variety of incidents intervened, which, though different perhaps in their first aim and purpose, were at last all inclined together towards the same single end. Now this may all be fully understood from general history; but by no means from the accounts of single wars, as that of Perseus, for instance, or of Philip. It might with equal reason be supposed, that the bare description of particular battles, as they are found in these historians, would be sufficient to convey a perfect knowledge of the disposition and entire economy of a whole war. But as this can never be expected from them, it is manifest, that a work like mine must be judged in all points to excel particular histories, as much as solid instruction is to be preferred to an empty tale. We now return from this digression.

CHAP. IV.

WHEN the Carthaginians had ended their discourse, the Romans made no reply to the arguments which they had urged in their defence. But the oldest of the ambassadors, folding his garment round him, and showing it to the senate, told them, that therein were contained both peace and war; and they might choose whichever of the two best pleased

them. The king of the Carthaginians answered, that he might throw out that which was most agreeable to himself. And when the ambassador replied that it should be war, the senate, with almost one voice, cried out, that they accepted it; after which the assembly separated.

Annibal was at this time in winter quarters at New Carthage. He first sent home the Spaniards to their several cities; in the hope, that by this indulgence he should fix them in his interests, and oblige them to his service for the time to come. He afterwards gave instructions to his brother Asdrubal, for governing the country in his absence, and defending it against the Romans. His last care was, in what manner he might most effectually provide for the quiet and security of Afric. For this purpose he put in practice a very sensible and wise expedient: making a body of African troops pass over into Spain, and another body of Spaniards into Afric; and thus connecting both those countries in the bonds of a reciprocal fidelity. The troops of Spain that were sent into Afric, were the Thersitæ, Mastians, some Spaniards of the mountains, and the Olcades. Their numbers amounted in the whole to twelve hundred horse, and thirteen thousand, eight hundred, and fifty foot. To these were added also eight hundred and seventy Baleares; a people whose name, as well as that of the island which they inhabit, is derived from their custom of using a sling in battle. These troops were all distributed through the parts of Afric called Metagonia; a small number only excepted,

who were sent to Carthage. Four thousand Metagonians were stationed also in that city; as well to serve as hostages as to assist in the defence of the place.

With Asdrubal in Spain, he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes. Thirty-two of the quinqueremes, and the five triremes, were completely equipped. To these he added likewise a body of forces, both horse and foot. The cavalry consisted of four hundred and fifty Libyphœnicians and Africans, three hundred Lorgitæ; and a mixed body of eighteen hundred, composed of Numidians, Massylians, Maciens, Massesylians, and Maurusians, whose country lay towards the ocean. The infantry was composed of eleven thousand, eight hundred, and fifty Africans; three hundred Ligurians; and five hundred Baleares; together with twenty-one elephants. If I have given here a more precise and accurate detail of all that was now transacted by Annibal in Spain, than could perhaps have been expected even from one who himself had borne some part in the conduct of those affairs, I must desire the reader not to think it strange; nor to rank me among those writers who cover their own fictions under such a dress, as may seem most nearly to resemble the form of truth. For I found at Lacinium a table of brass, on which all these circumstances were engraved, by the orders of Annibal himself, when he was in Italy. And as this seemed to be a monument of the first authority, I have closely copied it in my relation.

Annibal, having thus provided in the fullest manner for the security both of Spain and Africa, now waited only for the arrival of those messengers that were expected to return to him from the Gauls. For he had endeavoured to inform himself, with all the exactness that was possible, of the fertility of the country that lay beneath the Alps, and along the Po; of the numbers and courage of the people; and above all, whether they still retained any resentment against the Romans, from their former wars; of which we have already given some account, that the reader might more fully comprehend the things which we are now going to relate. His chief expectations of success in his intended enterprise were built indeed upon the assistance which he hoped to find among the Gauls. For it seemed scarcely possible to maintain the war in Italy against the Romans, unless these nations could be engaged to join him with their forces, after he had first surmounted the difficulties of the country that lay between. He sent therefore, with the greatest care, to all the chiefs that lived among the Alps, and to those likewise who possessed the country on this side of them; and endeavoured by every kind of promise to tempt their hopes, and draw them to his party. At last, when his messengers were returned, and had informed him, that the Gauls were perfectly disposed to favour his design, and even expected his approach with eagerness; and that the passage across the Alps, though likely to be attended with great pains and difficulty, was such, however, as in the end might be surmounted;

as the spring advanced, he drew out all his forces from their winter quarters. The news also, which he had just before received from Carthage, had greatly raised his hopes, and given him full assurance of the approbation of his fellow-citizens. He now, therefore, openly declared his intentions to the army, and exhorted them to make war against the Romans. He informed them of the manner in which this people had demanded, that himself, together with the other chiefs, should be delivered into their hands. He described the richness of the country through which they were to pass; and acquainted them with the favourable disposition of the Gauls, and the promise which they had made to join him with their forces. When the multitude cried out, that they would cheerfully attend him, he applauded their alacrity, fixed the day for their departure, and dismissed the assembly.

These things then being all thus regulated during the time of winter, and the necessary measures taken for the security of both Spain and Afric, on the day appointed Annibal began his march, with ninety thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse. He passed the Iberus, and with incredible rapidity, though not without many obstinate battles, and a great loss of men, reduced all the nations that inhabited between that river and the Pyrenæan mountains; the Ilurgetes, Bargusians, Ærenosians, and Andosinians. He gave to Hanno the care of the conquered countries, with a power to exercise inventive and absolute sovereignty over the Bargusians, because these especially were suspected of

favouring the interests of the Romans. He left also with him a detachment from his army, of ten thousand foot, and a thousand horse; together with all the baggage of the troops that were designed to attend him into Italy. He sent back, likewise, an equal number of the Spanish forces to their several cities; being desirous not only to secure to himself, by this indulgence, the favour of the people that were now dismissed; but to encourage also, by the hope of returning again to their native country, both the troops that were engaged to follow him in the present expedition, and those likewise that were left behind him in Spain, in case that he should want their service in any future exigency.

The army thus disincumbered of the heavy baggage, and consisting in the whole of fifty thousand foot and nine thousand horse, continued their march forwards, by the way of the Pyrenæan mountains, in order to pass the Rhone; being not so considerable in their numbers, as from the goodness of their troops. For they were all tried soldiers; men well disciplined, and inured to action, by the continual engagements which they had sustained in Spain.

But in order to clear this part of our history from all obscurity, it will be necessary to trace out distinctly the country from whence Annibal began his march, the places through which he passed, and the way by which he first entered Italy. Nor will it be sufficient, barely to insert the names of rivers and of cities, as some historians have done; ima-

gining, that the recital of their names alone must at once convey a full conception of the places. With regard to those places indeed, with which we have been before acquainted, the mention of their names, as it recalls them to the memory, perhaps may be sufficient for the end that is proposed. But with respect to those, of which we have no previous knowledge, it must be allowed, that no greater advantage can arise from the bare recital of their names, than from the repetition of any other sounds that are void of sense and meaning, which only strike the ear, but make no impression on the understanding. For unless the mind has something to which it can apply and fix itself; something already conceived and understood, to which that which is heard may be referred; it must of necessity be lost in doubt and ignorance. Since, therefore, we are to speak of things unknown, we shall endeavour to lead the reader to a right apprehension of them, by connecting them with those that are already known and familiar to him.

The first and most general notion then, in which all mankind agree, and which even the vulgar apprehend, is that by which we conceive the heavens round us to be divided into the four quarters of East, West, North, and South. The next step is, to consider the several parts of the earth as lying beneath the one or other of these divisions; and thus we are able to refer, even the places which we have never seen or known, to some settled and determinate conception. This being done with regard to the whole earth, it remains that we observe

the same method of division in speaking of that portion of it which we know to be inhabited. Now this consists of three separate parts; the first of which is called Asia, the second Afric, and the last Europe; and these are bounded by the Tanais, the Nile, and the straits of the Pillars of Hercules. Between the Tanais and the Nile, lies Asia; and its situation with respect to the heavens is beneath that space which is contained between the north-east and the south. Afric lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules; under that part of the heavens which extends from the south to the south-west, and from thence forwards to the west, which coincides with the Pillars of Hercules. So that these two countries, taken together in a general view, possess all the space from east to west, on the southern side of the Mediterranean sea. Opposite to these, on the north side of the same sea, lies Europe; being extended also, without any interruption, from east to west. The greatest and the most considerable part of it is that which falls beneath the north, and possesses all the space between the river Tanais, and Narbo; which last place is situated towards the west, at a small distance only from Masailia, and those mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian sea. The Gauls are the people who possess the country from Narbo to the Pyrenean mountains; which extend in one continued chain from the Mediterranean sea to the ocean. The rest of Europe, from these mountains westward to the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded partly by the Mediterranean,

and partly by the ocean, or exterior sea. The country which lies along the former, as far as to the Pillars of Hercules, is called Spain. But that which is washed by the exterior, or great sea, having been but lately discovered, has not yet obtained any settled name. It is possessed by a race of barbarous people, who are very numerous; and of whom we shall take occasion to speak more particularly in another place. But as it has never yet been known with any certainty, whether Æthiopia, which is the place where Asia and Afric meet together, be a continent extending forwards to the south; or whether it be surrounded by the sea; so those parts of Europe likewise, that lie between Narbo and the Tanais towards the north, have hitherto been quite concealed from our discoveries. In some future time, perhaps, our pains may lead us to a knowledge of those countries. But all that has hitherto been written or reported of them must be considered as mere fable and invention, and not the fruit of any real search or genuine information.

This, I think, will be sufficient to give the reader some conception even of these places to which he is a stranger; as he may now be able always to refer them to the one or other of these general divisions marked out and ascertained by the position of the heavens; and may turn his mind towards them as often as they are named in the course of this work, in the same manner as the eye directs its view to any object that is pointed out to its observance. We now resume our narration.

The Carthaginians were at this time possessed of all that part of Afric which lies along the Mediterranean sea, from the Philænean Altars, which are opposite to the greater Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules. This coast, in its full extent, includes a space of more than sixteen thousand stadia. They had also passed the Straits, and subdued all Spain as far as to those rocks, which, on the side towards the Mediterranean sea, form the extreme point of the Pyrenæan mountains; the boundary that divides Spain from Gaul. These rocks are distant from the Pillars of Hercules about eight thousand stadia.

The distance from the same Pillars to New Carthage, from whence Annibal began his march towards Italy, is three thousand stadia; from that city to the Iberus, two thousand six hundred; and from thence to Emporium, sixteen hundred; and the same number afterwards to the passage of the Rhone. For the whole of this route has been accurately measured by the Romans; and distinguished by distances, each of eight stadia. From the passage of the Rhone, if we take our course up the river, to the beginning of the Alps, we may count the distance to be fourteen hundred stadia; and the road across those mountains, till we arrive in the plains that are watered by the Po, twelve hundred more. Thus the route which Annibal now designed to take, from New Carthage into Italy, contained in its whole length about nine thousand stadia.

He had already surmounted almost one half of

this long march; but the most dangerous and difficult part was yet to come. He was now preparing to lead his army through the passes of the Pyrenean mountains, not without some apprehension that the Gauls might take advantage of the strength of those defiles, and fall upon him in his march. When the Romans were informed by their ambassadors of all that had been debated and determined in the senate of Carthage, and at the same time heard with great surprise, that Annibal was already advanced beyond the Iberus. They resolved, therefore, that an army should immediately be raised and sent to Spain, under the command of Publius Cornelius; and another, with Tiberius Sempronius, into Afric. And while the consuls were employed in perfecting the levies, and making all the necessary preparations, they used their utmost diligence to complete the settlement of these colonies, which they had some time before resolved to send into Gaul. They made haste to enclose the towns with walls; and ordered the citizens that were to inhabit them, of whom six thousand were allotted to each colony, to be all present on the place within thirty days. The one of these new cities was built on this side of the Po, and called Placentia; the other on the other side, and was named Cremona.

But scarcely were the inhabitants arrived, when the Boian Gauls, who had long watched in secret for some favourable occasion to shake off their alliance with the Romans, being now encouraged by the near approach of the Carthaginian army, re-

solved openly to revolt; shewing no regard to the safety of their countrymen, whom they had given as hostages at the conclusion of their last war against the Romans, which we described in the former book. And having prevailed with the Insubrians likewise, whose old resentment against the Romans was not yet extinguished, to assist them with their forces, they wasted all the lands that were allotted to these new colonies; pursued the Romans, who fled before them, as far as Mutina, another of their colonies, and invested them closely in the place. There were among them three Romans of distinguished rank, who had been sent to inspect the distribution of the lands. One of them, Caius Lutatius, was of consular, and the other two, of prætorian dignity. These desired to have an interview with the enemy, to which the Boians readily consented. But as they were returning from the conference, the Gauls treacherously seized and kept them prisoners; imagining that, through their means, they should recover their own hostages from the Romans. The prætor L. Manlius, who was posted with some troops upon the frontiers of the country, no sooner was informed of what had happened, than he advanced in haste towards the enemy. But the Boians, having placed their army in ambuscade in a certain forest, through which the Romans were to pass, as soon as they appeared, fell suddenly upon them from every quarter, and killed many of them. The rest fled at first with great precipitation; but having gained the neighbouring hills, they rallied again their broken forces,

and retreated with some kind of order, but in a manner that was scarcely honourable. The Gauls followed close behind, and blocked up these troops likewise in a village that was called Tanes, into which they had retired. As soon as it was known at Rome that their army was thus closely invested by the enemy, and the siege pressed with vigour, they sent away immediately to their relief, under the conduct of a prætor, the legions that had been raised for Publius; and gave orders, that the consul should make new levies among the allies. Such then in general, as we have described it both here and in the former parts of this work, was the state and condition of the Gauls, from their first settlement in the country to the time of Annibal's arrival in it.

The Roman consuls, having severally completed all the necessary preparations, sailed out to sea in the beginning of the spring: Publius, with sixty vessels, to go into Spain; and Tiberius, with a fleet of a hundred and sixty quinqueremes, to prosecute the war in Afric. The zeal and eagerness that appeared in the conduct of the last of these, and the preparations which he made at Lilybæum, drawing together troops and stores of every kind, and from every quarter, were all so great and formidable, that it seemed as if he meditated nothing less, than to lay siege to Carthage itself upon his first arrival. Publius, steering his course along the Ligurian coast, arrived on the fifth day in the neighbourhood of Massilia; and having anchored in the first mouth of the Rhone, which was called the Massi-

lian mouth, he landed his forces there. He had heard, that Annibal had already passed the Pyrenean mountains, but was persuaded that he must still be at a considerable distance from him; as the country through which he was to march was extremely difficult, and the Gauls around him very numerous. But Annibal having, with wonderful success, gained some of the Gauls with presents, and reduced the rest by force, continued his route forwards, keeping the sea of Sardinia on his right, and was now arrived upon the banks of the Rhone. When the news came that the enemy was so near, Publius, being in part surprised at this celerity, which seemed indeed to exceed all belief, and partly desirous also to be informed exactly of the truth, sent away three hundred of the bravest of his horse to make discoveries, together with a body of Gallic mercenaries that belonged to the Massilians; who were to serve as guides, and to support the cavalry also, if there should be occasion for it; while himself, in the mean time, employed his care to recover the troops from the fatigue which they had suffered in the voyage; and consulted with the tribunes concerning the posts that were most proper to be taken, and the place in which they might with best advantage meet and offer battle to the enemy.

Annibal, having now fixed his camp upon the Rhone, at the distance of about four days' journey from the sea, resolved to make his passage in that place, because the stream was narrow there, and confined within the proper channel of the river. By his gentle treatment of those that lived along the banks,

he prevailed upon them to sell to him all their canoes and boats, the number of which was very great; for almost all the people that dwell near the Rhone are employed in constant commerce upon the sea. They supplied him also with the wood that was proper for making the canoes; and in two days' time an incredible quantity of those vessels was finished by the army. For the soldiers all attended to their task with the greatest earnestness, as if each man had resolved to be indebted to no labour but his own for his passage across the river. But about this time a very great army of barbarians appeared on the other side, ready to oppose the Carthaginians in their landing. Annibal having seen their numbers, and considered with himself that as it was by no means possible to pass the river in defiance of so great a force, so on the other hand, in case that he should long remain in his present post, he must soon be enclosed on every side by enemies, as soon as the third night came on, sent away a part of his army under the care of Hanno, the son of king Bomilcar, with some of the natives of the country to serve as guides. These troops, when they had marched about two hundred stadia up the stream, at last rested in a place where a small island divided the river into two. And having cut down trees from a neighbouring forest, some of which they joined, and bound some together with cords in a hasty manner, in a short time they completed a number of floats sufficient for the present necessity, and passed the river upon them without any resistance from the enemy. And hav-

ing seized a strong and advantageous post, they remained upon it during that whole day; reposing themselves after the fatigue of their march, and making all things ready for the ensuing combat, agreeably to the orders which they had received. The rest of the troops that were left with Annibal were in like manner employed in taking such refreshment as was necessary, and completing all their preparations. But the point of greatest difficulty was, to contrive a method for the safe passage of the elephants, which were thirty-seven in number; and this indeed occasioned no small embarrassment and pain.

On the fifth night after the arrival of the Carthaginians upon the Rhone, the detachment that had already passed it began their march before break of day, and advanced along the banks of the river towards the enemy. At the same time Annibal, having all his troops in readiness, disposed every thing for their immediate passage. The larger boats were filled with the heavy-armed horse, and the infantry embarked in the canoes. The first were stationed higher up the stream, while the latter took their place below them; that when the strength and violence of the current had first been broken by the heavier vessels, the passage of the rest might be more secure and easy. The horses were made to swim across, being towed along behind the larger boats. And as three or four were in this manner conducted together by a single soldier, who was placed for that purpose upon either side of the stern of every vessel, a considerable

number of them were landed on the other side, in the very first passage over.

The barbarians, as soon as they perceived the disposition that was made, ran down from their camp in crowds, without observing any order; and were persuaded that they should be able, with the greatest ease, to prevent the Carthaginians from landing. But Annibal, having now discerned the smoke on the other side, which the detachment from his army had been directed to make, as the signal of their near approach, ordered all the troops to get immediately on board; and that those, who were in the larger vessels, should direct their course against the stream, in such a manner as might most effectually break its violence. His orders were executed in an instant. The troops, as they embarked, pursued their work with loud and eager emulation: animating each other by their cries, and struggling with all their strength, to surmount the violence of the stream: while the view of both the armies, with which the banks on either side were covered; the cries of the Carthaginians from the shore, calling after their companions, and seeming as it were to divide their labour with them; the noise of the barbarians on the other side, who demanded the combat with loud screams and shouts; formed all together a scene of great astonishment and horror. At this time, the troops that were led by Hanno appeared suddenly on the other side. And while one part of them set fire to the camp of the enemy, which was left without defence, the rest and

greater part made haste to fall upon the rear of those that were defending the passage of the river. The barbarians were struck with terror, at an event so strange and unexpected. Some ran in haste towards the camp, to stop the progress of the flames; while others were constrained to turn, and defend themselves against the enemy. When Annibal perceived, that all things had conspired most favourably with his designs, as fast as the forces landed, he drew them up in order, and led them to the charge. The barbarians, who had begun the combat in disorder, and whose consternation was now completed by the sudden attack that was made upon them from behind, were in a short time routed, and forced to fly. The Carthaginian general, being thus in the same instant master of his passage, and victorious against the enemy, gave immediate orders for passing the rest of the army over. And having in a short time brought all the troops to land, he encamped that night along the border of the river.

On the following day, Annibal, having received the news that the Roman fleet had cast anchor near the mouth of the Rhone, sent away a body of five hundred Numidian horse, to take a view of the situation of the enemy, and to discover their numbers and designs. He gave directions also for the passage of the elephants across the river. And having afterwards called together the troops, he introduced among them Magilus, a petty king, who had come to him from the country near the Po; and who now, with the help of an interpreter,

informed the assembly of all the resolutions, which the Gauls had taken in their favour. This expedient was such, indeed, as could scarcely fail to raise the spirits of the army, and inspire them with confidence and courage. For, in the first place, as the bare sight alone and presence of the Gauls, exhorting them to proceed in their designs, and promising that they would bear an equal part in all the fortune of the war, was itself a circumstance of great force and moment: so the assurance likewise, that was now repeated by his people, that they would lead the army into Italy, by a way that was both short and safe, and through places that would yield a full supply to all their wants, seemed highly probable, and such as well deserved their credit. They spoke with great advantage also of the extent and richness of the country, into which they were going to enter; and of the zeal and prompt alacrity of the people, upon whose assistance they designed chiefly to rely, for maintaining the war against the Romans.

The Gauls, after this discourse, retired: and Annibal himself came into the assembly. He began with reminding the soldiers of their past exploits. He desired them to remember, that though they had often been engaged in designs of the greatest difficulty as well as danger, they had never yet failed in any enterprise, because they had been always careful to repose a perfect confidence in the wisdom of their general, and paid an entire submission to his will. He exhorted them, to be still assured of the same success; and to be

persuaded, that they had already accomplished the most important part of their intended labour; since they had happily passed the Rhone, and seen with their own eyes the friendly disposition of their allies towards them, and their zeal for the war. With regard, therefore, to the particular measures that were now to be pursued, he conjured them to throw away all concern, and to rest securely upon his care and conduct, for the entire management of the whole. That they should be ready only to receive and execute his orders; to acquit themselves at all times like men of courage; and maintain the glory of their former actions. The multitude testified their applause by shouts; and showed the greatest ardour and alacrity. Annibal praised their zeal: and having recommended them all to the favour and protection of the gods, and directed them to make all things ready for their march on the following day, he dismissed the assembly.

About this time, the Numidian horse, that had been sent to make discoveries, returned to the camp. A great part of the detachment had been killed; and the rest were forced to fly. For no sooner had they gained a moderate distance from the camp, than they were met by the detachment of the Roman cavalry, which Publius had sent away upon the same design. The engagement that ensued between them was so sharp and obstinate, that a hundred and forty Gauls and Romans fell on one side, and more than two hundred Numidians on the other. The Romans, in pur-

suit of those that fled, advanced even close to the intrenchments of the Carthaginians: and having taken an exact and thorough view of all the camp, they returned again in haste, and informed the consul of the arrival of the enemy. Publius, having first sent the baggage to the ships, immediately decamped, and advanced with all the army along the banks of the river, with design to overtake the Carthaginians, and to force them to a battle without delay.

But early in the morning of the following day, Annibal, having posted his cavalry as a reserve on the side towards the sea, commanded the infantry to begin their march; while himself waited to receive the elephants, and the men that were left with them on the other side of the river. The passage of the elephants was performed in the following manner. When they had made a sufficient number of floats, they joined two together, and fastened them strongly to the ground, upon the bank of the river. The breadth of both together was about fifty feet. To the extremity of these, they fixed two more, which were extended over into the water: and to prevent the whole from being loosened and carried down the river by the rapidity of the current, they secured the side, that was turned against the stream, by strong cables fastened to the trees along the bank. Having, in this manner, finished a kind of bridge, which was extended to the length of about two hundred feet, they then added to it two other floats of a much larger size, which were very firmly joined together,

but were fastened in so slight a manner to the rest, that they might at any time be separated from them with little difficulty. A great number of ropes were fixed to these last floats: by the help of which, the boats, that were designed to tow them over, might hold them firm against the violence of the stream, and carry them in safety with the elephants to the other side. They then spread a quantity of earth over all the floats, that their colour and appearance might, as nearly as was possible, resemble the ground on shore. The elephants were usually very tractable upon land, and easy to be governed by their conductors, but were at all times under the greatest apprehensions whenever they approached the water. Upon this occasion, therefore, they took two female elephants, and led them first along the floats. The rest readily followed. But no sooner were they arrived upon the farthest floats, than, the ropes being cut which bound them to the rest, they were immediately towed away by the boats towards the other side. The elephants were seized with extreme dread, and moved from side to side in great fury and disorder. But when they saw that they were every way surrounded by the water, their very fears at last constrained them to remain quiet in their place. In this manner, two other floats being from time to time prepared and fitted to the rest, the greater part of the elephants were carried safely over. There were some indeed, that were so much disordered by their fears, that they threw themselves into the river in the midst of their

passage. This accident was fatal to their conductors, who perished in the stream. But the beasts themselves, exerting all their strength, and raising their large trunks above the surface of the river, were by that means enabled not only to breathe freely, but to discharge the waters also, as fast as they received them: and having by long struggling surmounted likewise the rapidity of the stream, they at last all gained the opposite bank in safety.

As soon as this work was finished, Annibal, making his rear guard of the elephants and cavalry, continued his march along the river; directing his route from the sea towards the east, as if he had designed to pass into the middle parts of Europe.

The Rhone has its sources above the Adriatic gulf in those parts of the Alps that stand towards the north, and at first flows westward. But afterwards it bends its stream towards the south-west, and discharges itself into the Sardinian sea. This river runs chiefly through a valley, the northern side of which is inhabited by the Ardyan Gauls; the southern parts being all bounded by the Alps, which look towards the north. The plains around the Po, which we have already described at large, are separated also from this valley by the Alps; which beginning near Massilia, are from thence extended even to the inmost extremity of the Adriatic gulf. And these were the mountains which Annibal was to pass, as he came forwards from the Rhone, to enter Italy.

There are some historians, who, in the description which they have given us of these mountains, and of the march of Annibal across them, while their design is to strike the reader with a view of something wonderful and strange, are unwarily betrayed into two faults, the most contrary of any to the true character of history. For they relate such things as are manifestly false; and, on many occasions, also, are forced even to refute their own accounts. They speak of Annibal, as a general, whose prudence and whose courage were such as never could be equalled; and yet at the same time they plainly prove him to have been of all men the most irrational and senseless. As often, too, as they find it difficult to bring the fables which they have feigned to any probable conclusion, they introduce the gods and demi-gods into a history, whose proper business is to treat of real facts. Thus they represent the Alps to be in every part so steep and broken that not only the cavalry, the heavy infantry, and the elephants, but even the light-armed foot, must in vain have attempted to surmount them. They describe them likewise to have been entirely destitute of all inhabitants; so that unless some god or hero had appeared, and pointed out the road to Annibal, he might still have wandered, ignorant of his way, till the whole army had been lost.

Now this account of things is both inconsistent with itself, and false. For must not Annibal have been esteemed the most imprudent and most rash of all commanders, if he had set out upon his march,

at the head of so great an army, upon which he had also built the noblest expectations, without being first informed of the direction of his route, and the places through which he was to pass; in a word, without knowing, into what kind of country he was going to enter, and what people he was likely to encounter in the way? and must it not be thought a still more high degree of folly, to have engaged thus blindly in an attempt, which was so far from yielding any reasonable prospect of success, that on the contrary, it was not even in its nature practicable? Yet these writers, while they lead him through a country, of which he had received no previous knowledge, ascribe to him such a conduct, at a time when his army was entire, and his hopes all fair and flourishing, as no other general would ever have pursued, even in the most weak and desperate state. With regard also to that which they relate, concerning the desert condition, and insuperable roughness of the *Alps*; it must appear at once to be a most direct and notorious falsehood. For the Gauls, that lived along the Rhone, had often passed these mountains. And even not long before the time of Annibal, they had led a very numerous army over them, to join the Cisalpine Gauls in their wars against the Romans, as we showed particularly in the former book. The Alps themselves are inhabited also by a numerous people. But these historians, through the want of being acquainted with all these circumstances, are obliged to feign the appearance of some demi-god, to direct the Carthaginians in

their march: following in this the example of the tragic writers. For as these are forced to introduce a deity in the catastrophe of their pieces, because their fables are founded neither on truth nor sense: so these historians likewise, when they have filled their first relations with circumstances that are both improbable and false, must of necessity have recourse to the gods and demi-gods, to clear the difficulties in which they have involved their story. For if the beginning be contrary to truth and nature, the end also must be the same. But, notwithstanding all which these writers may pretend, it is certain that Annibal, in the conduct of this enterprise, had taken all his measures with the best judgement and precaution. For he had informed himself with great exactness of the nature of the country through which he was to pass: he was well assured of the goodness of it; and of the inveterate hatred, which the people bore against the Romans. And that he might be able also to surmount the difficulties of the way, he chose for guides the natives of the country; men, engaged with him in the same designs, and actuated by the same common hopes. With regard to myself, I may be allowed to speak of these things with some confidence. For I not only received my accounts from persons that lived in the times of which I am writing, but have also passed the Alps, for the sake of gaining a more full and accurate knowledge of the truth.

CHAP. V.

ON the third day after the Carthaginians had begun their march, the Roman consul Publius arrived at the place where they had passed the river. When he found that the enemy was gone, his surprise was very great, and not indeed without good reason. For he had persuaded himself, that they would by no means venture to pass that way into Italy, amidst so many barbarous nations, noted for their fraud and perfidy. But as he saw, however, that they had made the attempt, he returned in haste to his ships, and ordered all the forces immediately to embark. And having sent away his brother into Spain, he steered his course back again to Italy; designing to march with the greatest diligence through Tyrrhenia; and so to reach the Alps, before the Carthaginians should be able to have passed those mountains. The latter, continuing their route forwards, arrived, after four days' march from the passage of the Rhone, at a place that was very fertile in corn, and possessed by a numerous people. It was called the Island; because the Rhone and Isara, running on both sides of it, fall together below, and sharpen the land into a point. This place, both in its size and figure, resembles that part of Ægypt which is called the Delta: with this difference only, that one of the sides of the latter is washed by the sea, which receives the rivers that enclose the other

two, whereas the third side of the island is defended by a chain of very rough and lofty mountains, which indeed are almost inaccessible. It happened that at this time there were two brothers in arms against each other, contending for the sovereignty of the place. The eldest of them immediately had recourse to the Carthaginians, and implored their aid to secure him the possession of his rights. Annibal embraced the occasion with no small joy, being well aware of the advantages that would result from it to himself. Having joined his forces therefore with this prince, he defeated and drove out the younger brother, and was well rewarded by the conqueror for the assistance which he had given him. For he not only supplied the troops with corn and other necessaries, in large abundance, but exchanged likewise all their arms, that were impaired and worn by use, for others that were sound and new. He furnished a great part of the soldiers also with new habits, and especially with shoes, which were of singular service to them in their march afterwards across the mountains. But the chief advantage was, that he attended with all his forces upon the rear of the Carthaginian army, through the whole country of the Allobroges, which they could not otherwise have passed without great fear and caution, and secured their march from insult, till they arrived at the foot of the Alps.

When the army, after they had marched ten days along the Rhone, and had reached the distance of about eight hundred stadia from the

place where they passed the river, were just now preparing to ascend the Alps, they found themselves in a situation that seemed likely to prove fatal to them. The chiefs of the Allobroges had suffered them to pass the plains, without any interruption or disturbance, being restrained in part by their apprehensions of the Carthaginian cavalry, and partly also by the dread of those barbarians that followed in the rear. But when the latter had returned back again to their country, and Annibal with the foremost of his troops was now beginning to enter the difficult passes of the mountains, they drew together their forces in great numbers, and possessed themselves of all the posts that commanded the defiles through which the Carthaginians were obliged to pass. If this design had been conducted with due secrecy and caution, the whole army must have been destroyed without resource. But as they employed no pains to cover their intentions, the attempt, though it brought great loss upon the Carthaginians, proved no less pernicious to themselves.

For when Annibal perceived, that the enemy had thus seized on all the advantageous posts, he encamped at the foot of the mountains, and sent away some of the Gauls that served as guides in his army, to discover their disposition, conduct, and designs. When these returned, they acquainted him, that, during the time of day, the barbarians remained constant in their stations, and kept a careful guard upon them, but retired, as soon as night came on, to a neighbouring town. The

general, having formed his measures upon this intelligence, continued his march in open view, as far as the entrance of the defiles, and encamped very near the enemy. And when night came on, he ordered fires to be lighted, and the greater part of the army to remain in the camp: while himself, having selected some of the bravest of the troops, and disincumbered them of every thing that might retard their march, advanced through the passes, and seized the posts which the enemy had now deserted. When day appeared, and the barbarians saw what had happened, they were forced to desist from their first design. But having afterwards observed, that the cavalry, and the beasts that conveyed the baggage, being crowded and pressed close together by the narrowness of the way, advanced very slowly forwards, and not without the greatest difficulty, they seized the occasion that appeared so favourable, and fell upon them as they marched, in many parts at once. The destruction that ensued was very great; especially of the horses and beasts of burthen. But the loss of these was rather owing to the badness of the ground on which they stood, than to any efforts of the enemy. For as the way was not only very rough and narrow, but was bounded also on every side by steep and craggy rocks, the beasts, that were loaded with the baggage, were overturned by every shock, and hurried headlong with their burthens down the precipices. This disorder was occasioned chiefly by the horses that were wounded. For these, being rendered

senseless and ungovernable, not only fell against the beasts of burthen that were near them, but forcing their way also through the ranks as they were labouring to advance, filled every thing with tumult, and bore down all that was within their reach.

But Annibal, perceiving this disorder, and reflecting with himself that the loss of the baggage alone must prove fatal to his army, though all the troops should escape with safety, advanced now in haste to their assistance, with the forces that had gained the hills in the night before; and rushing down with violence upon the enemy from those eminencies, he killed great numbers of them; but not without an equal loss. For the cries and conflict of these new combatants greatly increased the former tumult of the march. At last, however, the greater part of the Allobroges were slain, and the rest forced to fly. Annibal then conducted through the passes, though not without the greatest pains and difficulty, what remained of the cavalry and beasts of burthen. And having afterwards assembled as many of the troops as he was able to draw together after the disorder of the late action, he advanced against the town, from whence the enemy had made their attack upon him. As the place was in a manner quite deserted by the people, who had all gone out in search of booty, he became master of it upon his first approach; and from thence drew many great advantages, with respect both to the present and to future use. For besides the horses, beasts of burthen, and prisoners which

he gained, he found likewise in it so large a quantity both of corn and cattle, that it proved sufficient to support the army during two or three days' march. By this conquest also, the people that lived along the sides of the mountains were struck with terror, and feared to engage in any new attempt against him.

Annibal, having rested in this place during one whole day, again decamped, and continued his march to some distance forwards, without any accident. But on the fourth day he fell, a second time, into a danger from which it was not easy to escape. The inhabitants of those parts of the mountains, having formed the design of surprising him by treachery, advanced to meet him with green branches in their hands, and crowns upon their heads; which is the signal of peace among the barbarous nations, as the caduceus is among the Greeks. Annibal, being unwilling to trust too hastily to these appearances, questioned them with great exactness, concerning their intentions, and the purpose of their coming. They answered, that having been informed that he had taken a neighbouring town, and destroyed all those that had appeared in arms against him, they were come to assure him, that they had no intention to do him any injury, and to request that he would offer none to them. They promised also, that they would leave some hostages in his hands, as a pledge of their sincerity. Annibal still was doubtful and irresolute, and apprehended some ill design. But when he had reflected with himself, that his compliance

with the terms which this people now proposed, might serve perhaps to render them more mild and cautious; and, on the other hand, that, in case he should reject them, they would not fail to act against him as open enemies, he at last resolved to embrace their offers, and, in appearance at least, to consider them as friends. The barbarians brought their hostages; supplied the army liberally with cattle; and gave themselves up to the Carthaginians with so little reserve or caution, that Annibal was in a great degree induced to throw away all suspicion; and even intrusted them with the charge of leading the army through the rest of the defiles. But when the Carthaginians, after two days' march under the conduct of these guides, were now engaged in passing through a valley, that was surrounded on every side by steep and insuperable precipices, suddenly this treacherous people appeared behind them in great numbers, and fell with fury upon the rear. In this situation the whole army must inevitably have been destroyed, if Annibal, who still retained some little doubt of their sincerity, had not placed, by a wise precaution, the baggage with the cavalry at the head of all the march, and the heavy infantry behind. These troops sustained the attack, and in part repelled the impending ruin. The loss, however, was very great, both of men and horses, and beasts of burthen. For the barbarians, advancing still along the summit of the mountains, as the Carthaginians continued their march through the valley, both by slinging stones, and rolling down fragments of the rocks upon them;

spread so great terror and disorder through the army, that Annibal, with one half of the troops, was forced to take his station for the night upon a naked and desert rock, to secure the cavalry and baggage, till they had all passed the valley. And this was at last accomplished. But such was the roughness and the difficulty of these defiles, that the whole night was scarcely sufficient for the work.

On the following day, the enemy being now retired, the Carthaginian general joined the cavalry, and continued his march towards the summit of the Alps. From this time the barbarians never came to attack him in any very numerous body. But some straggling parties of them, appearing from time to time in different places, and falling, as occasion served, sometimes upon the foremost troops, and sometimes on the rear, gave frequent interruption to his march, and carried away a part of the baggage. The elephants were chiefly serviceable upon these occasions; for on which side soever they advanced, the enemy were struck with terror at the sight, and never ventured to approach. On the ninth day, having gained at last the summit of the mountains, he there fixed his camp, and rested during two whole days, that he might give some ease and refreshment to the troops that had performed their march with safety; and that the others might also join him, who were not yet arrived. During this time many of the wounded horses, and of the beasts that had thrown their burthens in the late disorders of the march, having followed the

traces of the army, arrived unexpectedly in the camp.

It was now near the time of winter. The mountains were already covered deep with snow, and the whole army seemed to be under the greatest dejection and dismay; being not only exhausted by the miseries which they had suffered, but disheartened also by the view of those that were yet to come. Annibal, therefore, had recourse to the only expedient that remained to raise their drooping courage. He assembled the troops together, and from the summit of the Alps, which, when considered with regard to Italy, appear to stand as the citadel of all the country, pointed to their view the plains beneath that were watered by the Po, and reminded them of the favourable disposition of the Gauls towards them. He showed them also the very ground upon which Rome itself was situated. By this prospect they were in some degree recovered from their fears. On the morrow, therefore, they decamped, and began to descend the mountains. There was now no enemy that opposed their passage, except some lurking parties only, which sometimes fell upon them by surprise, for the sake of plunder. But by reason of the snows, and the badness of the ground, their loss was not much inferior to that which they had suffered in the ascent. For the way was not only very steep and narrow, but so entirely covered also by the snow, that the feet knew not where to tread with safety; and as often as they turned aside from the proper track they were instantly hurried down some pre-

cipice. Yet the soldiers, to whom such accidents were now become familiar, sustained all this misery with an amazing firmness. At last they came to a place which neither the elephants nor the beasts of burthen could in any manner pass; for the ground, which was before extremely steep and broken, to the length of a stadium and a half, had again very lately fallen away, and left the road so narrow, that it was quite impracticable. At this sight the troops again were seized with consternation; and even began to lose all the hopes of safety. Annibal at first endeavoured to avoid this route, by changing the direction of his march, and making a circuit round it, but he soon was forced to desist from that design; for the way on every side was utterly insuperable, through an accident of a singular kind which is peculiar to the Alps. The snows of the former year, having remained unmelted upon the mountains, were now covered over by those that had fallen in the present winter. The latter being soft, and of no great depth, gave an easy admission to the feet. But when these were trodden through, and the soldiers began to touch the snows that lay beneath, which were now become so firm that they would yield to no impression, their feet both fell at once from under them, as if they had been walking upon the edge of some high and slippery precipice; and this mischance drew after it a still worse accident. For when they struggled with their hands and knees to recover themselves from their fall, as the ground was every where extremely steep, they were then sure to slide away with greater violence

and rapidity than before; carrying likewise with them whatever they had grasped for their support. The beasts also that were loaded with the baggage, having, by their endeavours to rise again when they had fallen, broken the surface of the lower snow, remained closely wedged in the pits which they had made, and by the weight of the burthens under which they lay, as well as from the unyielding firmness of the snows around them, were fixed immoveably in the place.

When this attempt was thus found to be impracticable, Annibal returned again to the narrow road which he had quitted; and having removed the snow, he encamped at the entrance of it, and ordered the soldiers to make a firm and level way along the precipice itself. And this, with the expense of vast pains and labour, was at last effected; so that, in one day's time, there was sufficient room for the horses and the beasts of burthen to descend. These were immediately conducted down; and having gained the plains, were sent away to pasture, in places where no snow had fallen. The Numidians were then commanded to enlarge the road, that the elephants might also pass. But so laborious was the task that, though fresh men still succeeded to those that were fatigued, it was not without great difficulty that they completed it, in three days' continued toil; after which these beasts came down the mountains, being almost exhausted and spent with famine. For the tops of the Alps, which are covered through all seasons with perpetual snows, produce neither tree nor pasture; though

the middle parts on both sides of them abound with woods and forests, and are proper to be cultivated. Annibal then descended last, with all the army, and thus on the third day gained the plains; having lost great numbers of his soldiers in the march, as well in passing rivers, as in the engagements which he was forced to sustain. Many of his men had also perished among the precipices of the Alps, and a far greater number of the horses, and beasts of burthen. And having thus at last completed his journey from New Carthage, in five months' time: fifteen days of which were employed in passing over the Alps; he now boldly entered the territory of the Insubrians, and the plains that are watered by the Po; though the whole of his infantry that was left amounted to no more than twelve thousand Africans, and eight thousand Spaniards; and his cavalry to six thousand only; as we learn from an account that was engraven by his orders on a column near Lacinium.

About the same time the Roman consul Publius, having sent away his brother, as we before related, with the greater part of the army into Spain, exhorting him to prosecute the war with vigour against Asdrubal in that country, landed at Pisæ, with a small body of forces only. But having taken his route through Tyrrhenia, and increased his army with the legions that were then in action, under the conduct of the prætors, upon the frontiers of the Boian Gauls, he came and encamped also near the Po, with design to press the enemy, and force them to an engagement without delay.

Thus then have we brought these generals together, and fixed the scene of the war in Italy. But before we go on to recount the battles that ensued, it may be proper and just to speak of certain matters, which may be thought perhaps to deserve a place in this part of our history. For as we have often taken occasion, in the course of this work, to give a full description of various places that occurred, both in Spain and Afric, many will be ready to inquire, from whence it happens, that we have made no mention of the straits that are formed by the pillars of Hercules, and of the sea beyond; together with the properties and accidents that are peculiar to them; of the British islands; with the manner of making tin: and of the gold and silver mines that are found in Spain: especially since other writers, who have treated of these subjects in a very copious manner, differ greatly from each other, in all that they report.

It must indeed be acknowledged, that these things are by no means foreign to the design of history. But I considered with myself, that a separate discussion of every one, as they occurred, would too much break the course of the narration, and divert the reader from those transactions which are the proper subject of this work: and, in the next place, that it would be far more useful likewise, to take a view of all of them together, in some time and place reserved expressly for that purpose; in which we might be able to explain at large whatever has been known with truth concerning them. Let no one therefore think it

strange if, whenever any other subjects of the same kind present themselves in the progress of our history, we should forbear to enter into a particular examination of them. To expect that a historian should crowd his work in every part with these descriptions, is indeed a proof of a very vicious and uninformed judgement. Such readers may very properly be compared with those men of liquorish palates, who taste eagerly of every dish that is set before them; and, amidst so great a variety of meats, not only lose the present relish of what they eat, but make their whole food pernicious to the body, which it was designed to strengthen and sustain. In the same manner also, these mixed histories, as they afford no pure or genuine entertainment in the reading, so neither are they able to convey any sound and lasting nourishment to the mind.

With regard to the reasons that induced me to reserve the full consideration of all these subjects for a professed and separate inquiry, there are many that might now be mentioned. But the chief and most considerable of them is, that by much the greater part of those historians, who have ever treated of the situation and the properties of the extreme parts of the habitable world, have fallen into numberless mistakes, in almost all which they relate. It will be necessary therefore to refute and rectify their accounts, not by some slight and cursory remarks, but in a full and deliberate examination of them. We must be careful however to remember, that their labours deserve

upon the whole rather praise than censure; and that their errors are always to be corrected in the gentlest manner: since it is certain, that they would themselves retract and alter many passages in their works, if they were now alive. For, in former times, there were but few among the Greeks, that made any attempt to extend their search into those places which we call the boundary of the earth. The difficulties in their way were indeed almost insuperable. Many dangers were to be encountered by sea; and more, and greater upon land. And when any, either by choice or accident, had gained an entrance into those countries, yet because some parts were destitute of all inhabitants, and others possessed by a race of men, whose manners were uncultivated and wholly barbarous, it was scarcely possible, that they should be able to examine with their own proper eyes even into a small part only of the things that deserved their notice. Nor could they, on the other hand, as they were strangers to the language of the natives, ever gain the information that was requisite, in those which they had opportunity of seeing. And even those few, that were able in some degree to surmount these difficulties, were all disposed to enlarge their descriptions far beyond the bounds of probability: and having neither sense nor candour to be satisfied with the plain and simple truth, invented strange and incredible fictions of prodigies and monsters; reporting many things, which they had never seen, and many also that had no existence. Since, therefore, all these

circumstances concurred to render it not only difficult, but utterly impossible to gain any accurate and certain knowledge of those countries, we ought by no means to pass too severe a censure upon the old historians, for their mistakes or omissions in these matters: but, on the contrary, should rather be persuaded, that they deserve our acknowledgements and thanks, on account even of the little information which they have left behind them; and that, amidst those numerous difficulties, they were able as it were to lay the foundation of more genuine discoveries. But in these times, since all Asia has been opened to us by the arms of Alexander; and the other parts of the world by the Roman victories, so that every place and every country is now become accessible either by sea or land; and since men of eminence in the world have shown great eagerness and zeal in making these researches; employing in them all that leisure which they now enjoy from the business of war and the care of public affairs; it may, with reason be expected, that, by the help of these advantages, we should at last be able to remove the obscurity, in which these inquiries have hitherto been involved. And this is the task which I shall undertake in its proper place, and shall endeavour to give those readers, whose taste is gratified by such descriptions, a clear and perfect insight into all these subjects. For I have exposed myself, without reserve, both to great fatigue, and many dangers, in traversing all Afric, Spain, and Gaul; and in voyaging also upon the exterior sea, by

which these parts of the world are bounded; that I might be able to correct with some assurance the mistakes of former writers, and lay open the knowledge of these countries to the Greeks. But we shall now leave this digression: and go on to the recital of the battles that were fought in Italy.

CHAP. VI.

THE Carthaginian general, having now entered Italy, with the forces which we have already particularly mentioned, at first encamped at the bottom of the Alps, that he might give some ease and refreshment to his troops. Indeed the present condition of his army was miserable almost beyond expression. For, besides the hardships which they had sustained from the difficulties of the way, both in ascending and descending the mountains, the want of such provisions as were necessary, and the diseases also which their bodies had contracted from neglect and nastiness, had changed them into spectacles of horror: while the greater part seemed voluntarily to sink beneath their sufferings, and even to reject all thoughts both of life and safety. For in a march so long and difficult, it was utterly impossible to bring with them such supplies, as might fully satisfy the wants of so

numerous an army: and even those which they had brought were almost all lost among the precipices, with the beasts that carried them. This army therefore, which, when it passed the Rhone, consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot and eight thousand horse, was now reduced to less than half that number. The rest had perished among the mountains. And those that were left alive, were so much worn and altered by continued sufferings, that their appearance was scarcely human.

The first care, therefore, to which Annibal now gave his whole attention, was to raise the drooping spirits of the troops, and by proper refreshment to restore both the men and horses to their former state. When this was done, he invited the Taurinians, who lived near the foot of the Alps, and were at this time engaged in war with the Insubrians, to enter into an alliance with him, and to assist him with their forces. And when his offers were rejected by them, he marched and encamped before the strongest of their cities; and having taken it after three days' siege, killed all that were found in arms against him in the place. By this severity, the neighbouring barbarians were all struck with terror, and submitted at discretion. The rest of the Gauls, that inhabited these plains, were impatient to take arms in favour of the Carthaginians, as they had at first designed. But because the legions, that were sent from Rome, had passed through many of their states, and had avoided all the ambuscades that were prepared to intercept them, they were forced to

remain quiet for the present, and some were even compelled to join the Romans. Annibal therefore, wisely judging that no time was to be lost, resolved to continue his march forwards without delay; and, by some action of importance, to fix the confidence of those that were disposed to embrace his party, and encourage them to act without restraint, for the advancement of their common hopes.

But while he was preparing all things for the execution of this design, the report arrived, that Publius, with his army, had already passed the Po, and was now at no great distance from him. At first, Annibal could scarcely give credit to the news. Not many days were past, since he had left the Romans upon the banks of the Rhone. And as the passage by sea from Massilia to the Tyrrhenian coast was both long and difficult, so the distance also from thence through Italy, to the bottom of the Alps, was very great, and the way by no means easy or commodious for an army. But as the fact received fuller confirmation, he was beyond measure surprised, both at the boldness of the attempt, and at the success likewise with which the consul had carried it into execution. Publius, on his part also, was not less astonished. For he had persuaded himself, either that Annibal would never venture to take his route across the Alps, with an army that was all composed of foreign troops, or if he did, that he must inevitably be lost in the attempt. But when he heard, that he had not only passed the mountains,

but was already laying siege to some of the towns of Italy, he was struck with admiration at the daring and undaunted spirit of this general. At Rome also, the surprise was not at all more moderate. For while the report, that Saguntum was taken by the Carthaginians, still sounded in their ears, and all their measures were suited to that event; when they had sent away the consuls but just before, the one to make a diversion of the war in Afric, and the other to oppose the progress of the enemy in Spain; on a sudden they are informed, that Annibal is already arrived in Italy with his army. This wonderful celerity, as it almost exceeded all belief, so it filled them also with the greatest apprehensions. They immediately send notice to Tiberius, who still lay at Lilybæum, that the enemy had entered Italy. They direct him to desist from his first design, and return again to defend his country. The consul, having received these orders, sent back the fleet to Rome, and commanded the tribunes to draw together all the legionary forces with the greatest diligence; and that, on a day which he prescribed, they should meet him at Ariminum, a town situated near the Adriatic coast, in the southern extremity of those plains that are watered by the Po. In a word, so contrary were the present accidents to all that had been expected or foreseen, that the consternation soon become general among the people, and held their minds in anxious suspense for the event.

But Annibal and Publius, as they now ap-

proached each other, endeavoured severally to animate their troops, by all the motives which the present conjuncture suggested to them. Upon this occasion, Annibal contrived the following expedient. Having assembled together all the forces, he brought them before the young prisoners, whom he had taken among those barbarians that had disturbed his march across the Alps. With a view to the design which he now put in practice, he had before given orders, that these wretches should be treated with the last severity. They were loaded with heavy chains: their bodies were emaciated with hunger, and mangled by blows and stripes. In this condition, he now placed them in the midst of the assembly, and threw before them some suits of Gallic armour, such as their kings are accustomed to wear, when they engaged in single combat. He ordered some horses also to be set before them, and military habits, that were very rich and splendid. He then demanded of the young men, which of them were willing to try their fate in arms against each other, on condition that the conqueror should possess those spoils that were before their eyes, while the vanquished would be released by death from all his miseries. The captives with one voice cried out, and testified the utmost eagerness to engage. Annibal then commanded, that lots should be cast among them, and that those two, upon whom the lot should fall, should take the arms that were before them and begin the combat. When the prisoners heard these orders, they

extended their hands towards the heavens, and every one most fervently implored the gods that the lot to fight might be his own. And no sooner was their chance decided, than those whose fortune it was to engage, appeared filled with joy, while the rest were mournful and dejected. When the combat also was determined, the captives, that were by lot excluded from the trial, pronounced him who had lost his life in the engagement to be in their sight not less happy than the conqueror: since, by dying, he was released from all that wretchedness which they were still condemned to suffer. The same reflections arose also in the minds of the Carthaginian soldiers: who, from comparing the condition of the dead with the ill fate of those that were led back again to chains and torture, declared the former to be happy, and gave their pity to the sufferings of the latter.

When Annibal perceived, that this contrivance had produced in the minds of all the army the effect that was intended from it, he came forwards in the assembly, and told the soldiers: "That he had offered that spectacle to their view, that, when they had discerned their own condition in the fate of those unhappy captives, they might more clearly judge what resolutions were most proper to be taken, and in what manner they might best form their conduct in the present circumstances. That, in the combat which they had seen, and the prize proposed to the conqueror, was displayed a perfect image of that state, into which they were themselves now brought by for-

tune. That such was their situation, that they must either conquer or be slain in battle, or else fall alive into the power of their enemies. That by conquest they would obtain a prize, not of horses and military habits, but the whole wealth and riches of the Roman empire; and would thus become the happiest of mankind. That if they were to fall in battle, they could then only die, without being first exposed to any kind of misery; and contending, to their latest breath, for the most glorious of all victories. But, on the other hand, in case that they were conquered, and the love of life should flatter them with any hopes of being able to escape by flight, or should they even consent upon any terms to live after their defeat, it was manifest beyond all doubt, that nothing but the extremity of wretchedness could await them. For surely there were none among them, who, when they had considered how vast a length of country they had traversed, what enemies had opposed them in their way, and what large and rapid rivers they were forced to pass, could be so wholly destitute of all sense and judgement as ever to be persuaded that it was possible to regain their several countries. He conjured them, therefore, to throw away all such hopes; and in judging of their own state and fortune, to retain those sentiments which they had just now shown with regard to the condition of the captives. That, as in that case they declared both the man that conquered, and him who fell in the combat, to be happy, and pitied those who were reserved alive;

so their business now was, to conquer if it were possible; and if not, to die; and on no account to entertain even the smallest expectation or thought of life, in case that they were conquered. That if they would heartily embrace these sentiments, and carry this resolution with them into action, there was indeed no room to doubt, but that they would both live and conquer. That no troops were ever known to be defeated, who had once been fixed in this determination, either by necessity or choice. But that, on the other hand, an army which, like the Romans, saw their country open to them on every side, and ready to receive all those that could escape by flight, must necessarily fall beneath the efforts of men, whose only hopes were placed in victory." This harangue, together with the spectacle that had passed before their eyes, fully inflamed the courage of the soldiers, and raised them into such a temper as Annibal had designed. He therefore applauded their disposition, and dismissed the assembly, with orders that they should make all things ready for their march by break of day.

Upon the same day likewise, the consul Publius, who had already advanced beyond the Po, and designed to continue his march forwards, and to pass the Ticinus, sent away a sufficient number of his troops to lay a bridge across that river; and having in the mean time called together the rest of the army, he harangued them in the following manner.

In the first part of his discourse, he displayed

in many words the dignity and splendour of the Roman empire, and recalled to their minds the glorious actions of their ancestors. Speaking afterwards on the subject of the present war, he told the soldiers, that, even though they had never yet made any trial of the strength of those that were in arms against them, they might however be assured of victory, if they would remember only, that their enemies were the Carthaginians: those very Carthaginians, who had been so often vanquished by the Roman legions, and had submitted to the imposition of repeated tributes: and who now, by an attempt not less absurd than insolent, had dared to appear in arms against a people, to whom they had paid such subjection as was not far removed from slavery. "But since in fact," continued he, "we so lately have experienced, that these enemies want the courage even to stand before us in the field, what must be our sentiments, if we judge with reason, concerning the issue of the war? For when their cavalry was engaged with ours upon the Rhone, they not only lost great numbers of their men, but the rest, that were left alive, fled before us in a manner the most dishonourable, even to their very camp. Their general also, and all his army, no sooner were informed of our approach, than they retired with such precipitation, that their retreat was rather to be called a flight. It was this fear alone, and not their choice or inclination, that hurried them across the Alps. Behold then, (added he) Annibal is indeed arrived in Italy, but his army is

lost among the mountains. And even the few that have escaped are so much wasted with fatigue, so worn and exhausted by the length and difficulties of their march, that both men and horses are alike disabled, and become unfit for all the services of war. To conquer such an enemy, it must surely be sufficient, to show yourselves but once before them. But if any thing should still be wanting to fix your confidence, let my presence here among you be considered as a certain pledge of your success. For it never can be thought, that I should thus have left the fleet, with the affairs of Spain that were intrusted to my care, and have run with so much diligence to join the army in this country, unless I had been first assured by the most solid reasons, not only that this measure was both wise and necessary in the present circumstances, but that I was hastening also to reap the fruits of an easy and undoubted victory."

The authority of the speaker, as well as the truth that was contained in this discourse, raised in all the troops an impatience to be led against the enemy. Publius commended their alacrity; and exhorting them to hold themselves in readiness for action upon the earliest warning, he dismissed the assembly.

On the following day, both armies continued to advance along the Ticinus, on that side of it which is nearest to the Alps; the Romans, having the river on their left; and the Carthaginians, upon their right. But on the second day, having received notice from their foragers, that they were

now at no great distance from each other, they encamped severally in the place where they then were. On the third day, Annibal, having drawn out all his cavalry, marched through the plain, to view the situation of the enemy. Publius also, with his cavalry and light-armed troops, was advancing on the same design. As soon as they approached so near as to discern the dust that was raised on either side, they immediately ranged their forces in order of battle. The consul, having placed his light-armed troops in front, together with the Gallic horse, drew up the rest in a line behind, and moved slowly towards the enemy. Annibal advanced to meet him, having thrown into his centre all the bridled and heavy cavalry, and placed the Numidians on the wings, that they might be ready to surround the Romans. As the cavalry on both sides, as well as the generals themselves, showed the greatest impatience to engage, the light-armed troops, being apprehensive that, as these bodies met, they should be borne down instantly in the shock, had scarcely thrown their first javelins, when they retired with great precipitation, through the intervals of their own squadrons that were behind them. The two bodies then advanced to action. The battle was fierce on both sides, and the success for some time doubtful. For many of the combatants left their horses, and maintained the fight on foot with the greatest obstinacy. But after some time, the Numidian cavalry, having taken a circuit round, and falling suddenly upon the light-armed

forces that had saved themselves in the rear, trampled them down in heaps, and from thence advanced to charge the hindmost of the squadrons that were engaged. The Romans, who had hitherto sustained the fight with such success, that, though they lost many of their men, they had yet destroyed a far greater number of the enemy, being thus attacked by the Numidians in their rear, were thrown at once into disorder, so that a general route ensued. The greater part fled different ways. But a small number of them, having formed themselves into a body round the person of the consul, retreated with him.

Publius immediately decamped, and marched in haste through the plains, in order to repass the Po. For, as the country round him was all flat and open, and the Carthaginians superior in their cavalry; and because himself also had received a dangerous wound in the late engagement; he thought it necessary to remove the troops without delay into a place of safety on the other side of the river. Annibal for some time stood in expectation, that the Romans would draw out their infantry, and engage in a general battle. But when he found that they had left their camp, he immediately pursued, as far as to the bridge upon the Po. The bridge had been broken by the Romans, and the greater part of the planks removed. But a body of six hundred men, that had been left to secure that post, and who still remained upon the banks of the river, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians. Annibal, being in-

formed by these, that the Romans had already gained a great distance from him, immediately gave a stop to the pursuit; and, directing his march up the stream, advanced along the river, in search of a part that might commodiously admit a bridge to be thrown across it. After two days' march, having found a place that was proper for this design, he made a bridge of boats, and ordered Asdrubal to conduct the army over the river: while himself, who first had passed it, gave audience to the ambassadors, that now came to meet him from all the neighbouring country. For the Gauls on every side no sooner had received the news of the late victory, than they immediately threw away all restraint; and pursuing their first design, entered into an alliance with the Carthaginians, and supplied their army both with men and stores. Annibal received all that came to join him with great marks of favour: and when the army had all passed the river, he advanced in haste along the banks, but by a way that was contrary to his former course; for he now directed his march down the stream, with design to overtake and engage the enemy without delay.

For Publius, after he had repassed the Po, went and encamped near Placentia, a colony of the Romans. And being persuaded that he had now placed the troops in safety from all insult, he lay quiet in his post; and attended carefully to the cure both of himself, and of those that were wounded with him in the late engagement. After

two days' march from the place where they had passed the Po, the Carthaginians arrived near the enemy: and on the third day, they advanced in order, and offered battle to the Romans. But as the consul still remained close in his intrenchments, they again retired, and encamped at the distance of about fifty stadia from him.

At this time, the Gauls that had joined the Roman army, being persuaded that the Carthaginians had now the fairest prospect of success, resolved to attack the Romans by surprise: and having secretly concerted their design, they waited in their tents for the time to carry it into execution. Supper was now ended in the camp, and the army all retired to their repose; when these men, having suffered the first part of the night to pass without any disturbance or commotion, at break of day took arms, being in number about two thousand foot and two hundred horse; and falling suddenly upon the legions that were nearest, killed and wounded great numbers of them: and having cut off the heads of those that were slain, they carried them to the Carthaginian camp. On their arrival there, they were received by Annibal with great acknowledgements. He applauded their zeal and courage; and having promised them also such rewards as were due to their important service, he dismissed them to their several cities, to inform their countrymen of all that had been transacted, and to invite them to join their forces with the Carthaginians. He knew, indeed, that, after this flagrant act of perfidy against the

Romans, they must of necessity be forced to embrace his party. They came accordingly in a short time afterwards, and brought also with them the Boian Gauls, who delivered to him the three Romans that had been sent to inspect the division of the lands, whom they had treacherously seized in the beginning of the war, as we have before related. Annibal received them all in the most favourable manner; concluded an alliance with them; and made them his associates in the war. But he returned the prisoners again into their hands; advising them to keep them carefully, as the means whereby they might recover their own hostages from the Romans, as they at first designed.

The consul Publius was thrown by this transaction into no small anxiety and concern. And not doubting but that all the neighbouring Gauls, who before were very ill disposed towards the Romans, would immediately join the enemy, he thought it most prudent to retire, and avoid the danger that must arise from so general a revolt. With this design, about three hours after midnight he decamped, and marched towards the river Trebia, and the mountains that were near it: being persuaded that the troops might there lie secure against all attacks, as the posts were very strong and advantageous, and the country also on every side possessed by their allies. As soon as Annibal was informed of this retreat, he immediately sent after them the Numidian horse, and afterwards the other cavalry; and himself in a short

time followed with the rest of the army. The Numidians, having entered the intrenchments, and finding them quite deserted, staid to set fire to the camp. This delay was highly advantageous to the Romans. For if these troops had followed the pursuit with diligence, as the march of the enemy lay through a flat and open country, great numbers of them must have been destroyed. But now, they had almost all safely passed the Trebia, before the cavalry were come up. A small part only of the rear, that still remained upon the banks, were either killed or taken prisoners by the Carthaginians.

The consul, when he had passed the river, posted his troops upon the nearest hills. And having thrown up an intrenchment round his camp, he resolved to wait for the arrival of Tiberius with the other army; and, in the mean time, carefully to attend to the cure of his wound, that he might be able to bear a part in the engagement, whenever it should happen. Annibal also fixed his camp at the distance of about forty stadia from the Romans: while the Gauls who inhabited the neighbouring plains, being now bound firmly to his interests, and animated by the past success, supplied his troops with all the necessary stores in the greatest plenty, and showed the utmost eagerness to share in all the labours, and in all the dangers of the war.

CHAP. VII.

WHEN the people were informed at Rome of the action that had happened between the cavalry, they were at first surprised at an event that was so contrary to all their expectations. They found, however, many reasons which served to flatter them in the opinion, that this accident was by no means to be considered as an actual defeat. For some ascribed the blame to the rash precipitation of the consul. Others imputed the whole mischance to the wilful cowardice and ill conduct of the Gauls: being led to this persuasion, by the treachery which that people had just now committed in the camp. And even though the worst should be admitted, yet since their infantry remained entire, it seemed reasonable that their hopes also should be still the same, with regard to the issue of the whole. When Tiberius, therefore, with his legions, passed through Rome, they made no doubt, but that the sight alone of so brave an army must at once strike the enemy with terror, and give a speedy determination to the war.

When the troops were all met together at Ariminum on the appointed day, agreeably to the oath which they had taken, the consul immediately pursued his march in haste, with design to join his colleague. Having fixed his camp near him,

he gave orders for the refreshment of the army, which had suffered no small fatigue in their route of forty days' continuance from Lilybæum to Ariminum, and made all the necessary preparations for a battle; and, in the mean time, held frequent conferences with Publius; as well to inform himself of all that had already been transacted, as to deliberate also with him concerning the measures that were now to be pursued.

About this time Annibal became master of Clastidium, which was surrendered to him by the treachery of the governor, a native of Brundusium, who had been placed there by the Romans: and having gotten into his hands the garrison and all the stores, he distributed the latter among his troops for their present use, and joined the prisoners to his army without offering them any injury. By this instance of his clemency, he hoped that all the neighbouring people might be indueed to lay aside their fears; since they would now perceive, that they had no cause to despair of safety, in case that they should hereafter fall into the hands of the Carthaginians. He rewarded the traitor also with ample presents; that the governors of other cities might be led to embrace his party. Not long afterwards, having received information, that some of the Gauls that lived between the river Trebia and the Po, who had before concluded an alliance with him, had now entered also into terms of treaty with the Romans, he sent away two thousand foot, and a thousand Numidian and

Gallic horse, to plunder and lay waste their country. These orders soon were executed: and the detachment was now returning with their booty, when the Gauls came running to the Roman camp, and implored assistance. Tiberius, who for some time had been impatient to be in action, seized the occasion, and immediately sent away the greatest part of his cavalry, together with a thousand light-armed foot. These troops, having passed the river, charged the Numidians and the Gauls that were loaded with the plunder, and forced them to retreat in haste to their intrenchments. But when the guards, that were posted before the Carthaginian camp, advanced to the assistance of those that fled, the Romans were in their turn routed, and constrained to return back towards their camp. Tiberius then commanded all the cavalry to advance, together with the light-armed troops, and the enemy was again forced to fly. Annibal, who was at this time wholly unprepared for a general engagement, and who knew it to be the part of a wise and prudent general, not to hazard a decisive action without mature deliberation and design, forced the troops to stand, as they fled towards the camp, and to turn their faces to the enemy; but, at the same time, ordered the trumpets to sound the signal of retreat, and forbade the soldiers either to pursue, or renew the combat. The Romans, when they had for some time waited in the field, returned back again to their camp; having lost but a very

inconsiderable part of their forces in the action, though they had destroyed great numbers of the enemy.

Tiberius, being beyond measure elated by this success, was impatient to try the fortune of a general engagement. But though he had already resolved to embrace the advantage, which the slow recovery of Publius gave him, and to govern all things by his own single authority and will; yet being desirous also to gain, if it were possible, the approbation of his colleague, he communicated his intention to him. But Publius was fixed in different sentiments. For he had considered with himself, that when the troops had first been trained and exercised during the time of winter, they would be able to perform much greater service in the following season, than any that could now be expected from them. He was persuaded likewise, that the natural levity and perfidious disposition of the Gauls would soon lead them to revolt from their new allies, in case that the Carthaginians should be forced to remain long inactive. And in the last place, he was willing also to believe, that when his own recovery should be completed, he might himself be able to perform some service in the conduct of a general action. He pressed his colleague, therefore, with the greatest earnestness, that things might still continue in their present state. Tiberius clearly understood the wisdom of these sentiments. But being hurried headlong by ambition, confident of victory, and heated also with the vain and flatter-

ing expectations of being able to finish the war alone, before Publius should be in a condition to assist him, or the new consuls, the time of whose election now drew near, arrive from Rome, to take upon them the command, he resolved, in opposition to all sense and prudence, to risk a general battle. And as he thus made choice of his own time for action, instead of that which the condition of affairs required, his conduct in all that followed was by consequence absurd, and such as could not fail to disappoint him in the end that was proposed.

Annibal, on the other hand, having formed the same reflections in his mind, as Publius had made, with regard to all the present circumstances, was led to just the opposite determination, and resolved to engage the enemy without delay. He saw the advantages that would arise, from employing the Gauls in action, before their first ardour was abated. He judged it also to be a point of no small importance in his favour, that the Roman troops were all new-raised levies, not yet inured to war; and that Publius was disabled by his wound from appearing in the field. But his chief and strongest reason was, that he might not suffer any moment of his time to be wasted in inaction. For when a general has once brought his army into a foreign country, and engaged them in designs that are beyond measure great and difficult, he must very shortly meet his ruin, unless he is able from time to time to renew the confidence and hopes of his allies, by a continual succession of

exploits. Not doubting, therefore, but that the eager and impatient spirit of Tiberius would soon afford the opportunity that was desired, he now began to make the necessary preparations for a battle.

He had before this time carefully observed the ground that lay between the camps. It was a smooth and naked plain: but the banks of the river that ran through it, which were of considerable height, and covered also with close shrubs and bushes, suggested to him the design of placing an ambuscade to surprise the enemy. This stratagem was such, indeed, as might well be carried into execution, without any fear of a discovery. For though the Romans always were prepared to expect this kind of fraud in woods and covered places, because the Gauls were accustomed to hide themselves in these, they had never any apprehension of it in a flat and open country. And yet, in fact, it is both more safe and easy, to place an ambuscade in a plain, than in a wood. For as the troops are able to discern from their concealment every thing around them to a greater distance, so there are always to be found some little eminences that will cover them effectually from the observation of the enemy. Any inconsiderable river, whose banks rise only to a moderate height, and sometimes even flags and rushes, or any kind of bushes, will serve to hide not only a body of foot, but even cavalry. The only caution to be observed is, to place their arms, whose

brightness might betray them, upon the ground, and their helmets under them.

Annibal then, when he had first communicated his intentions to his brother Mago and the rest of the officers in council, who all applauded the design, ordered Mago to attend him at the hour of supper, and gave to him the command of a hundred foot, and as many horse, directing him to choose them, while it was yet day, from the bravest of the troops, and to bring them after supper, to his tent. Mago was at this time young, but full of martial ardour; and had been trained in war from his very infancy. When he appeared with his men before the general's tent, Annibal, having first exhorted them to be strenuous in their duty, commanded each man to select, from his own proper company, nine of the bravest soldiers; and that afterwards they should attend his orders, in a certain part of the camp. Thus the whole number now amounted to one thousand foot, and as many horse. As soon as they were all assembled, Annibal, having furnished them with proper guides, and instructed Mago in the time in which he should appear and charge the enemy, sent them away by night to the place of the ambuscade.

On the morrow, at break of day, he assembled the Numidian cavalry; who, of all the army, were best able to sustain fatigue and hardship. And having promised great rewards to all that should perform any signal service in the battle, he ordered

them to pass the river without delay; to approach the camp of the Romans; and endeavour, by skirmishing, to draw their army into motion. His intention was, to surprise the enemy, when they were wholly unprepared for an engagement; and before they had taken their first repast. He then called together all the officers, harangued them as the occasion required, and directed them to give orders, that the troops should take their usual meal, and prepare their arms and horses for the combat.

When Tiberius saw, that the Numidians were advancing towards the camp, he immediately sent against them all his cavalry; and after these, his light-armed foot, in number about six thousand men; and at last, drew out the legions likewise from both the camps. Confident in the number of his troops, and elated also by the advantage which his cavalry had gained the day before, he seemed to be persuaded, that, in order to obtain the victory, it would be sufficient only to appear before the enemy. It was now deep winter: the snow fell fast: the cold was uncommonly severe: and the Romans, both men and horses, had almost all left the camp, before they had taken any repast. The soldiers, however, began their march with the greatest ardour and alacrity. But when they came to pass the Trebia, whose stream was now so swelled, by the torrents that had descended in the night from the neighbouring hills, that the waters reached even to their breasts, it was not without the greatest pains and difficulty that

they gained the other side. As the day also was now far advanced, they began to faint through cold and hunger. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, had taken the usual meal at leisure in their tents; had prepared their horses for the combat; had all rubbed their limbs with oil, and put on their armour before a fire.

Annibal, who stood waiting till the Romans should have passed the river, no sooner saw that they had gained the other side, than he immediately sent away the Balearic slingers and the light-armed foot, in number about eight thousand, to support the Numidian cavalry; and himself then followed with all the army. At the distance of eight stadia from the camp, he ranged in one single line his infantry, which was composed of Spaniards, Africans, and Gauls, and amounted in the whole to about twenty thousand men. His cavalry, whose numbers with the Gauls included were above ten thousand, was placed, in two bodies, on the wings. And the elephants, divided also into equal numbers, were posted, at some distance, before either wing.

Tiberius, perceiving that his cavalry could gain no advantage against the Numidian horse, who, as their custom was, fled in one moment from the charge, and in the next, returned again with the same force and vigour as before, gave the signal for their retreat. His infantry was composed of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand of their allies; which is the just amount of that which they esteem a perfect army, in the case of

a general engagement, when both consuls are together in the field. He ranged them after the usual manner of the Romans; and having placed his cavalry, which were about four thousand, on the wings, he advanced with a slow and haughty pace towards the enemy.

The armies now approached each other, and the light-armed forces began the combat. But even in this first onset, the Romans manifestly laboured under many disadvantages, while every circumstance was favourable to the enemy. For the troops of the former that were now engaged, not only were exhausted by the cold and hunger which they had suffered ever since the morning, but had discharged the greatest part of their weapons also in their combat against the Numidian horse. And even those javelins, that were left, were now, from the continual rain that had fallen upon them, become unfit for any service. The cavalry also, and indeed all the army, were alike feeble and disheartened; while the Carthaginians, on the contrary, fresh and vigorous, and prepared for action, flew briskly to the charge, and maintained the fight in every part with courage and success.

As soon therefore as the light-armed troops had retired on either side through the intervals of their respective armies, and the heavy forces advanced to action, the Carthaginian cavalry, which was far superior to the Roman both in numbers and in strength, advancing together from the wings, pressed the enemy with so much violence, that they forced them instantly to retreat before them.

When the infantry was thus uncovered, the Numidians and the light-armed forces of the Carthaginians, returning back again from the rear, and passing beyond the front of their own army, fell suddenly upon both flanks of the Romans, and spread among them so great tumult and disorder, that they were no longer able to defend themselves against those that were attacking them in front. In the centre of the armies, the foremost ranks, on either side, remained for a long time firm; and maintained the fight with equal courage and success. But when Mago and his troops, now rising from their ambuscade, fell furiously upon the rear of those legions that were fighting in the centre, then were the Romans every way distressed, and the disorder such as could receive no remedy. Their two wings, pressed by the elephants in front, and charged in flank by the light-armed foot, were in a short time turned to flight, pursued, and pushed together in crowds into the river. In their centre also, the hindmost of the legions, unable to sustain the fury of those troops, that rose against them from the ambuscade, were in like manner broken and destroyed. The foremost ranks alone, urged by necessity to conquer, forced their way beyond the Gauls, and a part also of the Africans that opposed them; and, with great slaughter, opened for themselves a passage through the midst of the Carthaginian army. But when they saw, that both their wings were irrecoverably routed; and that the numbers of the Carthaginian cavalry, the river, and the

rains which now fell strong and heavily, all combined together, to render their own return back again to their camp impracticable; they formed themselves into close order, and continued their march with safety to Placentia. The number of them was about ten thousand. The rest were trampled down in heaps, upon the banks of the Trebia, under the feet of the horses and the elephants. A small part only that were able to escape, among whom were many of the routed cavalry, joined those legions which we have just now mentioned, and retreated with them to Placentia. The Carthaginians, when they had pursued the enemy as far as to the river, were then forced to yield to the rigour of the season, and return back again to their camp. Their victory afforded no small joy. For though many of the Gauls were slain in the action, the loss of the Africans and Spaniards was very inconsiderable. But the rains and snows, which had fallen continually during that whole day, were so severe and fatal, that, of all the elephants, one only was preserved alive: and great numbers also, both of men and horses, perished through the extremity of the cold.

Tiberius, after this misfortune, being willing, as far as he was able, to conceal the knowledge of it from the people in Rome, sent word only, that he had fought a battle, and that the badness of the season had robbed him of the victory. The Romans at first gave credit to this account. But not long afterwards, they were fully informed of all that

had happened in the action, with the consequences also that had followed their defeat: That the Carthaginians had gained possession of their camp, and drawn all the Gauls to embrace their party; that the Roman legions had abandoned their intrenchments after the battle, and fled for safety to the neighbouring cities; and that they were deprived of all supplies, except those that were sent to them from the sea, up the river Po. An event, so contrary to all their expectations, filled them with no small amazement. They immediately renewed their preparations for the war with greater vigour than before; and used their utmost diligence to secure those parts of their dominions that were most exposed; sending troops into Sicily and Sardinia, and placing a garrison in Tarentum, and in every other post that needed such defence. They also equipped a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. The consuls, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius, who were just now elected to their office, raised new levies among the allies; enrolled the Roman legions; and having collected stores from every quarter, sent one part to Ariminum, and the rest towards Tyrrhenia; the places into which they had resolved to lead their armies. They demanded succours also from king Hiero; who sent to their assistance five hundred Cretans, with a thousand heavy-armed foot. In a word, every effort was exerted, and every measure practised, which zeal and extreme diligence could suggest. For such is the disposition and temper of the Romans, as well in public affairs as also in their private conduct, that whenever they

have any real cause of fear, they are at that time themselves most greatly to be dreaded.

During this time Cnæus Cornelius, who was left by his brother with the fleet, as we before related, steered away from the mouth of the Rhone; and having landed his troops in Spain near Emporium, advanced along the coast, and reduced by force all the cities that refused to surrender to him, as far as to the Iberus. But those that voluntarily submitted were treated by him with the greatest gentleness, and protected from every kind of injury. Having secured his conquests by sufficient garrisons, and received among his troops a great number of the Spaniards that had come to join him, he continued his march from thence into the inland parts of the country, and in his way gained many towns, some by persuasion and some by force. When he arrived near Cissa, a body of Carthaginians, that were posted in that province under the command of Hanno, came and encamped before him, with design to stop his progress. But Cornelius, having immediately ranged his troops in battle, gave them an entire defeat, and gained an immense booty by his victory. For the army, that had marched with Annibal into Italy, had left all their baggage behind them in this place. He obtained the alliance also of all the people that lived on that side of the Iberus; and took prisoner the Carthaginian general, Hanno; together with Andobalis, who was a sovereign prince in that part of Spain, and had always strenuously supported the interests of the Carthaginians.

As soon as Asdrubal was informed of these transactions, he made haste to pass the Iberus with his army. And having received notice that the naval forces of the Romans, grown confident from the success which the legions had now gained by land, had relaxed their usual discipline, and neglected all precaution, he sent away a body of eight thousand foot, and a thousand horse; who, falling suddenly upon them, when they were dispersed on every side through all the country, killed great numbers of them, and forced the rest to fly precipitately to their ships. He then retired again, and repassed the Iberus; and having fixed his quarters for the winter in New Carthage, he employed all his care to secure the posts that were on that side of the river, and to complete all the necessary preparations for the war. Cornelius also, when he had first returned to the fleet, and punished, as the military laws required, all those whose negligence had been the cause of the late misfortune, sent away to Tarraco both the naval forces and the legions, to take their winter quarters together in that city. And having made an equal distribution also of the plunder among all the troops, he gained to himself the favour of the army, and inspired them with the warmest hopes. Such was the condition of affairs in Spain.

CHAP. VIII.

AS the spring now came on, the consul Flaminius with the forces that were under his command, directing his march through Tyrrhenia, passed beyond Arretium, and there encamped; while Servilius, on the other hand, advanced towards Ariminum, to oppose the entrance of the enemy on that side.

Annibal had fixed his winter quarters in the Cisalpine Gaul. During his continuance there, the Romans that had fallen into his hands were all confined in prisons, and scarcely received the food that was necessary for life. But their allies were treated by him with the greatest gentleness. After some time, having assembled these together, he told them, "that his intention was not to make war upon any of them; but, on the contrary, to engage in their defence against the Romans; that their interest, therefore, if they would judge with reason, must lead them to embrace his friendship; since the sole purpose of his coming was, in the first place, to restore to all the inhabitants of Italy their ancient freedom; and to assist likewise each particular state to recover again those towns and territories of which the Romans had deprived them." After this discourse he dismissed them all to their several countries, without demanding any ransom; imagining, that by this conduct he should

gain them to his party, and inspire their minds with an aversion to the Roman government; or that those especially might be excited to revolt, whose ports and cities had been taken from them by the Romans.

At the same time he practised also another artifice which was truly Carthaginian. Having reflected with himself, that his connexion with the Gauls was fresh and recent, and fearing, lest a people so noted for their fickleness and fraud, should on a sudden change their sentiments, and form designs against his life; he procured some artificial suits of hair, adapted to the looks of persons of every age, and different sorts of habits, that corresponded with them; and, varying his dress continually, he lay so well concealed under this disguise, that not those alone who had seen him only in a transient view, but even his intimate acquaintance could scarcely know him.

But the Gauls, not willing that the war should any longer be protracted in their country, began to grow importunate and clamorous, and demanded to be led against the enemy. This zeal, as they pretended, all arose from the resentment which they had conceived against the Romans. But the real motive was no other than the hope of plunder. Annibal, however, resolved to gratify their impatience, and to begin his march without delay. As soon, therefore, as the spring advanced, having inquired of those that were best acquainted with the country, he was informed, that all the common roads were not only of considerable length, but well

known also to the Romans; but that, if he would venture to conduct the army over certain marshes which would lead directly to Tyrrhenia, his march, though difficult indeed, would yet be short; and such also as must fully disappoint the expectation of the enemy. As the difficulty only served to flatter the disposition of this general, he resolved that he would take his route that way.

As soon as this design was known among the army, the soldiers were all seized with consternation; and formed in their minds the most dreadful image of the pits and pools into which they seemed ready to be plunged. But Annibal, being well assured that the bottom of the marshes was firm and solid, began his march; placing in van the Africans and Spaniards, with the most serviceable part of all his army; and mixing among them as much of the baggage only, as might serve for their supply in the present journey. For with regard to future use, he considered, that if they should prove victorious, and hold the open country against the enemy, their necessities would all be fully satisfied; and in case that they were conquered, that they would then be in want of nothing. After these marched the Gauls, and last of all the cavalry. The care of the rear was left by Annibal to his brother Mago; chiefly on account of the effeminacy of the Gauls, and their known impatience of toil and hardship. For the orders given to Mago were, that he should press them closely from behind, and as often as they appeared disheartened by the difficulties of the way, or showed any inclination to re-

turn, should fall upon them with his cavalry, and by force constrain them to advance.

The Africans and Spaniards pursued their way without any immoderate pain or difficulty. For besides that the ground was fresh and not yet broken, they were all men that were inured to toil, and by long use become familiar with such kind of hardship. But when the soil had been disturbed by the passage of the foremost troops, and trodden through to a considerable depth, the Gauls that followed were unable to advance a step, without extreme fatigue and labour; which were the heavier also, and more severely felt, because they had never been accustomed to such sufferings. Nor was it possible for them to return, while the cavalry still pressed upon them from behind, and forced them to advance. Indeed all the army suffered much; chiefly through want of sleep. For during four whole days, and three nights successively, they marched continually through water. But the Gauls were harassed beyond all the rest; and even quite exhausted by their miseries. The greater part of the beasts that were loaded with the baggage stuck fast in the mud, and perished there. But their mischance afforded some convenience to the troops, who threw themselves down in heaps together upon the bales that lay above the water; and thus, during some part of the night at least, obtained a little sleep. Many of the horses also left their hoofs behind them in this dreadful journey. Even Annibal himself, who was carried upon the only elephant that remained alive, was saved with the greatest

difficulty; having suffered, during all the march, great pains and anguish from a disorder that had settled in his eyes. And as the time afforded neither leisure nor convenience for a cure, he was at last deprived by it of the sight of one of them.

Having now gained, however, almost beyond all expectation, the end of this dangerous march, and hearing that Flaminius was still posted near Arretium, he at first encamped upon the edge of the marshes, that he might give some ease and refreshment to his troops; and, at the same time, employed all his pains in searching into the designs and disposition of the enemy, as well as the condition of the country that was before him. He was soon informed, that the country was rich and fertile, and such as would afford a noble booty: and that Flaminius was a man who was singularly formed by nature for gaining popular applause, and was immoderately ambitious of it; that he was filled with a high conceit of his own abilities, but in reality was destitute of all those talents that were requisite in the affairs of war and real service. Annibal therefore was persuaded, that if he could once advance beyond the camp of the Romans, and waste the country before their eyes, Flaminius, provoked beyond all patience, and dreading the reproaches of the multitude, would run with haste to revenge the insult; would pursue all the motions of the Carthaginian army; would flatter himself with the hope of finishing the war alone, before his colleague could arrive; and, in a word, that he would thus

afford to his enemies the opportunities that were desired, of attacking him with some advantage.

It is certain that these reflections were perfectly the result of wisdom and sound experience. For all men, even of moderate discernment, must acknowledge that nothing is more useful, or of greater importance, in the conduct of a general, than to examine with the nicest care into the character and natural disposition of the opposite commander. For as in engagements of single men, or of rank with rank, the several combatants carefully survey the bodies of their adversaries, in order to discern some part that may be open to their stroke; in the same manner also, it is necessary that a general in the field should endeavour to discover in the chief that is sent against him, not what parts of his body are most vulnerable, but whether there be any weakness in his mind and character, through which he may be attacked with some advantage. For among those that are placed at the head of armies, there are some who are so deeply immersed in sloth and indolence, that they lose all attention both to the safety of their country, and their own. Others are immoderately fond of wine; so that their senses are always disordered by it before they sleep. Others abandon themselves to the love of women; a passion so infatuating, that those whom it has once possessed will often sacrifice whole cities, and even their honour and their lives, to the indulgence of it. Some again are cowards; which is esteemed no slight disgrace, even among private men.

But in a general, this disposition is a public evil; and draws after it the most fatal consequences. For the troops under his command, not only waste the time without attempting any thing, but, by their confidence in such a leader, are frequently betrayed into the greatest dangers. On the other hand, a precipitate rashness, a violence that rejects the rule of reason, pride, and vanity, and self-conceit, are all qualities, not more pernicious to the friends of those who possess them, than advantageous to the enemy. For men of this character are always ready to be taken in every snare. Every bait is sure to catch, and every artifice to delude them.

If a general, therefore, could be informed of all the weakness of his enemy, and would so regulate his designs, as always to attack the opposite commander in the part in which he is most open to surprise, no power would long be able to withstand his efforts. For as a vessel that has lost its pilot, soon becomes an easy conquest, together with all the crew, so likewise in the field, if the chief can once be taken by his foible, and led artfully to the snare that is most proper to intrap him, both himself and all his army must, in a short time, fall together into the power of the enemy. This, therefore, was the address which Annibal now exerted against Flaminius; and the success was such as fully answered even his strongest hopes.

For no sooner had he decamped from the neighbourhood of Fæsula, and advancing beyond the Roman camp, began to plunder and lay waste the country, than Flaminius, who considered this pro-

ceeding as a designed contempt and insult, swelled with fury and resentment. And when the destruction began to spread, and the smoke was seen to ascend from every quarter, he no longer could restrain his passion, but gave vent to it in bitter exclamations. In vain his officers represented to him that it was by no means seasonable to pursue or engage the enemy; that the strength and numbers of their cavalry required that he should act with the greatest reserve and caution; and that on all accounts it would be far more prudent to wait the arrival of the other consul, and employ together the united forces of both armies. Flaminius was deaf to these remonstrances; and even offended with those that made them. "What," said he, "must be the sentiments of all our fellow-citizens at home, when they see the country wasted even to the very walls of Rome, while we still keep our post behind the enemy, and remain idle in our camp?" With these words he immediately began his march; disdaining to employ even the least care or foresight, with regard either to the time or place of action; and solicitous for nothing but to overtake the enemy; as if the victory had been already in his hands. And indeed so strong was the assurance with which he had inspired the multitude, that those who followed the army for the sake of booty, exceeded even the troops in number, and carried with them chains and fetters, and other implements of the same kind, in very great quantity.

In the mean while Annibal still advanced towards Rome, through Tyrrhenia; having on his

left Cortona and the neighbouring mountains, and the lake of Thrasymene upon his right; burning and destroying every thing in his way, that he might the more provoke the impatience and resentment of the enemy. But when he saw that Flaminius now drew near, and that the ground before him was very proper also for his design, he made all things ready for a battle.

In the road through which the armies were to pass, there was a level valley, enclosed on either side by a chain of lofty mountains. At the farthest end of it stood a hill that was rough and difficult of approach. Near the entrance was a lake; and between the lake and the foot of the mountains, a very narrow pass, which led into the valley. Annibal, entering along this defile, marched through the valley; and having gained the hill that was at the farthest end, he posted himself upon it with the Africans and Spaniards. He then ordered the Baleares and the light-armed troops, who had marched in the van of all the army, to take a circuit round, and range themselves along the back of the mountains that stood upon the right hand of the valley. The Gauls and cavalry were disposed in like manner, behind those that were on the opposite side. And these latter were extended to so great a length, that the farthest troops reached even to the narrow pass that was between the foot of the mountains and the lake, and which gave entrance into the valley. He posted some troops also in ambuscade, in different places through the valley; and having completed his whole disposition in the

night, he then lay quiet, and expected the approach of the enemy.

Flaminius was following fast behind, being impatient to overtake the Carthaginians. Arriving late in the evening upon the lake, he encamped there for the night, and early on the following day began his march into the valley. It happened that the morning was unusually dark and misty. When the greatest part of the Roman army had now entered along the valley, and the foremost troops had almost reached the hill upon which Annibal was posted, this general then gave the signal to engage; sent notice to the troops that were in ambuscade, and fell with fury upon the Romans from every side. The suddenness of the attack, the darkness in which all objects were concealed from view, the vigour and rapidity of the enemy, who came pouring down in many parts at once from the hills above them, struck Flaminius and his officers with extreme amazement, and made even all defence impracticable. For so far were they from being able to give the necessary orders, that they neither knew nor comprehended any thing that passed. In the same single instant they were charged at once in front, in flank, and in the rear. The greatest part, therefore, of the troops were destroyed in heaps, in the very order in which they marched; deprived even of the power of resisting; and betrayed as it were to death by the folly of their general. For while they yet stood deliberating on the measures that were fit to be pursued, they fell beneath the strokes of their adversaries, without any notice or

warning of their fate. In the midst of this disorder, Flaminius himself, vexed and tortured with despair and rage, was surrounded by certain Gauls, who put an end to his life. Fifteen thousand Romans were destroyed in this valley, without being able either to fight or to escape; for they esteemed it the most sacred of all their institutions, on no account to fly, or ever to desert their ranks in battle. The rest, that were enclosed in the narrow pass between the mountains and the lake, lost their lives in a manner that was still more wretched and deplorable. Hurried by despair, and pushed along in crowds before the enemy, they hoped to find their safety in the lake. But some, attempting to swim across it with their armour, were soon sunk and drowned. The rest and greatest part, having waded forwards till they were able to advance no farther, stood with their heads only above the water; and when the cavalry followed closely after them, and their destruction seemed inevitable, they raised their hands, and with every suppliant voice and gesture begged for mercy; but all their prayers were vain, and disregarded. One part were slaughtered by the enemy; and the rest, having urged each other to the attempt, with their own hands deprived themselves of life. About six thousand only of all the army, who had marched the first along the valley, gave an entire defeat to the body that attacked their front. If these troops had returned again, and endeavoured to surround the Carthaginians, a relief so seasonable might have changed perhaps the whole fortune of the battle;

but being ignorant of all that was transacted, they still continued to advance, expecting to be met by some new party, till at last they had gained insensibly the summit of the hills. From thence, as the mist was now dispersed, they saw the entire ruin of their army, and that the Carthaginians were completely masters of the field. Perceiving, therefore, that it was quite impracticable to send any assistance to their routed forces, or in any manner to renew the fight, they formed themselves into close order, and retreated to a certain village in Tyrrhenia. But when the battle was ended, Maharbal, having received orders from the general to pursue them with the Spaniards and the light-armed troops, invested them closely in the place. The Romans, being thus beset with various difficulties, and seeing no way left to escape, consented to deliver up their arms, and yield themselves prisoners, on condition only that they should be dismissed with safety.

Such were the circumstances of the battle in Tyrrhenia, between the Carthaginians and the Romans. As soon as the prisoners were conducted to the camp, Annibal, having ordered them to be brought before him, as well those that had surrendered to Maharbal as the rest also that were taken in the action, whose numbers amounted altogether to more than fifteen thousand men, told the former that Maharbal had no power to give any promise of safety without his authority and consent. He then began to accuse and reproach the Romans; and at last commanded, that they should be all distributed among the ranks of his army, and be

guarded carefully. But he dismissed the allies to their respective cities, without demanding any ransom; having first repeated to them the same discourse which he before had made: "that his intention was not to make war upon the people of Italy, but, on the contrary, to restore them to their liberty, of which they had been deprived by the Romans." He then gave the necessary orders for the refreshment of the troops, and paid the last honours to the chief among his officers that had fallen in the battle. These were about thirty in number, and in the whole engagement he had lost no more than fifteen hundred men; the greater part of whom were Gauls. He afterwards deliberated with his brother and the rest of his friends, concerning the measures that were next to be pursued. His past successes had already filled him with the strongest confidence, and flattered him with the hope of every thing that was great and prosperous, with regard to the final issue of the war.

CHAP. IX.

WHEN the news of this defeat arrived at Rome, as the misfortune was much too great to be either softened or suppressed, the magistrates were forced to call together an assembly of the people, and to acquaint them with the whole transaction. But scarcely had the prætor from the rostra spoken

these few words, "We have been defeated in a great battle," than such was the consternation which immediately ensued, that those among the hearers, who had been present in the action, were in a manner forced to be persuaded, that the calamity was far more dreadful than it had appeared to be even in the time of the engagement. For it was now so long a time since the Romans had either suffered a defeat, or heard any mention of a battle lost, that even the sound itself was new, and full of horror; nor could they hear their loss so publicly avowed, without deploring the misfortune with a grief that was beyond all bounds. But the senate still retained their firmness; and, as their post required, deliberated with great attention on the measures that were necessary to be taken, and in what manner they might best avert the consequences of this fatal accident.

About the time of the late engagement, Servilius, the other consul, who was posted near Ariminum, which stands towards the Adriatic sea, upon the confines which divide Gaul from the rest of Italy, at no great distance from the mouths of the Po, having heard that Annibal had entered Tyrrhenia, and encamped near Flaminius, at first resolved to march immediately with all his army to support his colleague. But because the legions were too heavy to perform the march with such expedition as was necessary, he sent away before four thousand of his cavalry, under the command of Caius Centenius; that they might be ready to assist the consul, in case that there should be occasion for it, before

himself was able to arrive. But Annibal, being informed of their approach, ordered Maharbal to advance against them with the light-armed troops, and a part also of the cavalry; who, falling upon them in their march, killed almost one half of the detachment in the very first onset. The rest fled in haste to a neighbouring hill, but were pursued and taken prisoners on the following day. The news of this misfortune arrived at Rome within three days only after the account of the former battle; while the city was still inflamed, and every mind strongly filled with the sense of their first calamity. And now, not the people only, but the senate themselves, were struck with consternation and amazement. The usual business of the year was all neglected; the magistrates were no longer chosen as before; every one turned his thoughts to find some remedy against the impending evils; and the result of their deliberations was, that in times so pressing, a dictator only could protect the state from the dangers which so nearly threatened it.

In the mean while Annibal, though he was now persuaded that the issue of the war would fully answer all his hopes, thought it not yet seasonable to advance nearer towards Rome; but continued his route through Umbria and Picenum, wasting the country without resistance, and after ten days arrived in the neighbourhood of Adria; having gained so immense a booty by the way, that the army could neither carry nor remove it. He had destroyed great numbers of people also in his

march. For so unalterable was his hatred of the Romans, and so deeply rooted in his mind, that he gave orders to his troops, that they should slay, without distinction, all those that were found of age to carry arms, in the same manner as when towns are taken by storm.

Having fixed his camp near Adria, in a country which produced all necessaries in the greatest plenty, he first employed his care, to provide such refreshment for the army, as might recover them from their present miserable state. For partly through the cold and nastiness, to which they had been exposed while they lay encamped in Gaul during the winter, and partly also from the fatigue which they had suffered in their march afterwards through the marshes, both the men and horses were now covered with a kind of leprous scurf; a disease, which is usually the consequence of famine and continued hardships. But these rich and fertile plains soon supplied both the opportunity and the means, of recovering the horses to their former vigour, and of restoring also the strength, and raising the spirits of the troops. He armed also his Africans after the Roman manner, from the spoils that had been taken: and now for the first time sent some messengers to Carthage, with an account of his success; for he had never before approached near the sea, from the time of his first entrance into Italy. The Carthaginians received the news with the greatest joy. They began to fix their whole atten-

tion upon the affairs of Spain and Italy: and resolved to employ every effort, to support the war with vigour in those countries.

The Romans named for dictator, Quintus Fabius: a man of noble birth, and great abilities: who gained, by his exploits, the surname of Maximus; which his descendants likewise have derived from him, and still enjoy. The office of dictator is different, both in dignity and power, from that of consul. Each of the consuls is attended only by twelve lictors; the dictator by twenty-four. The consuls are in many things restrained from acting, unless they have first obtained the approbation and concurrence of the senate. But the authority of the dictator is absolute and uncontrolled; and from the time of his appointment, except only that the tribunes still retain their office, all the magistracies in the state are instantly dissolved. But we shall treat more fully of these subjects in another place. At the same time also, Minucius was declared master of the horse. This officer is entirely subject to the dictator: but, in the absence of the latter, he succeeds as it were to his place, and becomes the delegate of all his power.

Annibal changed his camp from time to time, but continued still to move along the Adriatic coast. He ordered the horses to be bathed with old wine, which was found in great abundance in the country, and soon healed the ulcerous humours which had rendered them unfit for service. He recovered the soldiers also from their wounds; and

employed every care and remedy to restore to all the troops their full strength and vigour. When this was done, he began his march; passed through the districts of Adria and Pretetia; traversed all the country of the Marucinians and Frentanians; and from thence advanced into Apulia; plundering and destroying every thing in his way. Apulia is divided into three separate districts, the names of which are Daunia, Peucetia, and Messapia. Annibal, having entered the first of these, wasted the lands of Luceria, which was a Roman colony: and afterwards, having fixed his camp near Hipponium, in the territory of the Argyripians, he from thence spread his troops over all the country, and ravaged it without resistance.

About this time Fabius, when he had first offered sacrifice to the gods, set out from Rome, attended by Minucius, and carrying with him four legions that were newly raised. When he arrived upon the confines of Daunia, and had joined the army that had marched into that province from Ariminum, he dismissed Servilius from his command, and sent him well attended back to Rome; with orders, that if the Carthaginians should make any attempt upon the sea, he should be ready to observe their motions, and to act as occasion might require. He then advanced with all the forces, and encamped near a place called Æca, at the distance of about fifty stadia from the enemy.

As soon as Annibal was informed of their ap-

proach, he drew out all his army, and, in order to strike a terror into these new troops upon their first arrival, advanced near to the Roman camp, and stood for some time in order of battle. But when the Romans remained still close in their intrenchments, he returned back again to his camp. For Fabius was fixed in his determination, not to hazard any rash attempt, or on any account to try the fortune of a general battle: but, on the contrary, to employ his chief and only care, to secure his troops from danger. At first, indeed, this conduct drew upon him no small reproach and censure; while every one considered him as a man that was cold and cowardly, and who feared to engage the enemy. But after some short time, the wisdom of his sentiments was clearly proved by the event: and all men then were ready to acknowledge, that the measures, which he now pursued, were by far the best and most judicious that could be taken in the present circumstances. For the Carthaginian troops had all been exercised in one continued course of war, even from their earliest age. Their general also, from his infancy, was trained in camps, among those very troops which he now commanded. They had gained many signal victories in Spain; and had defeated the Romans and their allies, in two successive battles. But the point of greatest moment was, that they had no resource or hope in any thing but victory. On the part of the Romans, all circumstances were contrary to these: so that their defeat must have been inevitable, if they had now

risked a general battle. But Fabius wisely chose to have recourse to that one advantage, which belonged confessedly to the Romans; and to regulate the whole conduct of the war upon it. This advantage was, that they might still receive into their camp supplies both of men and stores; without any apprehension that the source from whence they were derived could ever be exhausted.

From this time, therefore, he attended closely to the motions of the Carthaginian army; following still at a moderate distance; and taking care to secure, before the enemy, all those posts which, from his acquaintance with the country, he knew to be most proper for his design. And as he still received supplies in the greatest plenty, he never sent his troops abroad to forage, or suffered them to straggle from the camp, but kept them always close together, and united in a body; attending carefully to every advantage, which time and place suggested; and by that means intercepted and destroyed many parties of the Carthaginian foragers, whom their contempt of the Romans frequently led away to too great a distance from their own intrenchments. Thus, while he diminished by degrees the numbers of the enemy, he at the same time exercised the strength of his own forces, and raised again their courage, which had been much depressed by the late defeats. But no persuasions could prevail upon him, to try the fortune of a general battle. This conduct was in all points very unpleasing to Minucius, who mix-

ed his sentiments with those of the discontented multitude; charging the dictator with sloth and cowardice; and proclaiming, on his own part, the utmost impatience to seek and engage the enemy.

The Carthaginians, when they had ravaged all the places that have now been mentioned, passed the Apennine, and came into the country of the Samnites: which, as it naturally was very rich and fertile, and had now for a long time flourished in continual peace, afforded every kind of necessaries in so great abundance, that not all the waste and consumption which they made were sufficient to exhaust it. They made incursions likewise upon the lands of Beneventum, a Roman colony, and took Telesia, a city that was strongly fortified with walls, and which yielded also a very great booty. The Romans still followed close behind, at the distance of one or two days' march, but never approached so near as to afford the opportunity of a battle.

When Annibal perceived, that Fabius thus persisted to decline a general action, and yet refused to leave the field, he formed a very bold and hardy project, and resolved to throw himself at once with all his army into the plains of Capua, near the place that was called Falernus: being persuaded, either that the Romans must then be forced to venture on a battle; or that all mankind would see that he was confessedly the master of the open country; and that the neighbouring towns would from thence be struck with terror,

and hasten to embrace his party. For though the Romans had been now defeated in two successive battles, not one single city had revolted from them, to join the Carthaginians. But all remained unshaken in their duty; though many of them, on that account, had been exposed to the severest sufferings. Such was the dignity of the Roman republic, and so great the awe and veneration in which it was held by the allies.

It must be acknowledged, that this design was very wise and reasonable. For the plains of Capua are distinguished, not only by their natural beauty and fertility, above the rest of Italy, but by their happy situation also near the sea, which fills their markets with the commerce of almost every part of the habitable world. Their cities, likewise, are more celebrated for their beauty, than any that are besides in Italy. Along the coast stand Sinuessa, Cumæ, Dicæarchia, Neapolis, and Nuceria: in the inland parts, towards the north, Calenum and Teanum; to the south and east, Daunium and Nola; and near the middle of the country, Capua, the noblest and most splendid of them all. In a word, so delicious are these plains, that the mythologists may seem, perhaps, to be not altogether removed from truth, in that which they relate concerning them. For these are called also the Phlegræan fields; as well as some other parts of the earth, that are distinguished by their beauty and fertility: and even the gods themselves are reported to have contended together in former times for the sovereignty and possession of

them. But, besides these great advantages, this country also is by nature very strongly fortified, and difficult of all access. For as one part of it is bounded by the sea, the rest stands covered by a chain of lofty mountains, which admit no entrance, except only by the way of three very narrow passes; of which one lies towards the country of the Samnites, another along mount Eribanus, and the third on the side of the Hirpinians. The Carthaginians, therefore, by encamping in the very middle of these plains, were going as it were to stand upon a public and conspicuous theatre; from whence they were sure to astonish all mankind by the uncommon boldness of the attempt, and, if the Romans should still decline a battle, to make it manifest, that they had driven them from the stage, and remained without dispute the masters of the open country.

With this design, Annibal, leaving now the territory of the Samnites, entered Campania by the pass of mount Eribanus: and having continued his march as far as to the river Athurnus, which flows through the middle of the plains, and divides them into two nearly equal parts, he encamped on that side of it which was nearest towards Rome; and from thence sent out his foragers, and wasted all the country without resistance. A design so bold and hazardous filled the dictator with surprise; but, at the same time, fixed him still more strongly in his first determination. But Minucius, and the rest of the Roman officers, being all now persuaded, that the enemy were at last ensnared in a

place in which they might be attacked with great advantage, advised, that no moment should be lost; that they should hasten to pursue the Carthaginians; should offer battle to them in these plains; and save the noblest part of Italy from ruin. Fabius, therefore, was forced to yield to their impatience; and, covering his real sentiments, began his march with the greatest haste, as if he had concurred with them in the same design. But when he arrived in the neighbourhood of Falernus, he only showed his army upon the bottom of the hills, marching still on one side of the enemy as they advanced, that he might not be thought by the allies to have entirely left the field, but refused to descend into the plain, or risk the fortune of a general engagement; as well from the other reasons that have before been mentioned, as most especially, because the Carthaginians were far superior to him in their cavalry.

But Annibal, having now wasted all the country, and in vain endeavoured to draw the Romans to a battle, was again preparing to decamp, that he might be able to remove the booty, before it was consumed, into some place of safety, and there fix his quarters for the winter. For his intention was, that the troops not only should enjoy a present plenty, but be supplied continually with all kinds of necessaries in great abundance, for the time to come. When Fabius perceived, that the Carthaginians designed to take their route back again, by the same way along which they had entered, and that the narrowness and difficulty of the road af-

forded the most favourable opportunity to fall upon them in their retreat, he sent away a body of four thousand men, with orders that they should possess themselves of the defiles through which the enemy were to pass; should attend, with the greatest care, to the proper time of action, and lose none of those advantages which their situation could scarcely fail to throw into their power: while himself at the same time took his post, with the greatest part of all the army, upon a neighbouring hill, which commanded the defiles.

The Carthaginians, continuing their march forwards, came and encamped at the very foot of the hills. The Romans were persuaded, that they should with ease recover all the booty, and even began to hope, that, with the advantage of the place, they might perhaps be able to give a full determination to the war. In this confidence, the dictator was now employing all his thoughts and care, in examining into the nature of the several posts, and in making such a disposition as was requisite, with regard both to the time and manner of the attack. The necessary measures were all fully regulated, and were to have been carried into execution on the following day.

But Annibal, having conjectured from all circumstances, what it was that the Romans, upon this occasion, would most probably attempt, contrived to defeat all their projects, and gave them neither time nor opportunity, to accomplish any part of that which had been thus concerted. Having assembled together all the pioneers and labour-

ers of the army, who were under the command of Asdrubal, he ordered them to provide as much dry wood, and other combustible matter, as they were able to procure; to bind it together in bundles fit for torches; and to choose out of all the plunder two thousand of the strongest oxen, and conduct them to a little distance without the camp. At the same time, he showed to them a certain hill, which stood between the camp and those defiles through which he was to pass; and instructed them, that, as soon as they should have received his orders, they should drive the oxen up the sides of the hill with great speed and force, till they had gained the top. He then dismissed them, that they might all take their supper, and afterwards a little sleep. But about three hours after midnight, having called them again together, he ordered them to bind the torches to the horns of the oxen, to set them on fire, and drive the beasts by violence before them towards the summit of the hill. The light-armed troops were posted also behind the pioneers, to assist at first in driving the oxen forwards. But as soon as the beasts should be engaged in a proper course of running, they were then commanded to spread themselves upon the right and left on both sides of them; to push their way with speed, and with loud shouts and noise; to possess themselves of all the eminences; and be prepared to attack the enemy, if any of them should be found upon the summit of the hill. At the same time Annibal himself, with all his army advanced towards the

passes, having in his van the heavy infantry, the cavalry, followed by the booty, in the centre, and the Gauls and Spaniards in his rear.

As soon as the Romans, who were posted in the entrance of the defiles, saw the light of the torches, imagining that Annibal was taking his route that way, they left immediately their first station, and hastened to ascend the hill. But when they approached the oxen, the sight of those strange fires filled them with doubt and consternation, and raised dreadful apprehensions in their minds, of some danger far more terrible than the truth. The light-armed troops, as they met together upon the summit of the hill, were engaged in some slight skirmishing; but the oxen falling in among them, soon separated the combatants, and forced them to remain quiet in their place; expecting with impatience the appearance of the day, that they might then be able to discern the real state of things around them. The dictator, likewise, being in part surprised by what had happened, and suspecting that it covered some deceit, and partly also because he still persisted in his first determination, not rashly to engage in a general battle, remained quiet in his intrenchments, and waited for the day. In the mean while Annibal, perceiving that all things favoured his design, and that the Romans, who were appointed to guard the passes, had left their post, conducted his army through them, together with the booty, without any loss. And when day appeared, observing that his light-armed forces were exposed to some

danger from the Romans that had gained the summit of the hill, he sent a body of Spaniards to their assistance; who engaged the enemy, killed about a thousand of them, and descended again in safety with the rest of the troops.

The Carthaginian general, having thus happily led his army back again from the plains of Capua, encamped without fear of any insult, and had now no other care, than to consider, in what place he should fix his quarters for the winter. This retreat spread a very great and general consternation through all the towns of Italy. The dictator also was loaded with the severest censure and reproach, as if nothing, but the basest cowardice, could have suffered the enemy to escape, when he had such advantages in his hand against them. But Fabius still remained unshaken in his purpose. Being forced, within some days' afterwards, to return to Rome, in order to assist in celebrating certain sacrifices, he delivered up the army to Minucius: and, at the same time, pressed him with the greatest earnestness, to be much less solicitous to gain any advantage against the enemy, than to cover his own troops from danger. But Minucius was so far from paying even the least attention to these entreaties, that, on the contrary, while the dictator was still speaking, his mind was wholly fixed on the design of fighting. Such was the state of the war in Italy.

CHAP. X.

ABOUT the same time Asdrubal, who governed the affairs of Spain, having ordered the thirty vessels that were left with him by his brother, to be refitted during the winter, and added to them ten more also completely furnished and equipped, as soon as the spring came on, ordered all the fleet, which consisted now of forty ships, to sail from New Carthage under the conduct of Amilcar, and to steer their course along the coast; while himself, having drawn the forces from their winter-quarters, began his march, keeping his route likewise close along the shore, that thus both armies might meet, and act together, near the Iberus. Cnæus, having conjectured, without great difficulty, that this was the intention of the Carthaginians, at first resolved to begin his march by land, and to offer battle to their army. But when he had afterwards received a more exact account of the number of their troops, and the preparations which they had made, he desisted from that design: and having equipped a fleet of thirty-five ships, and filled them with a body of select forces from the legions, he sailed from Tarraco, and arriving on the second day near the mouth of the Iberus, cast anchor at the distance of eighty stadia from the enemy, and sent away two light frigates, that belonged to the Massilians, to make

discoveries. For this people were at all times ready to meet every difficulty, and to throw themselves the foremost into danger. And as their zeal, and generous attachment to the interests of the Romans, have often been shown in later times, so were they most especially conspicuous in the great services which they performed, during the course of the present war. As soon as these vessels were returned, with an account that the Carthaginian fleet was stationed near the mouth of the river, Cnæus immediately sailed away in haste, hoping to fall upon them by surprise, before they could receive any notice of his approach. But Asdrubal had long before sent his scouts abroad; and being now informed, that the enemy were advancing fast towards him, he ranged his army in battle upon the shore, and ordered all the naval forces to get immediately on board: and when the Romans appeared in sight, he sailed out to meet them, and raised the signal to engage. But the Carthaginians, though they began the fight with vigour, sustained it but for a short time only. For the troops, that stood in view along the shore, were so far from animating them to any higher degree of alacrity and confidence, that, on the contrary, they only served to check their courage, and restrain their efforts, by affording the prospect of an easy and secure retreat. As soon, therefore, as two of their ships were taken, with their men, and four more disabled, their oars being broken and their soldiers killed, the rest all fled with great precipitation; and having forced their vessels close

into land, saved themselves among the troops that stood upon the shore. The Romans pursued boldly after them, to the very shore. And having bound fast behind the stern of their own vessels as many of the Carthaginian ships as could be set in motion, which were twenty-five in number, they sailed back again in triumph, and with no small joy: having thus in the very first onset gained a victory, which rendered them the entire masters of the sea, and by that means wholly changed the face of affairs in Spain.

As soon as the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, they immediately equipped another fleet of seventy ships. For they judged it to be a point of the last importance, with regard to the prosecution of the war, that they should still preserve their sovereignty upon the sea. This fleet, having first steered their course towards Sardinia, sailed from thence to Pisæ; in the hope, that they should there join Annibal, and be able to act in concert with him. But being informed that the Romans had sent against them a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes, they returned back again to Sardinia, and from thence to Carthage. Servilius for some time followed after them with the Roman fleet: but when he found, that they had gained a very great distance from him, he desisted from the pursuit, and anchored in the port of Lilybæum. From thence having steered his course towards Cercina, which stands upon the coast of Afric, he forced the inhabitants to pay a sum of money, to save their country from being

plundered. In his return, he made himself master also of the island Cossyrus; and having placed a garrison in the little town that was in it, he then sailed back again to Lilybæum, laid up the fleet in harbour, and returned not long afterwards to the army.

When the news arrived at Rome, of the victory that had been gained by Cnæus against the Carthaginians, the senate began now to think, that it not only was expedient, but absolutely necessary, that they from this time should attend more closely to the affairs of Spain, and support the war in that country, with greater application and vigour than before. They resolved, therefore, that Publius Scipio, to whom this province was at first allotted, should sail away immediately with twenty ships to join his brother Cnæus, and to act in concert with him. For they were under no small apprehensions, that the Carthaginians, in case that they could once obtain the conquest of this country, with all the wealth that might be drawn in great abundance from it, would in a short time become superior also upon the sea, and from thence be enabled more strongly to support the war in Italy, and to furnish Annibal from time to time with continual supplies both of men and stores. In order to avoid this danger, which indeed demanded their most serious care, they now sent Publius into Spain. This general, even upon his first arrival, pursued such measures, as greatly advanced the interests, and enlarged the power of the republic. For before this time, the Romans

never had attempted to extend their views beyond the Iberus, but were fully satisfied with having gained the alliance of the people that lived on this side of it. But Publius now passed the river, and resolved to maintain the war on the other side. An accident at the same time happened, which greatly favoured this design. The Romans, when they had passed the Iberus without any resistance from the neighbouring people, who were struck with terror at their approach, encamped near a temple that was consecrated to Venus, at the distance of about forty stadia from Saguntum; in a post in which they not only were secure against all danger from the enemy, but were able also to receive supplies continually from their fleet; which, as the army advanced, had still sailed along the coast. In this place the adventure happened to them which I am going to relate.

At the time when Annibal was preparing to march into Italy, he had taken hostages from all the towns in Spain, of whose fidelity he had any doubt, and ordered them to be kept together at Saguntum; both because this city was a place of strength, and because the government also of it was left by him in the hands of men in whom he had an entire and perfect confidence. The hostages were all of them the children of the most distinguished families, in the several cities from whence they had been sent. There was a certain Spaniard, whose name was Abilyx; of high rank and character in his country, and one who had always seemed to be attached more strongly even than any of his nation

to all the interests of the Carthaginians. This man, having carefully weighed all circumstances, and judging that the Romans had now the fairest prospect of success, formed the design of betraying his faith to his allies, and delivering up these hostages to the enemy; a project truly worthy of a Spaniard and barbarian. But he had persuaded himself that this declaration of his zeal in favour of the Romans could not fail to raise him to a very high degree of credit and esteem among them; especially when joined to a service of so great importance, and rendered in so critical a season.

He went, therefore, to Bostar, the Carthaginian general, who had been sent by Asdrubal to oppose the passage of the Romans over the Iberus, but not daring to risk a battle, had retired and fixed his camp near Saguntum, on the side towards the sea. He was a man of a mild and harmless disposition; easy and tractable in his nature, and not forward to suspect any ill designs. Abilyx, beginning his discourse with the subject of the hostages, represented to him, "that as the Romans had now passed the river, the Carthaginians no longer would be able by the means of terror to keep the Spaniards under due restraint; that the times required, that they rather should employ their pains to win the affections of the people, and fix them in their interest by favour; that as Saguntum might, perhaps, in a short time fall into the power of the Romans, who were now encamped before it, if Bostar, seizing the occasion, would send back the hostages to their parents and respective cities, he would not only disappoint

the expectations of the enemy, who were earnestly solicitous to become masters of them, for this very purpose; but by his wise and timely care, in thus providing for the safety of these young men, would secure also the affections of the Spaniards to the Carthaginians; that if he would trust to him the conduct of this business, he would take care abundantly to magnify the merit of the kindness; and, as he led the hostages to the several cities, would raise, not only in the parents, but in all the people of the country likewise, the warmest sentiments of esteem and favour, by painting in the strongest colours the generosity of this proceeding. In the last place he reminded him, that himself might also expect to be rewarded in the amplest manner; and that every parent, when he had thus, beyond all hope, recovered what was dearest to him, would strive to exceed the rest in his acknowledgements, and load with favours the commander to whose power he was indebted for so great a happiness." By these, and many other arguments of the same kind, he prevailed on Bostar to approve of all that was proposed. And having fixed the day on which he was to be in readiness, with some attendants, to receive the hostages, he then retired.

As soon as night was come, he went privately to the Roman camp, joined some Spaniards that were at that time in the army, and was carried by them to the generals. And having, in a long discourse, represented to them the great alacrity and zeal with which the Spaniards would all concur to promote the interest of the Romans, if through their means

the hostages should be restored, he at last engaged to deliver the young men into their hands. Publius received this offer with the greatest eagerness and joy, and dismissed him with the assurance of immense rewards; having first appointed the time and place in which he would himself attend his coming. Abilyx then returned again to Bostar with some friends whom he had chosen for the occasion, received the hostages, and leaving Saguntum in the night, on pretence of concealing his motions from the enemy, passed beyond the Roman camp, and delivered them to the generals at the appointed place. He was received by Publius with all possible marks of honour; and was charged with the care of conducting back the hostages to their respective cities. Some Romans also, that were most proper for the trust, were ordered to attend him. In every place through which they passed, the dismission of these young men was highly magnified by Abilyx, as a signal instance of the clemency and generous spirit of the Romans. On the other hand, he displayed in the strongest colour the jealous diffidence of the Carthaginians, and the severity with which they had always treated their allies. He urged his own example likewise, as an encouragement to them to revolt. By these persuasions many of the Spaniards were led to embrace the friendship of the Romans. With regard to Bostar he was thought to have acted with such weakness, as was by no means to be excused in a person of his age; and was afterwards involved, on that account, in very great misfortunes. The Romans,

on the contrary, derived many advantages from this accident, in the prosecution of the war. But as the time for action was already past, both armies now retired to their quarters for the winter. In this state we shall here leave the affairs of Spain, and return again to Italy.

CHAP. XI.

ANNIBAL, being informed by those whom he had sent to view the country, that the lands round Luceria and Gerunium afforded great quantities of corn, and that the last of these two cities was a commodious place for laying up his stores, resolved to fix his quarters for the winter there. Passing, therefore, beyond the mountain called Liburnus, he led his army to Gerunium, which was distant from Luceria about two hundred stadia. On his first approach, he endeavoured by gentle means to draw the citizens to his party; and even offered such engagements as might secure to them the full performance of his promises. But when this proposal was rejected, he laid siege to the place; and, having in a short time made himself master of it, ordered all the inhabitants to be destroyed. But he reserved the walls, together with the greater part of the houses, still entire; designing to convert them into granaries for the winter. He then or-

dered the army to encamp before the town, and threw up an intrenchment round his camp. From this post he sent away two parts of all the forces, to gather in the corn; with orders, that each soldier should be obliged to bring a stated measure of it every day, to the officers of his own company that were appointed to receive it. The remaining third part of the troops were left to guard the camp; or disposed, as occasion required, in proper posts to support the foragers. As the country was plain and open, the number of the foragers almost infinite, and the season likewise proper for the work, vast quantities of corn were collected every day.

The Roman general, Marcus, to whom Fabius had left the army when he returned to Rome, for some time shifted his post from hill to hill, attending to the motions of the Carthaginians, and flattering himself with the hope that he should at last find some occasion to fall upon them with advantage from those eminencies. But when he heard that they were masters of Gerunium, had fortified their camp before the town, and were employed in gathering stores from all the country, he immediately left the mountains, and descending along the promontory that gave entrance to the plain, encamped near the foot of a hill that was called Callene, in the district of Larinum; and resolved, without more delay, to bring the enemy to a battle. When Annibal was informed that the Romans were so near, he sent one third part only of his troops to gather in the corn; and advancing with the rest towards the enemy, fixed his camp upon a hill, at a

distance of about sixteen stadia from Gerunium, that he might restrain in some degree the ardour of the Romans, and be able also to support his foragers as occasion should require; and when night came on he ordered likewise a detachment of two thousand light-armed forces, to march and possess themselves of another neighbouring hill, which stood between the camps, and commanded that of the Romans. But as soon as day appeared, Minucius drew out also all his light-armed troops, and sent them to dislodge the Carthaginians from their post. The dispute was sharp and obstinate; but the Romans, having at last prevailed, remained masters of the hill, and came soon afterwards, with all their army, and encamped upon it.

As the distance between the two camps was now so inconsiderable, Annibal at first kept together in a body the greatest part of all the army. But after some days he was forced to send abroad his detachments, as before, to lead the cattle to their pasture, and to gather in the corn; having resolved, agreeably to his first design, not only to preserve entire the stores which he had already gained, but to draw together also as large a quantity of corn as he might yet be able to procure; that thus the troops, the beasts of burthen, and especially the horses, might be supplied with all provisions in the greatest plenty during the time of winter. For his chief and strongest hopes were founded on the cavalry. When Minucius saw that the greater part of the Carthaginian army was busied in this work, and dispersed on every side through all the country,

he chose the time that was most proper for his purpose, and leading out all his forces, approached close to the intrenchments of the enemy with the legionary troops, drawn up in order of battle; and, at the same time, sent away, in separate divisions, his cavalry and the light-armed forces to fall upon the foragers; with orders, that they should take none alive. Annibal was in no small degree embarrassed by this sudden accident. For as the forces that remained with him in the camp were too few to be drawn out in battle against the legions, so neither, on the other hand, was he able to send any assistance to the rest that were dispersed about the country. Great numbers, therefore, of the foragers were destroyed by the detachments that were sent against them; while the rest of the Roman forces, that were ranged in order of battle, arrived at last at such a height of insult, that they even began to tear away the pallisade of the intrenchments, and almost besieged the Carthaginians in their camp. Annibal, though thus reduced to a condition that seemed indeed to be next to desperate, struggled with all his force against the storm; drove back the enemy as they advanced, and kept possession of his camp, though not without the greatest difficulty. But after some time, when Asdrubal was come to his assistance, with four thousand of the foragers who had fled together to the camp before Gerunium, he then resumed his courage, marched out of his intrenchments, and, having ranged his forces in order of battle at a little distance from the camp, at last repelled the ruin that

so nearly threatened him. The Romans returned back again to their camp, elate with their success, and filled with the strongest hopes for the time to come. For many of the Carthaginians had fallen before the intrenchments; and a much greater number of those that were spread through the country, were destroyed by the parties that were sent against them. On the following day, Minucius went and took possession of the camp which the Carthaginians now had quitted. For Annibal, as soon as the fight was ended, had resolved to return again to his first camp before Gerunium; being apprehensive that if the Romans should march thither in the night, and finding the camp deserted, should take possession of it, they would by that mean become masters of his baggage and all his stores. After this action the Carthaginians used great precaution when they went away to forage; while the Romans, on the contrary, were bold and confident, and exposed themselves to danger without any caution or reserve.

When the news of this success arrived at Rome, and was enlarged in the relation far beyond the bounds of truth, the people all were filled with the greatest joy. For first, as the despair into which they had lately fallen, with respect to the final issue of the war, seemed now to have given place to better hopes; so the terror likewise that had hitherto been spread among the legions, and the inaction in which they had still remained, were judged clearly to have sprung, not from any want of courage in the troops, but from the cold and cau-

tious disposition of the general. From this time, therefore, Fabius was openly reproached by all; as a man who, through timidity, had suffered even the fairest occasions to escape him; while Minucius, on the other hand, was raised so high in the opinion of the citizens by this exploit, that a resolution was taken in his favour, of which there was no example. For they declared him dictator likewise; being persuaded that the war would thus be brought to a quick decision. Thus there were at one time two dictators, intrusted jointly with the conduct of a single war; a thing never known before among the Romans.

As soon as Minucius was informed of the high applause and favour which his conduct had gained for him among the citizens, and of the dignity to which the people now had raised him, he became much more eager and impetuous than before; and resolved to attempt every thing against the enemy. But Fabius was not to be moved by any of these accidents; but, on the contrary, persisted even with greater firmness in his first determination. When he returned, therefore, to the army, and saw that Minucius was elated beyond all bounds; that he haughtily opposed him in every sentiment, and was urging him perpetually to venture on a battle; he offered to his choice, that he should either take in turn the single and supreme command of all the army, or remove with one half of the troops to a separate camp, and there pursue such measures as he should judge convenient. Minucius eagerly embraced the last proposal. The forces, therefore,

were divided into two equal bodies; and encamped apart, having the distance of about twelve stadia between their camps.

When Annibal was informed, as well by this division of the forces, as from the prisoners also that were taken, that some contention had been raised between the generals; and that it solely sprung from the ungovernable heat and ambition of Minucius; he was so far from apprehending, that this accident would in any manner prove pernicious to his interests, that, on the contrary, he conceived the hope of being able to draw great advantage from it. He resolved, therefore, from this time to observe, with the greatest care, the motions of Minucius; to meet and restrain his ardour; and to prevent him in all his efforts. Between this camp and that of Marcus, there stood an eminence, from whence those, that should first gain possession of it, might be able greatly to distress the enemy. Annibal resolved to seize this post: and not doubting but that the Romans, confident from their late success, would hasten to dislodge him from it, he employed the following stratagem. The country that was round the hill was a flat and naked plain: but the ground in many parts was broken and unequal, and abounded with various kinds of pits. He sent away, therefore, in the night, a body of five hundred horse, and about five thousand foot; which were distributed in small divisions, of two and three hundred each, among the several cavities in which they best might lie concealed. And that they

might not be discovered in the morning by the Roman foragers, he ordered his light-armed troops to take possession of the eminence before break of day. Minucius, perceiving what had happened, applauded his good fortune, and immediately sent away the light-armed troops, with orders that they should charge the Carthaginians with the greatest vigour, and exert all their efforts to drive them from their post. In a short time afterwards, he commanded the cavalry also to advance; and himself then followed with the legions. His disposition was the same as in the former battle. It was now clear day. But as the Romans directed their eyes, and whole attention, towards the combatants upon the hill, the Carthaginian troops, that were placed in ambuscade, remained secure and unsuspected. Annibal sent fresh troops continually to the hill: and himself, in a short time, followed with the cavalry, and all the army. The cavalry on both sides were soon engaged. But as the Carthaginians were far superior in their numbers, the light-armed forces of the Romans, being also pressed in this first conflict, fled back precipitately towards their own legions, and threw them into great disorder. In this moment the signal was given by Annibal to the troops that were in ambuscade, who appeared on every side, and vigorously charged the Romans. And now not the light-armed forces only, but the whole army was in danger of being irrecoverably lost. But Fabius, having from his camp observed the progress of the action, and perceiving that a general and

entire defeat must soon ensue, drew out all his forces, and advanced in haste to the assistance of his colleague. The Romans, though their ranks all were broken, now resumed their courage; and as these troops approached, formed themselves again in order, and retired towards them for protection. But many of their light-armed forces had fallen in the action; and a much greater number of the legionaries and bravest soldiers. Annibal, not daring to renew the fight, against troops that were fresh, and disposed in perfect order, desisted from the pursuit, and returned back again to his camp.

The Romans, being thus rescued from destruction, were at last fully sensible, that the rashness of Minucius had engaged them in such measures as proved almost fatal to them; and that they owed their safety, not at this time only, but on former occasions likewise, to the cautious management of Fabius. The people also at Rome were now forced to acknowledge, that a wise and steady conduct, regulated by sound skill and judgement in the art of war, is far to be preferred to all those rash and impetuous sallies, which result from mere personal bravery, and a vain desire of popular applause. From this time therefore, the troops, made wise by their misfortunes, encamped once more together, and resolved to leave to Fabius the whole conduct of the war, and punctually to receive and execute his orders. The Carthaginians drew a line between the eminence and their camp; and having thrown up an intrenchment also round

the top of the hill, and posted some troops upon it, they had now leisure to complete, in full security, the preparations that were necessary for the winter.

CHAP. XII.

WHEN the time was come, in which the Romans usually elected their chief magistrates, the people chose for consuls, Lucius Æmilius and Caius Terentius; and the dictators resigned their office. Æmilius, having ordered the former consuls, Cn. Servilius, and M. Regulus, who had succeeded to that dignity after the death of Flaminius, to take upon them the entire command of the army in the field, in quality of his lieutenants, remained still at Rome, to deliberate with the senate on the measures that were fit to be pursued, and to raise new levies. And when he had enrolled the numbers that were necessary to complete the legions, he sent them to the army; with an express order to Servilius, that he should by no means venture on a general action; but should from time to time engage the Carthaginians in such sharp and frequent skirmishes, as might serve to exercise the strength and raise the courage of his troops, and by degrees prepare them for a decisive battle. For it was now judged to have been the

chief and only cause of all the losses which hitherto the Romans had sustained, that their battles had been fought by new-raised levies, undisciplined, and without experience. At the same time also the prætor L. Posthumius was sent with a legion into Gaul, to make a diversion there, and force the Gauls that were with Annibal to return and defend their country. The fleet, that had remained during the winter in the port of Lilybæum, was brought back to Rome. The generals that were in Spain were supplied with every kind of stores. And in a word, whatever preparations were judged necessary for the war, were all completed with the greatest diligence and care.

Servilius punctually observed the orders of the consul, and engaged only in some slight and separate skirmishes, which we shall not now particularly describe. For though many of these little combats were very sharp as well as frequent, and were conducted by the Roman generals with great skill and courage, yet both by reason of these orders, and from the circumstances also of the times, no action happened that was of great importance, or in any manner general or decisive.

In these camps, opposite, and in sight of each other, both armies thus remained, during the whole winter and the following spring. But when the time of harvest drew near, Annibal, having left his camp before Gerunium, went and possessed himself of the citadel of Cannæ; hoping, that by this mean, he should at last be able to force the enemy to a battle. For the Romans had brought

together to this place all the corn and other stores, which they had collected in the district of Canusium: and from hence their army constantly was supplied with necessaries. The town had been destroyed some time before. But as the citadel remained, and fell now into the hands of the Carthaginians with all the stores, the Romans were thrown at once into the greatest difficulties. For they not only were deprived of their supplies; but such also was the situation of this post, that it commanded all the neighbouring country. The generals, therefore, sent messenger after messenger to Rome, desiring earnestly to be informed, in what manner they should act in this conjuncture; since it was now no longer possible to decline a battle, in case that they should approach any nearer to the enemy. For the country was all wasted and consumed; and the allies were fixed in expectation, and waited with impatience for the event. The opinion of the senate was, that they should venture on a battle. But they advised Servilius to delay it yet for some time longer, and gave orders that the consuls should leave the city and hasten to the camp. For all men now had turned their eyes towards Æmilius; who, as well by reason of the constant probity of his life and manners, as on account also of the great services which his country had received, some time before, from his brave and skilful management of the war against the Illyrians, was judged most capable to satisfy their fullest expectations, in this dangerous and critical conjuncture. It was order-

ed likewise, that the army should consist of eight legions, a thing never known before in any of their wars, and that each legion should contain five thousand men, besides the allies. For the constant custom of the Romans, as we have already mentioned, was to raise four legions only, and to allow to each four thousand foot and two hundred horse. In case that they were pressed by any great and unusual danger, they then increased the number to five thousand foot and three hundred horse. The infantry of the allies was the same in number with that of the legions: but their cavalry three times as many. Of these forces, one half of the allies and two legions were allotted separately to each consul; who was then sent to prosecute the war apart, in his own proper province. Thus their battles had been always fought by a single consul, with two legions only, and an equal proportion of the allies. For it had very rarely happened, that all the forces were employed together in any single expedition. But now, their apprehensions were so great, that they resolved to send, not four, but eight legions, at once, into the field. They represented also to Æmilius, in the strongest terms, the happy consequences that must attend a victory, and, on the other hand, the ruin that could scarcely fail to follow his defeat; and exhorted him to choose his time for action with such skill and judgement, as might give at once a final issue to the war, in a manner worthy of his own great character, and of the dignity of the Roman name.

As soon as the consuls arrived in the camp, they called the troops together; informed them of the resolutions of the senate; and employed all the exhortations that were suited to the present circumstances. Æmilius chiefly, who was himself very deeply affected with the distresses of his country, addressed the soldiers in the most earnest and pathetic manner. He explained to them the causes of the late defeats; and endeavoured to dissipate the fears, which the remembrance of them had impressed upon the minds of all the army. He told them, that it was easy to assign, not one, but many causes of the ill success, that had attended them in all their former combats; but that, at this time, nothing but the want of resolution could deprive them of the victory. That hitherto they had never been engaged with both consuls together at their head. That the soldiers likewise were all new-raised levies; unused to the sight of danger, and unpractised in the art of war: and, which was still a circumstance of greater moment, that they were so far from being acquainted with the condition of the forces that opposed them, that, on the contrary, they were hurried to the fight before they had even so much as seen the enemy. For the troops that were defeated near the river Trebia, arrived one day from Sicily, and early on the next were drawn out in battle. And those that fell afterwards in the sight of Thrasymene, had not only never seen their enemies before the combat, but were prevented also, by the mist, from seeing them even in the time of the en-

gagement. "But now, Romans," continued he, "you see that all things bear a different face. You have now both consuls together at your head; ready to divide all danger with you. And even the consuls also of the former year, have consented to remain, and to bear their part in the approaching battle. You are now acquainted with the numbers of the enemy; the manner in which their troops are armed; and their disposition in the field. And during the course of two whole years, scarce a single day has passed, in which you have not tried your strength against them. Since, therefore, every circumstance is so different from those that were found in all your past engagements, the event must be also different. For how improbable, or rather how impossible a thing must it be thought, that troops, which have returned so often with success from little combats against equal forces, should now fail, with more than double numbers, to obtain the victory in a general battle? Since then, Romans, all things afford such strong assurances of success, nothing now is wanting, but that yourselves in earnest resolve to conquer. But this surely is a point on which there is no need that I should much enlarge. If I were speaking indeed to mercenary soldiers, or to an army of allies, engaged in the defence of some neighbouring state, this kind of exhortation might perhaps be necessary. For the worst that can befall such troops, is the danger to which they are exposed during the time of action: since they have scarcely any thing, either to ap-

prehend, or hope, from the issue of it. But with you, who are prepared to fight, not for the defence of others, but for the safety of yourselves, your country, wives, and children, the consequences of the battle will be of far greater moment than all the dangers that are now before you. Reflect but for a moment only on those consequences; and such reflection, if I judge aright, will fully supply the place of the most pathetic exhortations. For who is there among you, that is not fixed already in his choice, to conquer if it be possible; and if not, to die, rather than behold the things that are dearest to him exposed to insult and destruction? Turn your views forward therefore to the event; and consider, on the one hand, the advantages, and on the other, the dreadful ruin that may possibly ensue. Remember, Romans, that the battle is not to decide upon the fortune of these legions only, but on that of the whole republic. For in case that you are now defeated, Rome can no longer stand against the enemy. Her whole strength and spirit, the fruits of all her pains, and the grounds of all her hopes, are now bound together and collected in your single army. Let your efforts then be such, as may fully answer all her expectations. Show yourselves the grateful children of your country: and make it manifest to all mankind, that the losses which the Romans have hitherto sustained, are by no means to be ascribed to any superior force or courage in their enemies; but to the circumstances only of the times, and the want of ex-

perience in the troops that were engaged." After this harangue, Æmilius dismissed the assembly.

On the following day the consuls began their march, and advanced towards the enemy; and on the second day they encamped at the distance of about fifty stadia only from the Carthaginians. But, as the country was all plain and open, and the enemy superior in their cavalry, Æmilius was persuaded that it would be still more prudent to decline a battle till they had drawn the Carthaginians to some other ground, in which the infantry might bear the chief part in the engagement. But Varro, ignorant and unskilled in war, was fixed in different sentiments; and from hence arose ill humour and dissension between the generals; a thing the most pernicious that can happen in an army. The Roman custom was, that when both consuls were together in the field, they should command alternately, day by day. On the next day, therefore, when Varro commanded in his turn, he ordered the army to decamp; and, unmoved by all the entreaties of his colleague, resolved to approach yet nearer to the enemy. Annibal, informed of his design, advanced to meet him with his cavalry and the light-armed forces; and, falling suddenly upon the Romans as they marched, threw them into great disorder. But the consul, having placed some of the heavy troops in front, to sustain the fury of the first attack, led afterwards to the charge his cavalry and light-armed foot; and inserted among them also some cohorts of the legions. This precaution turned the victory entirely to his side

against the enemy, who were destitute of the like support. But the night, which now came on, forced the combatants on both sides to retire; when the issue of the action had proved in all points contrary to that which the Carthaginians had expected from it.

On the following day Æmilius, who still was earnest to decline a battle, but saw that it was now impossible to retreat with safety, encamped with two-thirds of all the forces along the Aufidus; the only river that flows through the Apennine. For this chain of mountains separates all the other streams of Italy; of which one part are discharged into the Adriatic, and the rest into the Tyrrhenian sea. But the Aufidus takes its sources on the side of the Tyrrhenian sea, passes through the Apennine, and falls at last into the Adriatic Gulf. The remaining third part of the army were ordered by Æmilius to pass the river, to advance up the stream, and there to lie intrenched, at the distance of about ten stadia from his own camp, and not much farther from that of the enemy. His intention was to employ these forces, as well to cover and support his own foragers, as to harass those of the Carthaginians.

But Annibal, perceiving that all things tended fast towards a general battle, thought it necessary that he should first endeavour to raise again the courage of his army, which seemed to have been in some degree depressed by the loss which they had sustained in the late engagement. He, therefore, assembled all the troops together; and having commanded them to cast their eyes upon the country round, "Tell me, soldiers," said he, "if

the gods had left it to your choice, could you have formed any greater wish, superior as you are in cavalry to the enemy, than to contend with them upon such a ground for a victory that must decide the war? The army all cried out, and the thing indeed was manifest, that they could not have desired any greater advantage. "Pay your thanks then," continued he, "in the first place to the gods who have secured the victory in your hands, by leading your enemies into such a country; and afterwards to me, your general, who have forced them to the necessity of fighting. For how great soever our advantages are against them, they have now no means left to decline a battle. For your part, there is surely little need that I should now exhort you to perform your duty with bravery and spirit. Before you had ever tried your strength against the Romans, such discourses might perhaps be seasonable; and in that persuasion I endeavoured frequently to raise and animate your hopes, not by exhortation only, but by examples likewise. But now, since you have gained against them the most perfect victory in three successive battles, what words can I employ to excite any greater confidence than that which the remembrance of your own actions must inspire? By your former combats you gained possession of the open country; for such was the assurance which I had given you, and the event confirmed my promise. But now I offer to your hopes the towns and cities of your enemies, with all the treasures that they contain. Be victorious only in this single battle, and all Italy will

be ready to receive your laws. Your labours and your toils will then all be ended. The wealth and power of the Romans will become your own, and render you the undisputed sovereigns of the world. Let us hasten then to action; and, with the assistance of the gods, I will again make good my promise to you." This harangue was received by all the army with the loudest acclamations. Annibal, having applauded their good disposition, dismissed the assembly; and went soon afterwards and encamped very near to the enemy, on that side of the river upon which the greater camp of the Romans lay.

On the following day he gave orders that the troops should take the necessary refreshment and repose, and make all things ready for the combat. And on the third day he drew out all his forces, and ranged them in order of battle in sight of the enemy, along the bank of the river. But Æmilius, sensible of the disadvantage of the ground, and knowing also that the want of provisions would soon force the Carthaginians to decamp, resolved not to move from his intrenchments; and made only such a disposition of his forces, as was necessary to secure both camps from insult. Annibal, therefore, when he had for some time kept the field, led the rest of his army back again to their intrenchments, but sent away the Numidian horse to fall upon the Romans of the little camp, who were employed in fetching water from the river. The boldness of these troops, who advanced even close to the intrenchments, raised Varro's indignation beyond all

bounds. The soldiers also showed the greatest eagerness and impatience to engage; and could scarcely bear that the battle should any longer be deferred. For when men are once firmly fixed in their determination to force their way through the greatest dangers to the end which they have in view, every moment of delay is a burthen that can hardly be supported.

When it was known at Rome that the armies were encamped in sight, and that frequent skirmishes happened every day between them, the whole city was filled with agitation and concern. For the people were still so much dejected by the remembrance of the former losses, that they seemed now to apprehend the worst that could befall them, and to anticipate in their minds all the fatal consequences of an entire defeat. The oracles of their sacred books were repeated in every mouth. Every temple, and every house, was filled with prodigies and portents; which gave occasion to innumerable vows, and prayers, and supplicatory sacrifices. For in times of danger or distress, the Romans take unwearied pains to appease the wrath of gods and men; and think nothing sordid or dishonourable that is employed in that design.

On the following day, when the command had fallen in turn to Varro, this general put all the troops in motion by break of day. He ordered those of the greater camp to pass the river; and, as they gained the other side, drew them up in order of battle; joining also to them, in the same line, the troops of the little camp. Their faces were all

turned towards the south. He placed the Roman cavalry on the right wing, close upon the river; and next to these the infantry, extended in one single line. But the cohorts were drawn up behind each other in much closer order than was usual among the Romans; and their files so doubled as to give to the whole line a greater depth. The cavalry of the allies closed the line upon the left. And at some distance, in the front of all the army, stood the light-armed troops. The whole number of the forces, with the allies included, were eighty thousand foot, and somewhat more than six thousand horse.

At the same time Annibal, having first sent over the Balearic slingers and the light-armed troops, to take their post in front, passed the river in two places with the rest of the army, and ranged them in order of battle. The Spanish and Gallic horse were posted on the left, close upon the bank of the river, and opposite to the Roman cavalry. Next to these, upon the same line, he placed first one half of the heavy-armed Africans; then the Gauls and Spaniards; after these, the rest of the Africans; and closed his whole line upon the right with the Numidian cavalry. When he had thus ranged all his forces in one single line, he advanced towards the enemy, being followed only by the Gauls and Spaniards of the centre. Thus he detached these troops from the line in which they had stood together with the rest; and, as he advanced, he formed them also into the figure of a crescent; at the same time spreading wide their ranks, and leaving to this

figure but a very inconsiderable depth. His intention was, to begin the action with the Gauls and Spaniards, and to support it afterwards by the Africans. The Africans were armed after the Roman manner, from the spoils that had been taken in the former battles. The Gauls and Spaniards wore the same kind of buckler; but their swords were different. For those of the latter were formed as well to push with as to strike; whereas the Gauls could only use their swords to make a falling stroke, and at a certain distance. These troops were ranged together in alternate cohorts; and as the Gauls were naked, and the Spaniards all clothed with vests of linen bordered with purple, after the fashion of their country, their appearance was both strange and terrible. The Carthaginian cavalry amounted in the whole to about ten thousand; and the number of their infantry was somewhat more than forty thousand, with the Gauls included. The right of the Roman army was conducted by Æmilius, the left by Varro, and the centre by Regulus and Servilius, the consuls of the former year. On the side of the Carthaginians, Asdrubal had the care of the left, Hanno of the right, and Annibal himself, with his brother Mago, commanded in the centre. Both armies were alike secure from being incommoded by the rising sun; for the one was turned towards the south, as we have already mentioned, and the other towards the north.

The action was begun by the light-armed troops that were posted before the armies. In this first conflict the success was on both sides equal. But

when the Spanish and Gallic cavalry, advancing from the left wing of the Carthaginians, approached near the Romans, the contest that ensued between them was then indeed most warm and vehement; and such as resembled rather the combats of barbarians than a battle fought by disciplined and experienced troops; for, instead of falling back, and returning again often to the charge, as the custom was in such engagements, they were now scarcely joined when, leaping from their horses, each man seized his enemy. But after some time the victory turned wholly to the side of the Carthaginians. The greater part of the Romans were destroyed in the place, after a most brave and obstinate contention; and the rest, being closely followed as they fled along the river, were all slaughtered likewise, without being able to obtain any mercy.

About the time when this combat was decided, the light-armed troops on both sides retired back again to their respective armies, and the heavy infantry advanced to action. The Gauls and Spaniards stood for some time firm against the enemy; but being at last forced to yield to the weight of the Roman legions, they retreated backwards, and thus opened the figure of the crescent in which they had been formed. The Romans followed with alacrity and eagerness; and without much difficulty forced their way through the ranks of the enemy, which were loose and thin; whereas themselves, on the contrary, had drawn away many cohorts from the wings to strengthen their centre, in which, at this time, all the stress of the battle lay. For the

action was not begun by the whole line at once, but singly by the centre; because the Gauls and Spaniards, as they formed themselves into the figure of a crescent, had advanced far beyond the wings of their own army, and offered only the convex of the crescent to the enemy. The Romans, therefore, still pushing forwards through the middle of these ranks, which still gave way before them, were at last so far advanced within the centre that they saw on either side the heavy-armed Africans stand ready to enclose them. Nor did these troops long neglect the occasion, which of itself most clearly pointed out the measures that were now proper to be taken. For turning suddenly, the one part of them from the right to the left, and the other from the left to the right, they fell with fury upon both flanks of the Romans. And thus the event happened which Annibal chiefly had in view. For this general had foreseen that the Romans, in pursuing the Gauls and Spaniards, must at last inevitably be enclosed between the Africans. By this means they were now forced to break the phalanx, and to defend themselves, either singly or in separate parties, against the enemies that were attacking them in flank.

Æmilius, who at first was posted on the right, and had escaped from the general slaughter of the Roman cavalry, perceiving that the fortune of the battle was now to be decided by the infantry alone, and being earnestly solicitous that his actions should, in no respect, fall short of those assurances which he had given when he harangued the army, drove

his horse into the very middle of the combatants; killing and dispersing every thing in his way, and employing all his efforts to animate the soldiers that were near him. Annibal did the same on his part, for he had remained still in the centre from the beginning of the engagement.

The Numidians of the right wing had charged the cavalry of the allies upon the left; and though, by reason of their peculiar way of fighting, no great loss was sustained on either side, yet as they still, from time to time, returned again to the attack, they by that means held those troops so constantly employed that they had no leisure to assist the rest. But when the cavalry of the left, that was led by Asdrubal, and which now had finished the destruction of almost all the Roman cavalry that fled along the river, came round and joined the Numidians, the cavalry of the allies were at once seized with terror, and, not waiting to receive the charge, immediately turned their backs and fled. Upon this occasion Asdrubal bethought himself of an expedient which indeed denoted his great prudence, and his skill in war. Observing that the Numidians were considerable in their numbers, and knowing also that these troops were then most terrible whenever they were engaged against a flying enemy, he ordered them to pursue those that fled; and, at the same time, led his own cavalry to the assistance of the African infantry. He fell upon the Roman legions in their rear; and, having divided his cavalry into little troops, sent them into the midst of the action, in many different parts at once.

By this wise measure he gave new strength and courage to the Africans; while the Romans, on the contrary, began to lose all hope. It was at this time that Æmilius fell, oppressed with wounds; and that life which had on all occasions been devoted to the service of his country, was now lost in its defence. The Romans, though surrounded thus on every side, turned their faces to the enemy, and resisted yet for some time longer. But as the troops on the outside fell, their body by degrees was more and more diminished; till at last they were pressed together within a very narrow space, and were there all destroyed. Among them fell Regulus and Servilius, the consuls of the former year; both eminent for their virtue, and whose behaviour in the action was such as showed them to be worthy of the name of Romans.

During the time of all this slaughter the Numidians, pursuing the cavalry of the left, who fled before them, killed the greatest part, and threw many from their horses. A small number only escaped safe to Venusia; among whom was Varro, that base and worthless consul whose government proved so pernicious to his country.

Such was the battle of Cannæ; in which both sides long contended for the victory with the greatest bravery. Of this the action itself affords the clearest proof. For of six thousand horse, which was the whole cavalry of the Roman army, seventy only fled with Varro to Venusia; and three hundred more of the allies escaped to different cities. Of the infantry, ten thousand men indeed were taken

prisoners; but these had no part in the action. And about three thousand also found means to escape to some of the cities that were near. But the rest, to the amount of seventy thousand men, all died with honour in the field of battle.

The Carthaginians upon this occasion, as in all the former battles, were indebted chiefly for their victory to the numbers of their cavalry. And from hence succeeding ages may be able clearly to perceive that, in time of war, it is far more advantageous to have a great superiority of cavalry, with no more than half the infantry, than an army that is in all parts equal to the enemy. On the side of Annibal were slain four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Africans and Spaniards, with about two hundred horse.

The Romans that were taken prisoners had no part in the action, as we have just now mentioned. For Æmilius had left behind him in the camp ten thousand of the infantry; having considered with himself, that if the Carthaginians should draw out all their forces to the battle, these troops might fall upon their camp during the time of the engagement, and make themselves masters of the baggage; and, on the other hand, if Annibal, in apprehension of this danger, should send a detachment from his army to guard the camp, that the numbers of the enemy would then be lessened in the field. They were taken prisoners in the following manner. As soon as the action was begun, they advanced to force the intrenchments; which Annibal, however, had left strongly guarded. The Carthaginians

stood for some time firm, and repelled the efforts of the enemy; but were at last so pressed that they were scarcely able any longer to maintain their post. But when the battle was now in every part completely ended, Annibal, having brought some troops to their assistance, drove back the Romans, and invested them in their own camp. Two thousand of them were killed, and the rest made prisoners. About two hundred also of the routed cavalry, who had saved themselves in some of the fortresses of the country, were invested by the Numidians in the posts into which they had retired, and were brought away prisoners to the camp.

The immediate consequences of this victory were such as both sides had expected from it. The Carthaginians became at once the masters of the whole sea coast, and of that part of Italy which was called Great Greece. The Tarentines surrendered without delay. The Argyripians, with some of the cities also of Campania, sent offers of submission. And, in a word, all the neighbouring people began now to turn their eyes towards the Carthaginians; who, on their part, were persuaded that they should take even Rome itself upon their first approach. The Romans, on the other hand, not only renounced all hopes of being able any longer to retain the sovereignty of Italy, but were filled also with the greatest apprehensions with regard even to the safety of themselves and their own proper country; expecting that the Carthaginians instantly would arrive to finish their destruction. And as if fate itself

had taken unusual pains to fill up the measure of their misfortunes, and had joined with their enemies against them, it happened that not many days after this defeat, while the consternation still was fresh, the news came to Rome that the prætor that was sent into Gaul, had fallen into an ambuscade, and was destroyed with all his army.

In the midst, however, of these calamities, the senate had recourse to every measure that was practicable in order to preserve their country. They harangued the people, and raised their drooping courage; they provided all things that were necessary for the security of the city; and pursued their deliberations with the greatest firmness, as it appeared indeed not long afterwards in the event. For though the Romans were now plainly conquered and depressed, and forced to yield to their enemies the whole honour of the war; yet, through the prudence of their counsels, and the inherent excellence of their government, they not only drove the Carthaginians out of Italy, and again recovered the sovereignty of that country, but, within a short time afterwards, reduced beneath their yoke even the whole habitable world. Upon this account, having now finished the relation of all that passed in Italy and Spain during the hundred-fortieth Olympiad, as soon as I shall have gone through the affairs of Greece that were transacted likewise within the course of the same period, I shall then treat expressly of the form and constitution of the Roman republic. For as the subject is itself by no

means foreign to the nature or design of history, so I am persuaded also that those especially who are employed in the affairs of government, will find in it many things that may be highly useful, both in establishing and reforming states.

END OF VOL. I.

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
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